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Case No. 890202-CA 
Priority #2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The defendant, GILBERTO GONZALES, was arrested on August 4, 
1988, and charged with Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol, a 
class B misdemeanor. See §41-6-44, Utah Code Ann. (1988). On 
August 17, 1988, the case (Justice Court No. 2-1984-98A) was filed 
by the Salt Lake County Attorney in the Second Precinct Justice 
Court for Salt Lake County. On October 18, 1988, a hearing was held 
in that court on the defendant's Motion to Instruct the jury on 
"defense of justification." See §76-2-401, Utah Code Ann. (1978). 
Both parties subsequently submitted memoranda on the Motion. The 
Honorable Phyllis J. Scott, presiding Justice of the Peace, denied 
the defendant's Motion to Instruct. 
Based on advice of counsel and the Justice Court's denial 
of the defendant's pretrial Motion, Mr. Gonzales entered a 
"conditional" plea of "no contest" to the charge on April 25, 1989. 
See, e.g., State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935, 938 (Utah App. 1988) 
(Conditional plea of "no contest" was sensible and sound way to 
preserve suppression issue for appeal after denial of Motion in 
District Court). The defendant, through counsel, stated in court at 
that time that the purpose of the "no contest" plea was to appeal 
the justice court's denial of the defendant's Motion to Instruct. 
No trial was held in the justice court. W.C. Gwynn, Deputy County 
Attorney, agreed to the conditional plea in court at that time. 
A Notice of Appeal was filed in the justice court on April 
28, 1989. The case was transferred to the Third Circuit Court (Cir. 
Ct. No. 892004016TC), Murray City Department. The defendant timely 
filed a written Motion to Instruct the jury on defense of 
justification with a supporting memorandum in the circuit court. 
Maurice D. Jones, presiding judge, refused to rule on the Motion 
prior to trial. 
On July 14, 1989, the first and only trial in this case was 
held in the circuit court. After the State and defense had rested, 
Judge Jones denied the defendant's Motion to Instruct the jury on 
defense of justification. Judge Jones ruled that there was an 
insufficient factual basis to support the instruction. 
The jury returned a verdict of guilty to the charge of 
Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol. Judge Jones sentenced the 
defendant that day to: (1) 60 days in jail, with 57 suspended upon 
completion of probation, and three suspended for 24 hours of 
community service; (2) $480 fine to be paid within 60 days; (3) 
$120 fine surcharge to be paid within 60 days; (4) $100 victim 
restitution fund assessment to be paid within 60 days; (5) $50 
alcohol rehabilitation fee to be paid within 60 days; (6) $150 
attorney fee to be paid within 60 days; and (7) six months 
probation supervised by the Alcohol Counseling and Education Center. 
On July 31, 1989, the defendant filed a Notice of Appeal 
(Ct. App. No. 890202CA). On August 11, 1989, the defendant filed a 
Motion to Amend the sentence in the Circuit Court. Judge Jones 
refused to rule on the Motion for lack of jurisdiction. 
The defendant applied to the circuit court for a 
Certificate of Probable Cause to stay the sentence pending appeal. 
Judge Jones declined to schedule a hearing or issue on Order. There 
are no written findings of fact nor conclusions of law in this 
matter and the basis of the circuit court's action is unclear. The 
defendant then applied to the Court of Appeals for a Certificate of 
Probable Cause which was issued by the Court on November 20, 1989. 
See Addendum A. 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT AND ARGUMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court pursuant to 
§78-2a-3(2)(d), Utah Code Ann. (1989), whereby a defendant in a 
criminal case may take an appeal to the Court of Appeals from a 
final judgment in a circuit court. 
ARGUMENT 
JURISDICTION IS NOT DENIED UNDER 
§77-35-26(13)(a), UTAH CODE ANN. (1989), 
PURSUANT TO THE RULING IN CITY OF MONTICELLO 
V. CHRISTENSEN, 769 P.2d 853 (Utah App. 1989) . 
POINT A 
MONTICELLO DOES NOT APPLY TO THE FACTS OF THIS CASE 
In City of Monticello v. Christensen, 769 P.2d 853 (Utah 
App. 1989), defendant Christensen was convicted of driving without a 
valid Utah license after a trial in the justice court. He appealed, 
and was again convicted of the charge after a trial de novo in the 
circuit court. In the case at bar, however, Mr. Gonzales never had 
a trial in the justice court. He entered a conditional plea of "no 
contest" because his pretrial Motion to Instruct was denied. Thus, 
Mr. Gonzales, unlike Christensen, has not fully realized his right 
to appeal via trial de novo because the only issue reconsidered in 
the circuit court was the pretrial Motion. See Utah Const, art. 
VIII, §5 (1989); see also §§78-4-7.5 (1989) and 78-5-14 (1987). 
Dismissal of his case by the Court of Appeals would deny Mr. 
Gonzales his right to appeal. See Utah Const, art. I, §12. 
The rationale of Monticello is that under §77-35-26(13)(a) 
"an appeal from the justice court affords defendant a trial 'anew1 
in the circuit court . . .n 769 P.2d at 854. This rationale does 
not apply to the facts in the case at bar. For this reason 
Monticello is distinguishable and should not deny the Court of 
Appeals jurisdiction to review the case at bar. 
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POINT B 
SECTION 77-35-26(13)(a) IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS 
APPLIED TO THE FACTS OF THIS CASE• 
Justice courts and circuit courts in Utah have concurrent 
original jurisdiction over class B misdemeanors, including DUI 
charges filed under Article 5 of Chapter 6 of Title 41 of the Utah 
Code. Se£ §§78-4-5(1)(a)(1989), 78-4-5(1)(1987), and 78-5-4(1987), 
Utah Code Ann. Thus, the charge against Mr. Gonzales could have 
been filed originally in the Third Circuit Court rather than the 
Second Precinct Justice Court. Had the case been filed in circuit 
court, Mr. Gonzales would be entitled under Utah law to appeal 
judgments rendered there to the Court of Appeals. See Utah Const, 
art. I, §12, and §78-4-11, Utah Code Ann. (1987). Mr. Gonzales 
would be denied review by the Court of Appeals under 
§77-35-26(13)(a), Utah Code Ann. (1989), solely because the case was 
filed originally in a justice court. 
1. AS APPLIED, §77-35-26(13)(a) DENIES MR. GONZALES HIS 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO APPEAL. Article I, §12 of the Utah 
Constitution guarantees that "In criminal prosecutions the accused 
shall have . . . the right to appeal in all cases." On the facts of 
this case §77-35-26(13)(a) would deny Mr. Gonzales his right to 
appeal the judgments of the trial court, that is, the circuit court, 
because the only judgment from the justice court subjected to 
reconsideration in the circuit court was the pretrial Motion to 
Instruct the jury. 
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2. AS APPLIED, §77-35-26(13)(a) VIOLATES EQUAL 
PROTECTION OF LAWS. Article I, §24 of the Utah Constitution 
states: "All laws of a general nature shall have uniform 
operation." The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution prohibits any state from enacting laws that deny "any 
person within its jurisdiction equal protection of the law." 
Under Article I, §24 of the Utah Constitution, (1) laws 
must apply equally to all persons within a class, and (2) statutory 
classifications and the different treatment given the classes must 
be based on differences that have a reasonable tendency to further 
the objectives of the statute. Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 670 
(Utah 1984). In the case at bar, the relevant class is people 
charged with class B DUI under §41-6-44, Utah Code Ann. (1988). 
Members of the class are treated differently under §77-35-26(13)(a) 
depending on whether the charge is filed in justice court or circuit 
court. Under the facts of this case, Mr. Gonzales would be denied 
his right to appeal the judgments of the trial court because his 
case was filed originally in a justice court. Section 
77-35-26(13)(a) fails the Malan test because filing venue is 
arbitrary and within the unfettered discretion of the prosecuting 
agencies. Further, it is contrary to public policy by encouraging 
forum shopping by prosecutors. Assuming the objective of 
§77-35-26(13)(a) is judicial economy, the Rule again fails Malan as 
applied to this case because the State's interest in judicial 
economy is reduced since Mr. Gonzales never had a trial in the 
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justice court. 693 p.2d at 671. C_f., Monticello, 769 P.2d 853 
(Defendant convicted after trial in justice court and again after 
trial de novo in circuit court). 
Although there is no federal constitutional right to 
appeal, under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution an appeal "cannot be granted to some litigants and 
capriciously or arbitrarily denied to others without violating the 
Equal Protection Clause." Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 77, 31 L 
Ed. 2d 36 (1972). Under the facts of this case, justice court 
filing venue is arbitrary, and §77-35-26(13)(a) would effectively 
deny Mr. Gonzales an appeal from the judgments of the trial court, 
that is, the circuit court. This violates equal protection under 
the Federal Constitution because §77-35-26(13)(a) would not apply 
had this case been originally filed in the circuit court. 
3. AS APPLIED, §77-35-26(13)(a) VIOLATES DUE PROCESS OF 
LAW. Article I, §7 of the Utah Constitution guarantees that "no 
person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due 
process of law." Because §77-35-26(13)(a) would deny Mr. Gonzales 
his constitutional right to appeal, due process requires that the 
reasonableness of the statutory scheme outweigh the degree of 
intrusion upon Mr. Gonzales1 rights. Condemarin v. University 
Hospital, 107 Utah Adv. Rep. 5, 12 (Utah 1989). 
Due process of law is also guaranteed by the Fourteenth 
Amendment, §1, to the Federal Constitution. The United States 
Supreme Court has stated that due process requires "that the law 
shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and that the 
means selected shall have a reasonable and substantial relation to 
the objective sought to be attained." Pruneyard Shopping Center v. 
Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 85, 64 L.Ed. 2d 741, 754 (1980)(quoting Nebbia 
v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934)). 
Assuming that the objective of §77-35-26(13)(a) is judicial 
economy, the statute violates due process under state and federal 
standards because it arbitrarily denies Mr,, Gonzales the right to 
appeal his trial while others similarly charged are not so denied. 
There is no reasonable basis in the statutory scheme for this 
result; rather, it is within the unfettered discretion of the 
prosecutors based on where they decide to file the charge. Further, 
the degree of intrusion upon Mr. Gonzales1 rights is substantial 
because he would be denied his right to appeal the judgments and 
orders of the trial court, while the State's interest in judicial 
economy is reduced since he never had a trial in the justice court. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court of Appeals should not dismiss Mr. Gonzales1 
appeal for lack of jurisdiction pursuant to the ruling in City of 
Monticello v. Christensen because that case is distinguished on its 
facts. Because Mr. Gonzales never had a trial in the justice court, 
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the underlying rationale of Monticello — that an appeal from the 
justice court affords a defendant a trial anew in the circuit 
court — does not apply to the facts of Mr, Gonzales1 case. 
Further, as applied to these facts, dismissal of his appeal 
would deny Mr. Gonzales his constitutional right to appeal and would 
violate his rights of due process and equal protection guaranteed by 
the Utah and United States constitutions. For all of the foregoing 
reasons the defendant respectfully requests that the Court of 
Appeals acknowledge jurisdiction to consider his appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On August 4, 1988, at approximately 12:35 a.m. Deputy Fred 
Baird of the Salt Lake County Sheriff's office observed a 
brown-colored vehicle traveling westbound in the center turn-lane in 
the vicinity of 300 East on 3900 South in Salt Lake City. 
(T: 37-38). Deputy Baird activated the overhead lights on his 
vehicle west of State Street, and the brown-colored vehicle pulled 
over at about 250 West and 3900 South. (T: 42). The only person in 
the car was the driver, Gilberto Gonzales. (T: 43). Deputy Baird 
approached the vehicle and spoke to Mr. Gonzales through an open 
window. Mr. Gonzales told him that he was trying to find his son 
Walter who was very sick. (T: 106). Deputy Baird refused to help 
find Walter. (T: 7). Deputy Baird noticed an odor of alcohol and 
slurred speach, and asked Mr. Gonzales to exit the vehicle to 
perform field sobriety tests. (T: 44). At about this time Deputy 
Ken Davis arrived at the scene as a back-up officer. (T: 96). 
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Mr. Gonzales performed a "balance test," a "finger-counting 
test," and a "hand-clap test." (T: 48-49) . According to Deputy 
Baird, Mr. Gonzales failed these tests. Deputy Davis believed that 
Mr. Gonzales "was intoxicated beyond the legal point" based on the 
tests, although he could not remember how Mr. Gonzales performed on 
the tests. (T: 98; 99-101). Deputy Baird then placed Mr. Gonzales 
under arrest for driving under the influence of alcohol and 
transported him to the traffic office to perform a breath test for 
blood-alcohol content. (T: 50). Mr. Gonzales submitted to the 
test which produced a result of .20 grams. (T: 63). 
Mr. Gonzales is a native of El Salvador. He does not speak 
English very well. (T: 104). He resides in Kearns, Utah, with his 
wife and his eighteen-year-old son Walter. (T: 107). Mr. Gonzales 
works as a housekeeping supervisor at the Hilton Hotel in Salt Lake 
City from 11:00 p.m. to 7:30 a.m. (T: 103). Mr. Gonzales spent the 
day of August 3, 1988, at home. He drank some beer at home between 
the hours of 5:00 p.m. and 11:00 p.m. (T: 108-109). At about 
12:00 midnight Mr. Gonzales and his wife became alarmed because 
their son had not returned home. (T: 104-105). Walter had left the 
house at about 4:00 p.m., and when the last bus arrived at 12:00 
midnight, Walter was not on it. (T: 104). Between 12:00 midnight 
and 12:15 a.m., Mr. Gonzales left the house and drove his car to a 
dance club for minors near 2900 South in Salt Lake City, believing 
that Walter might be there. (T: 117). On prior occasions, 
Mr. Gonzales had been able to find Walter when he failed to return 
home. (T: 116-117). Mr. Gonzales then decided to return home, and 
on the way was arrested by Deputy Baird. (T: 105). 
Walter is psychotic. (T: 79). He was hospitalized from 
September 9 to October 10, 1987, in the intensive treatment unit at 
the Western Institute of Neuropsychiatry, which is a locked 
treatment unit for severely disturbed psychotics who can be 
dangerous to self or others. (T: 84-85). Walter's symptoms 
included delusions, schizophrenia, auditory hallucinations, thought 
insertion, ideas of reference, psycho-motor retardation, depression 
and so on. (T: 80-81). He was then and still is under the 
continuing care of Sayed Afroz, M.D., who has prescribed various 
anti-psychotic medications. (T: 81-82). Walter has tried to hurt 
himself in the past by swallowing things, and has gotten lost on 
prior occasions. (T: 115; 116). Mr. Gonzales was particularly 
worried about Walter on August 3, 1988, because he did not feel well 
and had been hearing voices that day, and Mr. Gonzales believed he 
had gotten lost or in trouble or might have hurt himself or someone 
else. (T: 105; 118). Dr. Afroz believed that Walter's condition 
was potentially dangerous, although he had no specific opinion as to 
Walter's condition on August 3, 1988, not having seen him that day. 
(T: 85; 87; 91). At 12:00 midnight the buses had stopped running 
and nobody else was available to drive Mr. Gonzales to try to find 
Walter. (T: 106). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
The defendant contends that he was denied a fair trial and 
that he was illegally sentenced. First, the trial court's denial of 
the defendant's Motion to Instruct the jury on his defense of 
justification constitutes reversible error. Second, the trial 
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court's admission of documents—including the Intoxilyzer Checklist, 
Affidavit and Receipt—and testimony of Deputy Davis without prior 
notice to the defendant constitutes reversible error. Third, the 
sentence imposed by Judge Jones is illegal because it creates 
conditions more severe than the prior sentence imposed by Justice of 
the Peace Scott. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR 
BY REFUSING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON THE 
DEFENSE OF JUSTIFICATION. 
Due process guarantees the right of a criminally accused 
person to present all competent evidence in his defense. See U.S. 
Const, amend XIV, SI; Utah Const, art. I, §12. Rule 19 of the Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure, and Rule 4.4 of the Rules of Practice 
in the District Courts and Circuit Courts of the State of Utah allow 
parties to request instructions to the jury. The Utah Supreme Court 
has defined the right of a defendant to instruct the jury in a 
criminal case: 
. . . where the defendant has [1] asserted a 
defense to justify or excuse the criminal 
charge, and [2] where there is reasonable 
basis in the evidence to support it, the 
viability of defense then becomes a question 
of fact and the jury should be charged 
regarding it. 
State v. Harding, 635 P.2d 33, 34 (Utah 1981). 
A. Justification is a legal defense. Section 76-2-401 of 
the Utah Code Annotated (1978) provides for "justification" as a 
complete defense to criminal responsibility: 
76-2-401. Justification as defense—When Allowed— 
Conduct which is justified is a defense 
to prosecution for any offense based on the 
conduct. The defense of justification may 
be claimed: 
(1) When the actor's conduct is in defense 
of persons or property under the 
circumstances described in sections 76-2-402 
through 76-2-406 of this part; 
(2) When the actor's conduct is reasonable 
and in fulfillment of his duties as a 
governmental officer or employee; 
(3) When the actor's conduct is reasonable 
discipline of minors by parents, guardians, 
teachers, or other persons in loco parentis; 
(4) When the actor's conduct is reasonable 
discipline of persons in custody under the 
laws of the state; 
(5) When the actor's conduct is justified 
for any other reason under the laws of this 
state. 
Section 76-2-401 should be interpreted as authorizing the legal 
defense of justification against the charge of driving under the 
influence of alcohol. First, the initial statutory language allows 
the defense against "any offense," and subsections one through five 
should not be interpreted as exclusive in the absence of disjunctive 
or conjunctive language. Second, subsections one and five should be 
interpreted as allowing for the defense on the facts of this case. 
In State v. Tuttle, 730 P.2d 630 (Utah 1986), the trial 
court instructed the jury on the defendant's defense of compulsion 
under §76-2-302, Utah Code Ann. (1978), agaisnt the charge of escape 
from official custody. The trial court, however, added three 
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qualifications to the instruction that were based on the Model Penal 
Code. In affirming the conviction, the Utah Supreme Court concluded 
that the trial court properly modified the statutory defense: 
The duress defense as enacted in Utah's 
current criminal code simply states the 
broadest contours of the defense as it might 
be raised against a criminal charge. 
Nothing in the 1973 Utah legislative history 
or in the commentary to the Model Penal Code 
indicates that the new code was intended to 
abolish subtle yet sound common law 
qualifications upon the defense as it 
relates to specific crimes that are 
consistent with its essential nature and 
that do not otherwise conflict with the 
provisions or the purposes of the new 
criminal code. 
Id. at 633. Justification and compulsion are related statutory and 
common-law defenses. In the case at bar, the defendant's 
justification instruction (see Addendum B) is properly based on the 
Model Penal Code §3.02 and Comments (see Addendum C): 
(a) the harm or evil sought to be avoided 
by such conduct is greater than that sought 
to be prevented by the law defining the 
offense charged; and 
(b) neither Code nor other law defining the 
offense provides exceptions or defenses 
dealing with the specific situation 
involved; and 
(c) a legislative purpose to exclude the 
justification claimed does not otherwise 
plainly appear. 
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Here, the State did not object to the wording of the 
justification instruction. The State did not propose an alternative 
justification instruction, nor did the trial court. The trial court 
simply ruled that there was inadequate evidence based on Tuttle, 
supra, to give the instruction because there may have been "a 
reasonable and legal alternative to violating the law," and because 
"the evidence [did] not support a finding of any threat or imminent 
use of unlawful force against the defendant." (T: 121). First, the 
harm sought to be avoided need not be directed against the 
defendant, but may, as here, be directed against a third person. 
See, e.g., §76-2-401(1), Utah Code Ann. (1978). Second, reasonable 
evidence was presented by the defendant on these issues. By 
refusing to instruct the jury the trial court usurped the jury's 
fact-finding function and denied the defendant the benefit of a jury 
trial. 
Prejudice to the defendant in the court's refusal to 
instruct was exacerbated first by the centrality of justification to 
the defense (T: 152), and second by the prosecutor's comments during 
closing argument: 
MR. PARKER: About five minutes? Thank you, 
your Honor. 
I would like, first of all, to encourage you 
folks to take these instructions, first thing 
when you get into the room and read through 
all of them, and see if you ever find 
mentioned anywhere in these instructions the 
word "justification"— 
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MR. SCOWCROFT: Your Honor, I object. I 
object. I call for— 
THE COURT: Well, it's closing argument, he 
has the right to cover the points you've 
raised. 
MR SCOWCROFT: I—well, okay. I just want 
that objection on the record, your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right, sir. But he does 
have the right to cover the points you 
raised. 
MR. PARKER: I ask you to try and find the 
argument the defense counsel just gave 
you. Find where the Judge told you that if 
some reason—if there was some reason for 
the defendant driving, that somehow you can 
excuse his conduct. You will not find it. 
(T: 154). 
B. There is reasonable basis in the evidence to support 
the defense of justification. At trial, Mr. Gonzales testified that 
he was alarmed because his son Walter had not returned home on the 
last-running bus at midnight. (T: 104-105). According to 
Mr. Gonzales and Dr. Afroz, Walter is mentally ill and potentially 
dangerous to himself and others. (T: 80-116). Mr. Gonzales 
testified that he had no alternative transportation to search for 
Walter because buses had stopped running and nobody else was 
available to drive him. (T: 106). Deputy Baird testified that he 
refused to help Mr. Gonzales find Walter. (T: 7). These facts 
could represent an imminent emergency that outweighs the harm of 
Mr. Gonzales driving his car, particularly as here where Mr. 
Gonzales' "driving pattern" did not present an immediate danger to 
others. (T: 66) . 
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These facts create a "reasonable basis" in evidence to 
instruct the jury on defense of justification. The evidentiary 
threshhold set forth in Harding should be high enough to prevent 
irrelevant or confusing jury instructions, but low enough to allow 
defendants to present a legal defense to a jury. By refusing to 
instruct the jury on justification, the trial court denied Mr. 
Gonzales a fair trial and denied him the benefit of a jury trial 
guaranteed by Article I, §12 of the Utah Constitution. 
C. The defense of justification has been recognized by 
other courts. In State v. Olson, 719 P.2d 55 (Or. App. 1986), the 
Court of Appeals of Oregon overturned a conviction for driving under 
the influence of intoxicants because the trial court refused to 
instruct the jury on a "choice of evils" defense provided under 
Oregon statute. There, the passenger drove the car out of a traffic 
intersection after the driver got out and walked away. The 
passenger was arrested and convicted for driving under the influence 
of alcohol. The court reasoned that the defendant was entitled to a 
jury instruction based on the law: 
Defendant's evidence was sufficient to support the 
choice of evils defense and to require the 
prosecution to rebut it. Whether the prosecution did 
that is for the trial court's determination as the 
fact-finder. 
Id. at 57. The "choice of evils" defense is equivalent to the 
defense of justification. See Addendum D. 
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In State v. Pena, 197 Cal. Rptr. 264 (Cal. Super. 1983), a 
California Appellate Court reversed a conviction for driving under 
the influence of intoxicating liquor because the trial court refused 
to instruct the jury regarding the defense of "justification." 
There, the defendant pursued a sheriff's deputy by car at 4:00 a.m. 
who had taken his girlfriend away under circumstances which 
reasonably might have caused the defendant to fear for the 
girlfriend's safety. The reasoning in Pena should apply with added 
force to the case at bar because the instruction was not supported, 
as here, by an underlying California statute, but merely by common 
law principles. See Addendum D. 
In State v. Knowles, 495 A.2d 335 (Me. 1985), the Supreme 
Judicial Court of Maine vacated convictions for driving on a revoked 
license and driving under the influence of alcohol because the trial 
court refused to instruct the jury on a "competing harms" defense. 
There, the defendant operated a motor vehicle to escape an assault 
upon himself and another person. The instruction was based on a 
Maine statute justifying otherwise criminal conduct where a 
defendant "believe[s] it to be necessary to avoid imminent physical 
harm to himself or another." Id_. at 338. This defense is 
equivalent to defendant's defense of justification, and the 
reasoning in Knowles should be applied in support of defendant's 
instruction. See Addendum D. 
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In State v, Dapo, 470 A.2d 1173 (Vt. 1983), the Vermont 
Supreme Court held that the trial court did not err in failing to 
instruct the jury on defense of necessity, in Vermont, the defense 
of necessity was already defined in case law. the Supreme Court 
held that a necessary element of the defense - the existence of an 
emergency - was not supported by the record on appeal, and the 
defendant was therefore not entitled to the instruction. The court 
stated: 
. . . a missing child could very well represent an 
emergency so imminent and compelling as to raise a 
reasonable expectation of harm either to the actor or 
to the child. However, under the facts of this case, 
at the time of the defendant's criminal activity, the 
emergency had already terminated and, as the defendant 
knew, his child was safe at home. 
Id. at 1175. The reasoning in Dapo should be applied to 
support instructing the jury on defense of justification in the 
case at bar. First, defense of necessity is equivalent to 
defense of justification, and Dapo recognized the validity of 
this defense. Second, the Vermont Supreme Court recognized 
that a missing child could be "an emergency so imminent and 
compelling" as to justify instructing the jury on such a 
defense. Third, the result in Dapo must be distinguished on 
its facts because in the case at bar the defendant's child was 
missing at the time of defendant's arrest. See Addendum D. 
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CONCLUSION 
The trial court committed reversible error in refusing to 
instruct the jury on defense of justification. Mr. Gonzales was 
denied due process and a fair trial by jury. For these reasons the 
Court of Appeals should vacate the verdict and remand this case for 
a new trial. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR 
BY ADMITTING DOCUMENTS AND TESTIMONY WITHOUT 
PRIOR NOTICE TO THE DEFENDANT. 
The defendant, through counsel, made a written Request for 
Discovery and mailed it to the office of the South Valley County 
Attorney on August 25, 1988. See Addendum E. This Request included 
the following: 
2. A list of all the witnesses that the 
State/City intends to call for trial in the 
above-entitled matter, their addresses, 
telephone numbers and criminal records. 
6. Any reports or results of scientific 
tests taken during the investigation of this 
case. 
At some time prior to September 27, 1988, the South Valley County 
Attorney's office voluntarily mailed discovery to defense counsel, 
including a Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office Initial Report, DUI 
Report Form and Witness list. See Addendum F. Although the DUI 
Report Form indicates that an Intoxilyzer test was given, there were 
no Intoxilyzer documents ever made known or available to the 
defendant prior to trial. Nor was it indicated at section XIII of 
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the DUI Report Form that such documents existed. Also, the list of 
witnesses that the prosecutor intended to call at trial included 
only one name, that of Deputy Fred Baird. 
At trial, Judge Jones allowed the prosecutor to introduce 
in evidence three Intoxilyzer documents, over defense objections, 
that were not known nor made available to the defense prior to 
trial. (T: 51-62). These were the Intoxilyzer Checklist, Affidavit 
and Receipt. Later during the trial Judge Jones allowed the 
prosecutor to introduce testimony, over defense objections, of a 
witness whose name was not included on the list of witnesses 
supplied to the defense whom the prosecutor intended to call at 
trial. This witness was Deputy Ken Davis. (T: 92-94). 
Pretrial discovery of evidence is integral to legal due 
process and effective confrontation. See U.S. Const, amends. V and 
XIV, §1, and Utah Const, art. I, §12. Rule 16 of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure codifies the prosecutor's obligation to comply 
with a defendant's written request for discovery. See, §77-35-16, 
Utah Code Ann. (1982). In the case at bar, the defendant 
specifically requested a witness list and any reports of scientific 
tests. Disclosure of these items—if not mandated under subsections 
(a)(1) through (a)(4) of Rule 16 — is required under 16(a)(5). In 
State v. Knight, the Utah Supreme Court interpreted this Rule: 
when the prosecution chooses to respond 
voluntarily to a request under subsection 
(a)(5) without requiring the defense to 
obtain a court order, considerations of 
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fairness require that the prosecution respond to 
the request in a manner that will not be 
misleading. Therefore, we articulate two 
requirements that the prosecution must meet when 
it responds voluntarily to a request for 
discovery. First, the prosecution either must 
produce all of the material requested or must 
identify explicitly those portions of the request 
with respect to which no responsive material will 
be provided. Second, when the prosecution agrees 
to produce any of the material requested, it must 
continue to disclose such material on an ongoing 
basis to the defense. Therefore, if the 
prosecution agrees to produce certain specified 
material and it later comes into possession of 
additional material that falls within that same 
specification, it has to produce the 
later-acquired material. 
734 P.2d 913, 916-917 (Utah 1987)(footnote omitted). The Court 
reasoned that a continuing obligation to disclose is in the interest 
of public policy by increasing confidence in informal discovery 
procedures and avoiding "game-playing" between the parties. 
Further, it is in the interest of judicial economy by reducing the 
need for frequent discovery requests by defense counsel and 
court-ordered discovery in an already-burdened criminal justice 
system. 16. at 917 ns. 2, 3; See also §77-35-16(b) ("The 
prosecution has a continuing duty to make disclosure."). 
These standards were not met by the prosecutor in this 
case. The prosecutor admitted during the trial that he did not know 
whether the Intoxilyzer documents had ever been provided to the 
defense prior to trial. (T: 52). Good-faith ignorance of the 
prosecution is irrelevant in determining whether he has violated his 
discovery duties. Knight, 734 P.2d at 918 n.5. 
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The trial court is empowered under 16(g), Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, to obviate any prejudice resulting from the 
prosecutor's violation of discovery rules: 
(g) If at any time during the course of 
the proceedings it is brought to the 
attention of the court that a party has 
failed to comply with this rule, the court 
may order such party to permit the discovery 
or inspection, grant a continuance, or 
prohibit the party from introducing evidence 
not disclosed, or it may enter such other 
order as it deems just under the 
circumstances. 
At trial, defense counsel asked the court to exclude from evidence 
the Intoxilyzer documents and the testimony of Deputy Davis. (T: 
51-62; 92-94). The trial court denied any relief pursuant to 
defense objections. 
The trial court abused its discretion in denying any relief 
because the prosecutor's failure to provide discovery resulted in 
prejudice sufficient to warrant reversal under Rule 30(a), Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure (§77-35-30, Utah Code Ann. (1982)): 
77-35-30. Rule 30 - Errors and defects. 
(a) Any error, defect, irregularity or 
variance which does not affect the 
substantial rights of a party shall be 
disregarded. 
Utah courts have interpreted this Rule as meaning that error is 
reversible only if absent the error there was a reasonable 
likelihood of a more favorable result for the defendant at trial. 
Knight, 734 P.2d at 919. 
In the case at bar, the testimony of Deputy Davis 
constitutes reversible error because he was qualified as an "expert" 
by the State and testified that he had no doubt that Mr. Gonzales 
"was intoxicated beyond the legal point." (T: 95-96; 98; 101). 
Not having been informed that Deputy Davis would testify, defense 
counsel could not prepare to rebut that testimony with other 
eye-witness testimony, like that of Mrs. Gonzales. 
Admission of the Intoxilyzer documents constitutes 
reversible error because absent those documents the State could not 
have established a presumption of validity of the Intoxilyzer test 
result. See Murray City v. Hall, 663 P.2d 1314, 1320 (Utah 1983). 
The State did not call a scientific expert to testify as to the 
validity of Intoxilyzer technology, nor was a public officer called 
to testify as to the accuracy of the Intoxilyzer equipment. Deputy 
Baird testified that he could not explain how the Intoxilyzer 
functions. (T: 70). Further, had it been known that the 
Intoxilyzer documents would be offered into evidence at trial, 
defense counsel could have prepared to rebut the presumption of 
validity through the expert testimony of Dr. Brian Finkle who has 
contracted with the Salt Lake Legal Defender Association to testify 
at DUI trials. Under either scenario there is a reasonable 
likelihood of a more favorable result for the the defendant at trial. 
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CONCLUSION 
By admitting evidence not provided to the defendant in 
pretrial discovery, the trial court abused its discretion and denied 
Mr. Gonzales his constitutional rights of due process and 
confrontation. For these reasons, the Court of Appeals should 
reverse the conviction and remand this case for a new trial. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ILLEGALLY SENTENCED THE 
DEFENDANT BY ENHANCING THE SENTENCE IMPOSED 
IN THE JUSTICE COURT. 
On April 25, 1989, Mr. Gonzales entered a conditional plea 
of "no contest" in the Second Precinct Justice Court. See Addendum 
G. He was sentenced then and there as follows: 
Sentencing as follows: DUI - $480.00 + $120 
Surcharge + $100.00 VR + $50.00 AR fee + 60 
days in jail/57 suspended on (1) Payment of 
fines & fees-to be determined after stay 
date; (2) DUI series to be determined 
after stay date; (3) Probation to court 6 
months-other 3 days are suspended on 24 
hours community service. 
Mr. Gonzales paid a $50 attorney referral fee on September 30, 
1988. See Addendum G. 
On July 14, 1989, Judge Jones resentenced Mr. Gonzales 
following trial as follows: 60 days jail, with three days suspended 
on 24 hours community service, and 57 suspended on (1) $480.00 fine 
to be paid within 60 days; (2) $120.00 surcharge to be paid within 
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60 days; (3) $100.00 Victim Restitution Fund assessment to be paid 
within 60 days; (4) $50.00 Alcohol Rehabilitation fee to be paid 
within 60 days; and (6) Six months probation supervised by the 
Alcohol Counseling and Education Center. (T: 164-165). 
The sentence imposed by Judge Jones differed from that 
imposed in the justice court. First, Judge Jones imposed a $150.00 
attorney fee, where the justice court imposed a $50.00 fee which the 
defendant paid on September 30, 1988. Second, Judge Jones ordered 
the defendant to pay all fines, fees and assessments (total $900.00) 
within 60 days of sentencing, where the justice court imposed no 
such order. Third, Judge Jones ordered that probation be supervised 
by the Alcohol Counseling and Education Center, where the justice 
court ordered unsupervised probation. In these three ways, Judge 
Jones sentenced Mr.'Gonzales more severely than the justice court. 
Imposition of a harsher sentence on appeal violates the 
defendant's constitutional rights to appeal and to legal due process 
by discouraging his legal defense. See wisden v. District Court of 
Sevier County, 694 P.2d 605 (Utah 1984)(interpreting §76-3-405 Utah 
Code Ann. (1978)); see also U.S. Const, amends. V and XIV, §1, and 
Utah Const, art. I, §12. 
CONCLUSION 
Judge Jones illegally sentenced Mr. Gonzales by enhancing 
the sentence imposed in the justice court. For this reason the 
Court of Appeal should remand this case to the circuit court for 
resentencing with orders (1) that the $150.00 Legal Defender fee be 
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vacated; (2) that Mr. Gonzales not be required to pay fines, fees 
and assessments within 60 days, but rather as he is able to pay (see 
§78-32-1, Utah Code Ann. (1987)); and see Van Hake v. Thomas, 759 
p.2d 1162 (Utah 1988)(In order to prove contempt for failure to 
comply with a court order it must be shown that the person cited for 
contempt knew what was required, had the ability to comply, and 
intentionally failed or refused to do so), and (3) that supervision 
by the Alcohol Counseling and Education Center not be required as a 
condition of probation. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court committed reversible error by refusing to 
instruct the jury on defense of justification, and by admitting 
documents and testimony into evidence that had not been provided to 
the defendant in pretrial discovery. As a result, Mr. Gonzales was 
denied a fair trial by jury, and the Court of Appeals should vacate 
the verdict and remand this case for a new trial. 
Further, the trial court illegally sentenced Mr. Gonzales 
by enhancing the sentenced previously imposed in the justice court. 
For this reason, the Court of Appeals should remand this case to the 
circuit court for resentencing pursuant to its orders. 
Respectfully submitted this }^ £"~ day of January, 1990. 
ROGER K. SCOWCKflFT 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
00O00 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
Gilberto Gonzales, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
^ MeryT. Uoormn 
CUK of T* Court 
liton Court # Appecfe 
CERTIFICATE OF PROBABLE CAUSE 
Case No. 890202-CA 
Before Judges Orme, Garff, and Davidson (On Law and Motion). 
Upon defendant's application for a certificate of probable 
cause and consideration of the oral arguments and memoranda of 
the parties, we consider the issue challenging the sentence 
imposed by the circuit court to be fairly debatable and 
integral to defendant's conviction. 
Therefore, defendant's application is granted and a 
certificate of probable cause is hereby issued. 
DATED this 
FOR THE COURT 
day of November, 1989. 
Grofgory YC. j0rmeT^Judge 
ADDENDUM B 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
DEFENSE OF JUSTIFICATION 
Conduct which is justified is a defense to prosecution for 
any offense based on the conduct. 
Conduct which the actor believes to be necessary to avoid a 
harm or evil to himself or to another is justifiable, provided that 
the harm or evil sought to be avoided by such conduct is greater 
than that sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense 
charged. 
Therefore, if the defendant proves to your satisfaction 
that the above elements of justification did exist, and the 
prosecution does not negate the defense of justification beyond a 
reasonable doubt, it shall be your duty to return a verdict of not 
guilty. 
ADDENDUM C 
Ixv / Model Penal Code $3.04. 
SECTION 3.02. JUSTIFICATION GENERALLY: CHOICE OF EVILS 
(1) Conduct which the actor believes to be necessary to avoid a harm or evil to himself 
or to another is justifiable, provided that: 
(a) the harm or evil sought to be avoided by such conduct is greater than that 
sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense charged; and 
(b) neither the Code nor other law defining the offense provides exceptions or 
defenses dealing with the specific situation involved; and 
(c) a legislative purpose to exclude die justification claimed does not otherwise plainly 
appear. 
(2) When the actor was reckless or negligent in bringing about the situation requiring 
a choice of harms or evils or in appraising the necessity for his conduct, the justification 
afforded by this Section is unavailable in a prosecution for any offense for which reckless-
ness or negligence, as the case may be, suffices to establish culpability. 
COMMENTS TO 53.02 AT 5-9 [(TENT. DRAFT NO. 8, 1958)] 
1. This Section accepts the view that a principle of necessity, properly conceived, 
affords a general justification for conduct that otherwise would constitute an 
offense; and that such a qualification, like the requirements of culpability, is 
essential to the rationality and justice of all penal prohibitions. 
The principle is subject to three vital limitations: 
(a) The necessity must be avoidance of an evil greater than the evil sought 
to be avoided by the law defining the offense charged. The balancing of evils 
cannot, of course, be committed merely to the private judgment of the actor, 
it is an issue for determination in the trial. What is involved may be described 
as an interpretation of the law of the offense, in light of the submission that 
the special situation calls for an exception to the prohibition that the legislature 
could not reasonably have intended to exclude, given the competing values to 
be weighed. 
(b) The issue of competing values must not have been foreclosed by a deliber-
ate legislative choice, as when the law has dealt explicitly with the specific situa-
tion that presents the choice of evils or a legislative purpose to exclude the 
justification claimed otherwise appears . . . 
(c) When the actor has made a proper choice of values, his belief in the 
necessity of his conduct to serve the higher value exculpates — unless the crime 
involved can be committed recklessly or negligently. But when the latter is the 
case, recklessness or negligence in bringing about this situation requiring the 
choice of evils or in appraising the necessity for his conduct may be the basis 
of conviction. . . . 
ADDENDUM D 
STATE v. OLSON 
ate M 719 F^d 55 (OrJtpp. 1986) 
Or. 55 
Before that he had worked on the green 
chain for another employer for six years. 
In January, 1983, he started feeling pain in 
his shoulders. By June, 1983, he was un-
able to continue working. In January, 
1984, he filed a claim for compensation. 
He alleged that "[s]ixteen years on green 
chain either caused or accelerated the bilat-
eral rotator cuff tendonitis." SAIF denied 
the claim. 
Dr. Baker, claimant's treating orthopedic 
physician, diagnosed his problem as bilat-
eral rotator cuff tendonitis with partially 
frozen shoulders "due to wear and tear 
over the past 60 years." He could not say 
with reasonable medical probability that 
claimant's problem was specifically caused 
by his work. He said that it was the result 
of wear and tear that must be attributed, 
at least in part, to claimant's work activity 
over the years and that he would not have 
reached his present level of disability had 
he not been working on the green chain or 
some equivalent activity. 
Dr. Degge, an orthopedic physician, ex-
amined claimant at SAIF's request. He 
stated that, although the underlying condi-
tion may have been pre-existing and non-
work related, his present problem "appar-
ently developed * * * as a result of repeti-
tive use of the arms while working on the 
green chain over a prolonged period." He 
concluded that "[w]hile the condition of 
[claimant's] neck and shoulders might have 
occurred as a natural progression of his 
chronic [pre-existing] condition, there is lit-
tle doubt that the repetitive use of his arms 
in pulling, lifting, pushing, etc., accelerated 
this process and would, therefore, consti-
tute an aggravation of a pre-existing con-
dition." (Emphasis supplied.) 
In order to prevail, claimant had to prove 
by a preponderance of the evidence that his 
work activity and conditions caused a wor-
sening of his underlying disease resulting 
in an increase in pain to the extent that it 
produced disability or required medical ser-
vices. Weller v. Union Carbide, 288 Or. 
27, 35, 602 P.2d 259 (1979). 
We understand both doctors to have con-
cluded that claimant's work on the green 
chain caused a worsening of his pre-exist-
ing condition. That worsening caused in-
creased pain, which required him to seek 
medical services. Both doctors agree that 
he would not have reached his present level 
of disability without the effects of his em-
ployment See Kepford v. Weyerhaeuser 
Co., 77 Or.App 363, 366-67, 713 P.2d 625, 
rev. den. 300 Or. 722, 717 P.2d 630 (1986). 
We conclude that his condition is compensa-
ble. Weller v. Union Carbide, supra. 
Reversed and remanded with instructions 
to accept claim. 
79 Or.App. 302 
STATE of Oregon, Respondent, 
v. 
Eric Leroy OLSON, Appellant 
M486112; CA A37579. 
Court of Appeals of Oregon. 
Argued and Submitted Feb. 10, 1986. 
Decided May 14, 1986. 
Defendant was convicted in the Dis-
trict Court, Multnomah County, Kimberly 
Frankel, J., of driving while under influ-
ence of intoxicants. The Court of Appeals, 
Young, J., held that defendant's evidence 
was sufficient to support choice of evils 
defense. 
Conviction vacated and remanded. 
1. Criminal Law <$=>38 
Showing that defendant's driving of 
car was necessary to avoid injury or threat 
of injury to human or animal life was not 
an element of choice of evils defense to 
charge of driving while under influence of 
intoxicants, which is available if conduct is 
necessary as an emergency measure to 
56 Or. 719 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
avoid imminent public or private injury. 
ORS 161.200(lXa). 
2. Criminal Law S=>38 
Nothing in choice of evils defense to 
driving while under influence of intoxicants 
prevents its use when defendant has acted 
to protect property rather than life. ORS 
161.200(lXa). 
3. Criminal Law <8=>569 
When defendant's evidence is suffi-
cient to support choice of evils defense to 
charge of driving while under influence of 
intoxicants, prosecution must rebut it be-
yond a reasonable doubt. ORS 161.055(1), 
161.190. 
4. Criminal Law <£=>569 
Defendant's testimony that he chose 
lesser evil of moving car out of intersec-
tion, although he was intoxicated, rather 
than leaving it in lane of traffic, sufficient-
ly supported choice of evils defense to re-
quire prosecution to rebut evidence. 
Garrett A. Richardson, Portland, argued 
the cause and filed brief for appellant 
Kendall Barnes, Asst Atty. Gen., Salem, 
argued the cause for respondent With 
him on brief were Dave Frohnmayer, Atty. 
Gen., and James E. Mountain, Jr., Salem. 
Before JOSEPH, CJ., and VAN HOOM-
ISSEN and YOUNG, JJ. 
YOUNG, Judge. 
Defendant was tried by the court and 
convicted of driving while under the influ-
ence of intoxicants (DUII). He appeals and 
claims that the trial court applied an incor-
rect legal standard in evaluating his choice 
of evils defense. We vacate the conviction 
and remand. 
Officer Brunt saw defendant on the eve-
ning of November 23, 1984, in an argument 
1. Farmer ORS 487.560(2Xa) was repealed by 
Or.Laws 1983, ch. 338, § 978, as amended by 
Or.Laws 1985, ch. 672, § 6, and replaced by 
with a woman in a restaurant parking lot 
Brunt intervened and determined that de-
fendant was intoxicated but that the wom-
an was not At Brunt's suggestion, de-
fendant and the woman left in defendant's 
car, with her driving. A few minutes later 
Brunt saw the car stop in an intersection. 
The woman got out from the driver's side 
and walked away. After a moment, de-
fendant moved to the driver's side and 
drove the car a short distance. Brunt then 
arrested him for DUII. 
Defendant admitted that he was intoxi-
cated and that he drove. His defense was 
that he chose the lesser evil of moving the 
car out of the intersection rather than leav-
ing it in a lane of traffic. The defense is 
statutory. ORS 161.200. His motion for a 
judgment of acquittal on the ground that 
there was insufficient evidence to rebut the 
defense was denied. The trial court found 
defendant guilty, explaining that there was 
not sufficient evidence to support the 
choice of evils defense. Although that ex-
planation is not entirely clear, it appears 
that the court rejected the defense as a 
matter of law. 
[1,2] In ruling on the motion and in 
announcing its verdict, the trial court ap-
parently held that, in order to establish the 
defense, defendant had to show that his 
driving the car was necessary to avoid "in-
jury or threat of injury to human or animal 
life." That is incorrect That standard is 
only applicable to the affirmative defense 
provided by former ORS 487.560(2Xa)! to a 
charge of driving while suspended or re-
voked. It is not an element of the choice of 
evils defense under ORS 161.200, which is 
available if the conduct "is necessary as an 
emergency measure to avoid an imminent 
public or private injury." ORS 161.-
200(lXa). The threatened injury must be 
"of such gravity that, according to ordi-
nary standards of intelligence and moral-
ity, the desirability and urgency of avoid-
Or.Laws 1983. ch. 338. § 599. as amended by 
Or.Laws i985. ch. 16, § 305; ch. 6731. § 18; ch. 
744, § 1 (now ORS 811.180(lXa)). 
McLEOD v. FOSSI 
CIteM719P.2d57 (OrJlpp. 1986) 
ing the injury clearly outweigh the desir-
ability of avoiding the injury sought to 
be prevented by the statute defining the 
offense in issue." ORS 161.200(l)(b). 
There is nothing inherent in the choice of 
evils defense which prevents its use when 
the defendant has acted to protect property 
rather than life. See State v. Haley, 64 
Or.App. 209, 215, 667 P.2d 560 (1983). 
[3] Although an incorrect standard was 
applied, the trial court did not err in deny-
ing the motion for judgment of acquittal. 
Defendant's evidence supported the choice 
of evils defense, but it did not establish the 
defense as a matter of law. The court was 
correct in leaving that decision for the fact-
finding process. However, the fact-finding 
process appears to have gone awry. Not 
only did the trial court impermissibly re-
quire proof of a threat to life, its comments 
indicate that it may have incorrectly placed 
the burden on defendant to prove the de-
fense by a preponderance of the evidence, 
rather than requiring the prosecution to 
rebut it beyond a reasonable doubt. See 
ORS 161.055(1); ORS 161.190. 
Or. 57 
79 Or.App. 306 
John McLEOD, Respondent, 
v. 
Carl FOSSI, Appellant 
43-302; CA A34610. 
Court of Appeals of Oregon. 
Argued and Submitted Nov. 1, 1985. 
Decided May 14, 1986. 
Review Denied July 29,1986. 
Action was brought seeking to enforce 
two promissory notes and claiming attor-
ney fees under provision of the notes. The 
Circuit Court, Washington County, Alan C. 
Bonebrake, J., entered judgment finding 
that one note did not exist and defendant 
was not liable on the other, bat denied 
defendant attorney fees, and defendant ap-
pealed. The Court of Appeals, Rossman, 
J., held that attorney fees were available 
under statute making attorney fee provi-
sions reciprocal. 
Reversed and remanded. 
[4] Defendant's evidence was sufficient 
to support the choice of evils defense and 
to require the prosecution to rebut it. 
Whether the prosecution did that is for the 
trial court's determination as the fact-find-
er. Because the trial court applied an in-
correct legal standard, its determination 
cannot stand. Nevertheless, a new trial is 
not warranted. The evidence has been 
presented, and the trial court need only 
evaluate that evidence under the correct 
standard. Accordingly, we vacate the con-
viction and remand to the trial court On 
remand, if the court finds, on the present 
record, that the state has disproved the 
choice of evils defense beyond a reasonable 
doubt, it shall enter a new judgment of 
conviction; otherwise, defendant is entitled 
to an acquittal. 
Conviction vacated; remanded for fur-
ther proceedings not inconsistent with this 
opinion. 
1. Costs <s=>173(l) 
Under statute making attorney fee 
provisions reciprocal, if one party would be 
entitled to attorney fees under contract had 
it prevailed, other party is similarly entitled 
to award when it prevails. ORS 20.096(1). 
2. Bills and Notes <3=>534 
Party which successfully established 
nonliability under promissory notes in ac-
tion in which party seeking to collect had 
prayed for attorney fees under contractual 
provision was entitled to attorney fees un-
der statute making such attorney fee provi-
sions reciprocal. ORS 20.096(1). 
Charles S. Tauman, Portland, argued the 
cause for appellant With him on briefs 
was Bennett, Hartman, Tauman & Reyn-
olds, P.C., Portland. 
William E. Hurley, Portland, argued the 
cause and filed brief for respondent 
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this amended section as evidence of intend-
ed retroactivity. But Statutes 1982, chap-
ter 1535, section 17, specifically states that 
"p]f the [repeal of the inheritance tax is] 
declared invalid by an appellate court of 
this state as applied to estates of persons 
dying before the effective date of this act, 
to transfers occurring by reason of a death 
occurring before the date, or to gifts made 
or completed before that date, it is the 
intent of the Legislature that the provi 
sions shall be applicable only to estates 
of persons dying on or after the effective 
date of this act " 
[5] Appellant has overlooked fye recent 
use oi Estate of Gibson {\m) p &\ 
ADP 3d 733,189 Cal Rptr 201, m which the 
retroactive effect of Proposition 5 was e\ 
phcitly rejected on the basis it was m irrec 
oncilable conflict with Proposition 6, which 
received the higher affirmative vote We 
jconcur with the reasoning set out in Gib 
son, and hold that the 1982 initiatives and 
legislation do not affect the estate of Povd 
Martin 
The judgment is affirmed 
LOW, P J , and KING, J , concur 
149CalApp3dSupp 14 
jThe PEOPLE, Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
T. 
Russell David PENA, Defendant 
and Appellant 
Cnm. A. No. 20250. 
Appellate Department, Superior Court, 
Los Angeles County 
Sept 16» 19S3 
Defendant w& convicted before tfte 
Municipal Court, Los Angeles County, Al-
influence of intoxicating liquor, and he ap-
pealed. The Superior Court, Appellate De-
partment, Los Angeles County, Bernstein, 
J., held that (1) defense of duress is avail-
able, presuming requisites of defense are 
satisfied, where defendant is charged with 
driving under the influence; (2) defense of 
duress may properly be predicated upon 
threats of harm to persons other than ac-
cused; and (3) refusal to instruct jury re-
garding availability of defense of duress 
was error 
Reversed. 
1. Criminal Law 0 3 8 
Homicide £>126 
Duress defense is available to defend 
ant charged with any crime except one 
which involves taking life of an innocent 
person. 
2. Criminal Law <S=>38 
Defense of duress is available, presum 
ing requisites of such defense are satisfied, 
where defendant is charged with driving 
under the influence of intoxicating liquor 
West's ton Cal Vehicle Code 5 23152(a) 
3. Criminal Law e=>38 
Statute enumerating classes of per 
sons who are incapable of committing acts 
which constitute crimes does not restrict 
application of duress tvpe defences to cases 
in which defendant's person is object of 
coercive threats of bodily harm West's 
Ann CaLPenal Code § 26 
4. Criminal Law e=38 
Defense of duress may properly be 
predicated u p threats of harm to persons 
other than accused. 
5. Criminal Law ^739(1) 
Determinations as to whether prereq-
uisites to establishment of defense of justi 
fication/duress have been satisfied are for 
tner of fact 
6. Automobiles $=352 
Defendant would be entitled to acquit-
tal of charge of driving under the influ 
ence, notwithstanding fact of his operation 
of motor vehicle while legally intoxicated, 
10. Automobiles ^ 3 5 7 
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ine belief that girl friend, who was ordered its duty to fashion legally adequate instruc 
to enter deput/s vehicle, was in danger of tion in response to defendant's request 
assault by or through deputy, that defend-
ant's good-faith belief was objectively rea-
sonable under totality of circumstances, Cnminal Uw ^nm® 
that defendant operated his vehicle in obe- In view of fact that duress was defend-
dience to his fear for girl fnend's safety ant's only defense to charge of dnving 
and not for any other purpose, that defend- under the influence, refusal to instruct jury 
ant had no opportunity to engage alterna- regarding availability of defense was preju-
tive legal means of protecting girl fnend &®& error 
from danger he believed she faced, and 
that defendant was not substantially at Richard L Dewberry, W h i t e , for de-
fault m creation of emergency situation fendant and appellant 
which he claimed justified his action in Ro b e r t H Mbsm, Dlst Attj( Don 
dnving while intoxicated West's Ann Cal 
Vehicle Code 5 23152(a) 
aid J Kaplan and Sterling S Suga, Deputy 
Dist Attys, for plaintiff and respondent. 
JERNSTEIN, Judge 7 Cnminal Law ^ 3 8 
Requirement of defense of duress that ^ ^ ^ 
defendant's f or be objectively reasonable ^ ^ ^
 fa ^ rf ^ m 
one does not rquire that defendant be m ^ ^ ^
 m ^ ^ (a), 
fact correct in his assessment of situation ^ ^ ^ ^ ^
 rf ^ ^ 
rather, defendant may reh on what ne ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^
 m[ 
erred in refusing his proffered jury instruc 
tion, regarding appellants theon of m> 
defense That theory was predicated on 
the presumed a\ailabilitv of what is p e r 
allj termed the defense of duress: W-
hold that the defense was indeed available 
to appellant, and that the evidence adduced 
at trial mandated a jun irstruction on thj 
subject Accordmgk *e reverse the judg 
mentot conuction 
±7 
reasonably believes to be true 
8 Automobiles ^356 
Whether defendant had reasonable be-
lief that gin fnend who w& ordered to 
enter deputy's vehicle, was m danger from 
deputy, for purpose of establishing defense 
of duress m prosecution for defendant's 
dnving under the influence n following 
deputy s vehicle, was question of fact 
9. Criminal Law e=830 FACTS 
Defendants omission from requested On November 5, 1981, appellant was 
duress instruction of requirement that de- charged by complaint with violations of 
fendant's fears for girl fnend be objective- former Vehicle Code sections 23102, subdi-
ly reasonable did not relieve trial court of vision (a)3 (count I) and 12500, subdivision 
L Vehicle Code section 23102, subdivision (a) 
was renumbered section 23152, subdivision (a) 
m 1981 (Stats.1981 ch 940 » 12.33) 
1 In this opinion, "duress" is used interchange 
abl\ with terns bich h . o e n o n " \ompui 
sion," "necessity" or "justification" Although 
there arc some distinctions, they are not maten 
al for purposes of this opinion. For a discus-
sion of these distinction* see Conde, \eassu\ 
Defined: A new Rob m the Criminal Defense 
System (1981) 29 UCLA LRcv. 409,427432, 
Frank D. Berry, Jr. The Mysterious Defense cf 
Necessity (1979) 54 State Bar J. 384. 
3 \ ehicle Code secaon 23102, >ubdi\ ision (a) as 
it read on November * 1981 provided as fo 
low*. 
"(a) It is unlawful for any person who is 
under the influence of intoxication liquor or 
under trie comoined influcrce of indication 
liquor and any drug, to drive a vehicle upon any 
highway." 
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(a)< (failure to have driver's license, count Appellant's second jury trial commenced 
U II) and'Healthjand Safety Code section on October 5,1982. The difficulties experi-
11357, subdivision (b)5 (possession of less ence(i k & ^  W a» r e f l e c t ed in 
than one ounce of marijuana, count III). *• ™ * W aurt ***' 
Counts II and III were subsequently dis- On October 29,1982, the court sentenced 
missed on motion of the People pursuant to appellant to one year in the county jail.7 
Penal Code section 1385. Appellant was j j b e evidence presented at appellant's tri- j , 
tried by jury on count I; a mistrial was al was essentially undisputed. Los Ange-
declared on May 25,1982;ivhen the jury les County Sheriffs Deputy Frank Webb 
reported itself to be hopelessly deadlocked, testified that he first encountered appellant 
The engrossed settled statement on appeal at approximately 4 a.m. on November l, 
states that "[d]uring deliberations (follow- 1S8L Webb, on patrol in Pico Rivera, ob-
ing appellant's first trial), the jurors re- served appellant and Sara Marrufo, appel-
quested instruction on the issue of the de- lant's girlfriend, asleep in a parked car.8 
fense of justification, ..." and were in- Webb stated that "due to the late hour," he 
structed by the court that it was not avail- decided to investigate the situation. He 
able as a defense to the charge 
4. Section 12500, subdivision (a) provides: 
"(a) No person shall drive a motor vehicle 
upon a highway unless he then holds a driver's 
license issued under this code, except such per-
sons as are expressly exempted under this 
code." 
5. Section ll 357, subdivision (b) provides: 
"(b) Except as authorized by law, every per-
son who possesses not more than one avoirdu-
pois ounce of marijuana, other than concentrat-
ed cannabis, is guilty of a misdemeanor and 
shall be punished by a fine of not more than 
one hundred dollars ($100): 
I "COURT INSTRUCTS JURY: THEY WERE 
SWORN: 
Jury retires to deliberate at 3.D5 p.m. Jury-
returns to courtroom at 4:15 p.m. for reread-
ing of the jury instructions. 
4:17 p.m. jury retires to deliberate further. 
Jury returns to courtroom at 4:38 p.m. for 
rereading of jury instruction! 
Case No. Municipal Court 
M 92945 0 Monte"" 
M106902 Whittier 
M116056 Whittier 
exited his patrol vehicle and approached 
39 p.m. jury retires to deliberate further. 
Jury returns to courtroom at 4:50 p.m., 
*Wc the jury in the above-entitled cause find 
the defendant guilty of the offense charged to 
wit 23102(a) V.C signed Foreman.'" 
7. Although appellant does not challenge the va-
lidity of his sentence, we are constrained to 
point out, for guidance of the parties in (he 
event of a retrial, that the sentence is of dubious 
validity. 
The trial court pronounced sentence in appar-
ent reliance upon appellant's "admission" of 
three prior convictions for violations of (for-
mer) Vehicle Code section 23102, subdivision 
(a). However, the complaint in me instant case 
(M 147948, Whittier MUILCL) establishes that 
each of the prior offenses alleged occurred 
more than five years before the date of the 
"offense" in the instant matter. Specifically the 
complaint alleges as follows: 








In the instant case, the operative statutes spe-
cifying permissible punishment for driving un-
der the influence are former Vehicle Code sec-
tion 23102, subdivisions (c) and (d). These sub* 
paragraphs provided in pertinent part: 
"(c) Any person convicted under this section 
shall be punished upon a first conviction by 
imprisonment in the county jail not less than 
48 hours nor more than six months or bv a 
fine of not less than three hundred fifty-five 
dollars ($355) nor more than five hundred 
dollars ( $ » ) or by both such fine and im-
prisonment. 
"(d) Any person convicted under this section 
of an offense which occurred within five 
resulted in a conviction of an offense under 
this section or section 23105 shall be punished 
by imprisonment in the county jail for no! 
less than 48 hours nor more than one year 
and by a fine of not less than three hundred 
fifty-five dollars ($355) nor more than one 
thousand dollars ($1,000): 
Thus, it plainly appears that appellant could 
not be sentenced to a jail term longer than the 
six months maximum specified in subparagraph 
(c), above. 
1 It was stipulated at trial that the car was 
parked on private property. 
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the parked car, at which time he stated that Appellant testified that he followed 
he smeiled alcohol. Webb then ordered the Webb and San in the sister's car. His 
occupants, appellant and Sara, to exit then" reason for doing so was his fear for the 
vehicle and demanded to see written idenfj- physical safety of his girlfriend. Appellant 
fication. Both parties complied. Follow- had observed Webb's earlier weapons 
ing this, Webb undertook a search of the search of Sara; it is at this point the only 
"suspects" assertedly to ascertain if either conflict in the evidence develops. Deputy 
of them were in possession of "weapons." Webb testified that he drove Sara directly 
Sara, at the time she was subjected to home and only after this, while "exiting 
Deputy Webb's "weapons search," was Sara Marrufo's doorway," did he observe 
dressed in a somewhat unusual manner. 
She was wearing a long fur coat and, ac-
cording to the engrossed statement, "was 
"an unusual black shadow" which proved 
to be appellant Appellant was sitting in 
the vehicle earlier described, with the mo 
semi-nude thereunder, wearing onlv a very tor ^  R e c a l l i n ? t h e alcoho1 odor at 
brief see-through teddy nightgown" (Sara te ™* o{ his on^nal encounter *lth 
testified that she and appellant had attend- a P ! * n t and Sara> Webb felt M a !^* 
lant had driven to his current location while 
under the influence of alcohol. He ordered 
ed a Halloween costume party earlier in the 
evening, and that her costume was suppos-
ed to be that of a "flasher"). Webb or- appellant out of the vehicle and, according 
to Webb, thereupon administered field so-dered Sara to open her coat, which she did . .
 u > 4 ... „ t M J ,ULL 
, m - u „ n „ W U » L -J j , bnetv tests which appellant failed. Webb 
very briefly. Webb thereupon ordered her ' . „ „ , 
toagainopenhercoatandtokeepitopen. ^ M l d i ^ Subsequently, ap-
Deputv Webb then examined Sara's body *** t0ok a n ' m ^ ' (teth) test 
with his flashlight Following this exami- which showed a?Fe!!anfc's biood alcohoi lev-
nation, the deputy turned Sara around and el l0 •* a pP r 0 X i n , a t e l y Ai 
pulled her coat up from the rear and conlin- However, according to Sara, Webb 
ued his examination with the flashlight stopped his car "by some railroad teks"; 
During his interrogation and search of at M ^ Webb observed ^M t0 
appellant and Sara Marrufo, Deputv Webb «» following them. Webb stated to Sara 
ascertained the following: * M *WM "would be made s o n 7 " f o r 
1. The vehicle in which aooellant and Mom* ta- Webb then started his his girlfriend had been sleeping was reg-
istered to Sara's sister; 
2. Appellant lived "about one block" 
from the location of the events above 
described; 
vehicle up again and drove to Sara's resi-
dence. 
Appellant testified concerning his arrest 
by Webb as follows: After he was ordered 
out of the car in which he had followed 
3. Sara lived about three miles from the Webb and Sara, appellant was immediately 
location; arrested and handcuffed by Webb. Appel-
4. Sara's identification showed her to be M ^M U no Mi **** tests 
20 years of age. were administered to him by Webb, al-
though he admitted to Webb that he had 
Deputy Webb concluded the encounter
 m m e i mn\ fan at the Halloween 
by ordering Sara to enter his vehicle inas-
 party ^ y e a r | j 8 r attended with Sara. 
much as the deputy had decided to take 
J » Sara home. Webb's onlyjasserted reason 
for this action was that it was for Sara's 
"protection."! Webb drove from the scene 
with Sara in tow, leaving appellant in pos-
session of Sara's sister's vehicle. 
9. The record is devoid of any suggestion that 
Deputy Webb possessed the legal authority to 
At both trials, appellant requested that 
the following instruction be given to the 
jury. 
"Evidence has been received to the ef-
fect that the reason defendant, Russell 
take Sara home, or anywhere else, against her 
wishes. 
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Pena, drove the car was because he be-
lieved that Sara Marmfo was in physical 
danger." 
"You are hereby instructed that if you 
find that it has been established by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the 
defendant had a good faith belief that 
Sara Marrufo might be in physical dan-
ger, and drove the car for Tier protection 
or to render possible aid, then you may 
acquit him based on this defense." 
j i t jThe trial court not only refused appel-
lant's tendered instruction, but further in-
structed the jury, upon the panel's inquiry 
during its deliberations, that the defense of 
"justification" was in fact no defense to the 
charge. 
The sole question on appeal is whether 
the trial court committed reversible error in 
refimg to inslract the jury, eifor by way 
of appellant's tendered instruction or a sim-
ilar, court fashioned charge, regarding the 
applicability of the defense of duress. 
Upon Proper Evidentiary Showing The De-
fense of Duress Is Available To Any 
Criminal Charge Other Than A Capital 
Offense 
The United States Supreme Court has 
recently had occasion to discuss the defens-
es of duress and necessity in the context of 
a prosecution for escape from lawful con-
finement In United Slates v. Bailey 
(1980), 444 U.S. 394, 100 S.CL 624, 62 
LEd.2d 575, the high court observed as 
follows: 
"Common law historically distin-
guished between the defenses of duress 
and necessity. Duress was said to ex-
cuse criminal conduct" where the actor 
was under an unlawful threat of immi-
nent death or serious bodily injur}', which 
threat cawed the actor :o engage >n con-
duct violating the literal terms of the 
criminal law. While the defense of du-
ress covered the situation where coercion 
had its soun£ k the actions of other 
human befltf&'the defense of necessity, 
or choice of evils, traditionally covered 
the situation where physical forces be-
vond the actor's control rendered illegal 
where A destroyed a dike because B 
threatened to kill him if he did not, A 
would argue that he acted under duress, 
whereas if A destroyed the dike in order 
to protect more valuable property from 
flooding, A could claim the defense of 
necessity. See Generally LaFave and 
M 374-384." (444ILS. at p. 409,100 
S.Ctatp.634.) 
Although California law regarding the 
"justification" defenses (Le, "duress," "ne-
cessity," "compulsion," etc see, fn. 2, 
ante) appears sparse in comparison to that 
of most American jurisdictions, there none-
theless exist several Court of Appeal deci-
sions which provide some guidance as to 
the parameters of those defenses-most 
recently the court in People v. Patrick 
(1981) 126 Cal.App.3d 952, 179 CaLRptr. 
276, noted that: 
"A/CAoagA trie exact confines of the 
necessity defense remain clouded, a well-
established central element involves the 
emergency nature of the situation, Le., 
the imminence of the greater harm which 
the illegal act seeks to prevent (See 
State i\ Johnson [M) miintfm 
fl83 N:.W.2d .541, .543,45 A.L.R.3d 1432].) 
The commission of a, crime cannot be 
countenanced where tljere exists the pos-
sibility of some alternate means to allevi-
ate the threatened greater harm." (126 
CaLApp.3d at p. 960,179 CaLRptr. 276.) 
jjn the leading California case regarding J i 1 
the applicability of the duress defense to a 
charge of prison escape, People v. Lorn-
camp (1974) 43 CaLApp.3d 823, 118 Cal. 
Rptr. 110, the court fashioned a five part 
judicial test for determining the avaiia&iEy 
of the defense. In such cases, the Lover-
camp court observed that it was not for-
mulating a new rule of law, but rather was 
applying "rules long ago established in a 
manner which effects fundamental jus-
tice." (43 Cal.App.3d at p. 827,118 Cal. 
Rptr. 110.) h People v. Graham (WW 
Cal.App.3d 238, 129 CaLRptr. 31 it was 
held that the burden of proof in cases in 
which duress was asserted by a defendant, 
required only that the defendant "raise a 
reasonable doubt that he had acted in the 
exercise of his free will." (57 Cai.App.3d 
i4*eaLApp.3dSupp.23 PEOPLE v. PENA 269 
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Two issues of apparent first impression circumstances, or by the application of 
in this jurisdiction must be addressed be- duress on the defendant by another per-
fore imposition of theinstinttppezlm be son."M 
effectat
 j [2 ] Thus, we hold that the defense of j 
(1) Is the duress/necessity defense avail- duress, is available, presuming other requi-
able to a defendant charged with misde- sites of such a defense are satisfied, where 
meanor driving under the influence?
 a defendant is charged with the violation of 
(2) Is the duress/necessity defense avail Vehicle Code section 23152, subdivision (a), 
able to a defendant who commits an un-
lawful act in an effort to prevent immi- Tie Duress Defense is Applicable To Sk&-
nent harm to a third party? tions In Mich The Threatened Hwn 
[1] With respect to the first question, it Is To Pems 0ther to n*Mml' 
appears settled that the duress defense is 2/3i 
available to a defendant charged with any [t appears that no California case has 
crime except one which involves the taking directly addressed the question of whether 
of the life of an innocent person. (15 Am. the duress defense is available in situations 
Jur.Crim.Uw § 31A; also see annotation
 wherein the C0€rcive circumstances ari,;e 
entitled Coercion, compulsion, or duress as
 from threatened harm not to ^ defendait 
personally, but to some party other than 
the accused. The classic example is that of 
a bank teller whose child has been kid-
naped. The kidnapers order the teller to 
use his position of trust at the bank to 
embezzle money for the kidnapers. The 
teller is informed that his child will be 
killed if he does not comply with the ce-
mands. The teller himself is not threat-
ened with bodily harm. Would an embez-
zlement under such circumstances consti-
tute a crime? (See Conde. Necessity De-
logic which compels the availability of such
 ]M; A A>Ir M m h Cnmul [)e, 
defenses is described in Fmher r. State
 fm Sy$lm {m 3 lCLA LRev ^ 
(1970) 8 MdApp. 439,260 A.2d 656,661: 
"It is essential to a crime that the 
defendant committed a voluntary act 
.... The voluntary requirement of the 
defense to criminal prosecution, 40 A.L 
R.2d 908.) Typical case authority for this 
proposition is represented by holdings such 
as the following: "It is established by the 
great weight of authority that although 
coercion does not excuse taking the life of 
an innocent person, yet it does excuse in all 
lesser crimes." {Stale r. Si Clair (Mo. 
1953) 262 S.Wid 25,27.) "We hold that 
duress is an affirmative defense to a crime 
other than murder...." (Stale r. Toscano 
(1977) 74 NJ. 421,378 Aid 755,756.) The 
438-439.) 
It appears that virtually every jurisdic-
tion in which the issue has been settled 
criminal act relates directly to compul- permits threats to third parties to sa&fy 
sion; it is a defense as to ail crimes the requisite coercive circumstance require-
except taking the life of an innocent per- ment so as to bring the duress defense into 
son that the defendant acted under a play. Perhaps the best articulation of the 
compelling force of coercion or duress. 1 rationale for permitting threats to persons 
Wharton's Criminal Law (Anderson) Sec- other than the defendant to allow invoca-
tion 123, P. 261. The compulsion may be uon of these defenses, appears in a Massa-
by necessity, that is duress arising from cnusetts :ase. Commonmlth i\ Uarlin 
10. Two caxs, both from Texas, specifically deal 
with the applicability of the justification defens-
es to prosecutions for driving while intoxicated. 
These cases, Bush v. State (1981) TexApp., 624 
S.Wid 377 and D m v. State (1977) TccCr. 
App., 359 S.W Id 307—recognize the apphcabiii-
ty of such defenses to the charge of driving 
under the influence (although both cases held 
that the necessary elements of the proffered 
defenses were not factually established), (flee, 
also, Browning v. Slate (1943) 31 AiiApp. 137, 
13 Soid 54 [defense of compulsion held to 
'excuse crime of reckless driving]; State v. Hap 
land (196;; 4 Con.iCir 424,233 Aid o9S [ille-
gal parking).) 
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(1976) 369 Mass. 640,341 N.E.2d 885,891-
892: 
"Whatever the precise precedents, it is 
hardly conceivable that the law of the 
commonwealth, or, indeed, of any juris-
diction [fn. omitted], should mark as 
criminal those who intervene forcibly to 
protect others; for the law to do so 
would aggravate the fears .which lead to 
the alienation of people from one anoth-
er, an alienation symbolized for our time 
by the notorious Genovese incident 
[Footnote omitted.] To the fear of "in-
volvement" and of injury to oneself if 
one answered a call for help would be 
added the fear of possible criminal prose-
cution. [Fn. omitted.]" 
The Martin court observed that some 
European countries have passed laws mak-
ing it a criminal offense not to render aid 
in certain circumstances: 
"It is instructive that the laws of some 
j u countries in Continental Europe jde-
nounce as a crime the failure to render 
help in given circumstances. See J.P. 
Dawson, Negotiorum Gestio; The Al-
truistic Intermeddler, U Harvard Law 
Review 817, 1073, 1101-1114 (1961). 
Thus art 330c of the West German Crim-
inal Code, as amended in 1953, provides 
(translation by Professor Dawson): 
'Whoever does not render help in cases 
of accident, common danger or necessity 
although help is required and under the 
circumstances is exactable, and in partic-
ular is possible without danger of serious 
injury to himself and without violation of 
other important [Wichtige] duties, will be 
punished by imprisonment up to one year 
or by fine.' l i , at 11044105." (341 
N.E.2datp.891,fn.l2.) 
11. Penal Code section 26 provides: 
"All persons are capable of committing crimes 
except those belonging to the following classes: 
"One—Children under the age of 14, in the 
absence of clear proof that at the time of com-
mitting the act charged against them, they knew 
its wrongfulness. 
Tw^-Idiots. 
"Three—Pcrsons-^ho committed the act or 
made the omission charged under an ignorance 
or mistake of fact, which disproves any criminal 
intent. 
[3] In the case at bench, the People 
contend that Penal Code section 26" re-
stricts the application of duress type de-
fenses to cases in which the defendant's 
person is the object of coercive threats of 
bodily harm. The People's argument can-
not withstand scrutiny. To begin, nothing 
in the language of section 26 can be con-
strued as limiting the applicability of the 
duress-necessity defenses to the circum-
stances therein described. The section 
merely enumerates the classes of persons 
who, under the circumstances contemplated 
by the statute, are incapable of commit-
ting acts which constitute crimes. Noth-
ing in the statute can be read to require the 
conclusion that a person not so enumerat-
ed, Li, a person who is capable of commit-
ting.^ crime, has in fact committed one by 
htf action in a given case. Indeed, other 
sections of the Penal Code explicitly autho-
rize, under certain circumstances, the com-
mission of acts which ordinarily would con-
stitute crimes. In particular, we refer to 
Penal Code sections 692-694: 
"Lawful resistance to the commission of 
a public offense may be made: ^ 
"1. By the party about to be injured; 
"2. By other parties." (Pen.Code, 
§692.) 
^Resistance sufficient to prevent the of-
fense may be made by the party about to 
be injured: 
"1. To prevent an offense against his 
person, or his family or some member 
thereof. 
"2. To prevent an illegal attempt by 
force to take or injure property in his 
lawful possession." (PenCode, § 693.) 
"Any other person in aid or defense of 
the person about to be injured, may 
Tour-Persons who committed the act 
charged without being conscious thereof. 
"Five-Persons who committed the act or 
made the omission charged through misfortune 
or by accident, when it appears that there was 
no evil design, intention, or culpable negligence. 
"Sii—Persons (unless the crime be punishable 
withideath) whojammitted theact or made the 
omission charged under threats or menaces suf-
ficient to show that they had reasonable cause 
to and did believe their lives would be endan-
gered if they refused." 
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make resistance sufficient to prevent the We recognize that, under the require-
offense." (Pen.Code, § 694.) ments listed above there is no suggestion 
Case law construing the above quoted ^ fte to* s o u ? k t o •* mM be ^ 
sections of the Penal W e uniformly holds of death or great bodfly injury. Penal 
that it is not necessary that the threatened Code section 26, subdivision six provides 
harm be actual, only that it reasonably that persons who commit acts (other than 
appear so: "Justification does not depend capital offenses) otherwise constituting 
on the existence of actual danger but on crimes, while in reasonable fear for their 
appearances. [Citations.]" (Peopfe ti Col lives should they refuse to commit the act, 
Iks (1961) 189 CaLApp.2d 515,588,11 Cal cannot be held criminally liable. As we 
Rptr. 504. See, also, People v. McKee stated earlier, Penal Code section 26, subdi-
(1968) 265 Cal.App.2d 53,61,71 CaLRptr. vision six is not coextensive with the pa-
26; People v. hckson (1965) 233 Cal. rameters of the duress defense. Indeed it 
App.2d 639,641413,43 CaLRptr. 81T.) is clear that this subdivision merely ad-
dresses itself to one particular eircum-
[41 We hold that a defense of duress stance within the general requirement that 
may properly be predicated upon threats of the charged act must not cause harm dis-
harm to persons other than the accused, proportionate to the harm avoided. Under 
the circumstances contemplated by section 
Elements of the Duress Defense 26, subdivision six, the harm sought to be 
The following requirements have tradi- avoided is the loss of life of the actor, 
tionally been held to be prerequisites to the Since no act undertaken by the threatened 
establishment of the defense of justifies party in such circumstances (other than the 
tion/duress: 
1. The act charged as criminal must 
have been done to prevent a significant 
commission of a capital offense) would 
cause a harm disproportionate to the harm 
to be avoided, it is clear that the subdivi-
sion is merely descriptive of one set of 
possible circumstances falling within the 
2. There most have been no adequate ambit of the duress defense. However, as 
alternative to the commission of the act;13
 we have ^  ^ fc defense o{ duress 
3. The harm caused by the act must not is not limited to situations wherein the ac-
be disproportionate to the harm avoided;12 cused acted in reasonable fear of his life. 
4. The accused must entertain a good- 0ther sections of ^ Penal ^ M -
faith belief that his act was necessary to §§ 692,693,694 see infra) explicitly per-
prevent the greater harm;u 
j o . Such belief must be objectively rea-
sonable under all the circumstances; and 
6. The accused must not have substan-
tially contributed to the creation of the 
emergency. 
[5] These determinations are for the tri- defense will excuse fewer and fewer acts 
er of fact undertaken to avoid that harm.15 
mit the commission of acts otherwise crimi-
nal, under circumstances where the actor 
need not be in fear of his life to be able to 
avail himself of the duress defense. Under 
the "disproportionate harms" requirement, 
it is plain that as the harm sought to be 
avoided decreases in seriousness the duress 
11 Sec, eg., Cleveland v. Municipality of Anchor-
a ^ {Alaska 1981) 631 PJd 1073,1078. 
e n d harm, the defenses will fa i l" (444 US. at 
p. 411,100 S.O. at p. 635.) 
13. Sec, also, Med Stales v. Bailey, supra (du- 14. People v. Patrick, supra, 126 CaLAppJd at 
ress and necessity) "Under any definition of page 962,179 CaLRptr. 276. 
these defenses one principle remains constant: 
If there was a reasonable, legs! alternative to 
violating the law, 'a chance both to refuse to do 
the criminal act and also to avoid the threat-
15. This is the reason that the justification de-
fenses are sometimes referred to as the "choice 
of evils' defense. 
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Lastly, with respect to the oft-cited "im- sonable one does not require that appellant 
minence" requirement of the defense, it is be in fact correct in his assessment of the 
apparent that this requirement is included situation. Rather, as in any situation 
within ^ more general "no alternative" where a defendant claims as his defense 
requirement Obviously, the more immi- that the charged acts were justified as hav-
nent the peril, the less likely the existence ing been undertaken in response to some 
of an alternative course of action. (See, emergency circumstance (Le., self-defense), 
also, State v. Toscano, supra, 378 Aid at & defendant may rely on what he reason-
pp. 762-765.) *My believes to be true. Whether appel-
lant, in the instant case, had a reasonable 
Appellant Was Entitled To An Instruction y ^ f that Sara was in danger from Depu-
On the Defense of Duress
 ty Webb is a question of fact That Webb 
[6] We now evaluate the merits of the seemed clearly to be an on-duty police offh 
instant appeal in light of the foregoing cer may be a factor to consider in assessing 
legal principles. Appellant would be enti- *e reasonableness of defendant's fear, but 
tied to an acquittal of thejcharge against il * c e r t a i n ' y n o t the o n l ? s u c h factor11 
him, notwithstanding the fact of hi^opera- 0ther considerations which the jury could 
tion of a motor vehicle while l e g a l l y W P ^ ' w e i ? h inclu(ie the c r e d i b i l i t ) ' o f 
cated, if he could convince the jury of the D e?u t? Webb's mM reason for ^ 
truth of the following: Sah from the scene a ? a i n s t her aPParent 
/1X - . . , .. . . .., , wishes, the reasonableness or unreason-
(1) frt e held a genuine behef that ^
 rf W s ^ mi ^ o{ 
Sara Marrufo was ,n danger of assault by
 and ^ and fc ^ rf fc 
or through Deputy Webb; , . c . , , 
0 r
 * search oi Sara in particular. 
(2) That appellant's good faith belief was 
objectively reasonable under the totality of [9,10] We note that in appellant's first 
the circumstances; trial, the jury during its deliberations, re-
(3) That appellant operated his vehicle in turned to the courtroom and r e W t e d 
obedience to his fear for Sara's safety and [m the court instructions on the "defense 
not for any other purpose; ' o{ justification." The court advised the 
m m , , il i L j -i «fc i F T that the defense of [justification was \n 
(4) That appellant had no opportunity to ,,, . . r -
 lL . -
1
-
engage alternative legal means of protect- * f f l l a b l e as a defen,Se to theLcharge' 
ing Sara from the danger he believed she ?e flrst»' was ^  l0 reach ^ 
j .^ diet. At the second trial, we know from 
' the docket, that the jurv experienced con-
(5) That appellant was not substantially
 sjderable ^ ^ ^ d;aling ^ ^ iri. 
at fault m the creation of the emergency
 iMim We a i s o know lhat al ^ 
situabon which he claims jusffies hb ac- ^ ^
 m a t (rom ^ ^ 
ton in driving while intoxicated. , .
 ( . . . . . . ., , 
6
 lant for a specific instruction on the de-
[7,81 We observe that the requirement fense of duress and that \he instruction 
that appellant's fear be an objectively rea- was refused" In view of the fact that 
fashion a legally adequate instruction in re-
sponse to appellant's request 
The trial judge was not required to adopt the 
language suggebted by a defendant m the 
Court's instructions to the jury, however, 
when a theory of defense finds some support 
in the evidence and in the law, a defendant \$ 
entitled to some mention of that theory in the 
instructions. United States v. Swallow, 511 
F 2d 514 (10th Cir.1975). Even when the sup-
porting evidence is weak or of doubtful :K6 
bility its presence requires an instruction on 
the theory of defense. Tatum v. United 
16. Police officers, on duty or otherwise, have 
been known to commit crimes. Further, recent 
events demonstrate the possibility that police 
officers may be impersonated. Thus, we cannot 
hold that Deputy Webb's status as a law enforce-
ment officer required, as a matter of law, that 
appellant be convinced of Webb's benign inten-
tion toward Sara. 
17* The insttctioh requested by appellant was 
defective in at least one particular, i.e., it omit-
ted the requirement that defendant's fears for 
San be objectively reasonable. However, that 
1
 -- . ~i.*.,» ,k» tri-jl rnurt of its dutv to 
149 CaLAppJi Supp> 41 PEOPLE v. JONES 273 
ateuft7CiLRptr.273 (CaLSaper. 1983) 
duress was appellant's only defense, it was years in which he did not file state income 
error for the trial court to refuse to in- tax return; and (4) prosecutor was not 
struct the jury regarding the availability of required to show that defendant intended 
this defense. to evade requirements of the statute. 
CONCLUSION Affirme(L 
We hold that the defense of justification 
was available to the appellant herein and
 f „ . . .. *~ A t n * • ». l a • * i L Criminal Law £>20 the faflure to s>o instruct the jury constitut- „ . . . , . ,.
 tt 
edprejAalem*. Accordingly,thejadg- < * * " » o f ^ * J * 
mentisrerersei not common-law crunes and classdied
 JS 
"malum prohibitum" rather than malum 
FOSTER, PJ., and COOPERMAN, J., in s e<" a r e P™h a f a l e d e sP i t e absence of 




 lf^y 2. Constitutional Law ^285.2 
Taxation $=952 
Statute making it a crime not to file 
state income tax return does not violaie 
149 CaUppJd Supp. 41 due process because it is a strict liability 
j « jThe PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent statute which does not require scienter, 
since power to tax is certainly with state's 
police power and failure to file returns and 
Leroy S. JONES, Defendant ^ ^ ^
 be ^ ^ of ^  ^ 
and Appellant ^ West's Ann.CaI.Rev. & T. Caie 
Cr. A. 1123. § 19401; U.S.C.A. ConsL\meni 14. 
Appellate Department. Superior Court. 
San Bernardino County. 
Sept 26,1983. 
4. Criminal Law $=338(2) 
3. Criminal Law ^569 
Evidence in prosecution for failing to 
file state income tax returns was insuffi-
cient to support claim of discriminatory 
Defendant was convicted m the Mania- ^m^(m based on defendant'5 m^' 
pal Court, San Bernardino County, Dan L s h l P i n ^ P r o t e s t e r W 
Rankins, J., and Thomas Parry, Temporar>f 
Judge, of failing to file state income tax 
returns, and he appealed. The Superior Circumstantial evidence is an accept* 
Court, Appellate Department, Ziebarth, ble form of proof, even in criminal cases. 
PJ., held that (1) statute making it a 
crime to fail to file state income tax returns 5. Taxation 6=>1103 
does not violate due process because it is a Evidence in prosecution for failure to 
strict liability statute which does not re- file state income tax returns, including tes-
quire scienter (2) evidence was insufficient timony of fellow employee of defendant 
to support claim of discriminatory prosecu- that defendant never complained about not 
tion premised on defendant's membership getting paid, was sufficient to support jun* 
in tax protester group; (3) evidence was finding that defendant actually received his 
sufficient to support jury finding that de- earnings in years he did not file tax re-
fendant actually received his earnings in turns. 
Slates, 88 U.SippJ).C 384.190 FJd 612 (i/mraf 5 t o » y. Gamer (dlh OT.1976K 529 F2d 
(1951)" w 970. See. also. Pwle v. Seieno (1974) 10 
CalJd 703.716,112 CaLRptr. 1.51S PJd 913.) 
sion to be other than a just one 
the wife brought more assets to the mar-
riage than did the husband, the husband 
was the couple's sole source of income for 
the first year of the marriage, and contrib-
uted a significant portion of the income 
thereafter. In light of these circumstanc-
es, the decision to make an equal division 
was not an abuse of discretion by the di-
vorce court.1 
Whether the division was in fact equal is 
another issue. The wife squarely con-
demns the divorce court's finding that "the 
marital property in the possession of the 
Plaintiff and Defendant is substantially 
equal and therefore each party should keep 
that property." The wife further argues 
that the divorce court erred in failing to 
make specific findings as to the value, iden-
tity, and location of items of personal prop-
erty. Although the unsworn lists of items 
and values submitted to the court by the 
parties were markedly disparate, the di-
vorce court did not indicate on whose ap-
praisal reliance was placed. 
[7,8] In a case such as this it may be 
impracticable and nearly impossible for the 
divorce court to make a specific finding as 
to the value and location of each chattel 
with which the court is dealing. Here that 
problem is exacerbated by the parties' dis-
agreement as to both values and locations, 
their disputes with some of the values as-
signed by the independent appraiser, and 
their failure in many instances to offer 
evidence of value apart from their own 
respective estimates. While we deplore the 
divorce court's failure to state upon which 
appraisal or appraisals the court was rely-
ing, cf. Shirley v. Shirley, 482 A.2d 845, 
849 (Me.1984), nevertheless the court was 
certainly entitled to rely upon the evidence 
the court found most credible. 
Moreover, upon the court's issuance of 
its findings of facts and conclusions of law, 
1. In Shirley v. Shirley, 482 A.2d 845. 849 (Mc. 
1984), we voiced our disapproval of the trial 
court's dividing the marital property according 
to who currently had possession. However, we 
found that because the Plaintiff had failed to 
STATE ve KNOWLES Me. 335 
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Although pursuant to M.R.Civ.P. 52(b), the Plaintiff 
could have easily requested further find-
ings, specifically addressing the estimated 
values upon which the court was relying. 
This she failed to do. Therefore, we can-
not now say that the court's omission of 
more specific findings as to value consti-
tutes reversible error. 
[9,10] Finally, the wife contends that 
the Superior Court erred in failing to 
award her periodic alimony or a lump sum. 
The divorce court is afforded considerable 
discretion in its decision as to alimony. 
See, e.g., Skelton v. Skelton, 490 A.2d 
1204, 1207 (Me.1985); Shirley, 482 A.2d at 
847. In the instant case, we find no abuse 
of this discretion. The wife left the mar-
riage, which was of relatively short dura-
tion, with substantial assets. In addition, 
she had the ability to support herself as a 
counselor and an antique dealer. The rul-
ing therefore was not inappropriate. 
The entry is: 
Judgment affirmed. 
All concurring. 
(q | HY HUMB£« SYSTEM > 
STATE of Maine 
Linwood KNOWLES. 
Supreme Judicial Court of Maine. 
Argued May 2, 1985. 
Decided July 12, 1985. 
Defendant was convicted in the Superi-
or Court, Somerset County, of operating a 
provide estimates of values, we could not deter-
mine whether the division was inequitable. In 
the instant case, in contrast, both parties sup-
plied estimates, and an independent appraisal of 
many, but not all, antiques was performed. 
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motor vehicle after his right to operate had 
been revoked because he was a habitual 
offender and of operating a motor vehicle 
while under the influence of intoxicating 
liquor, and he appealed. The Supreme Ju-
dicial Court, Violette, J., held that trial 
court improperly denied defendant's re-
quest for an instruction on competing 
harms to effect that, though he was al-
leged to have operated his van while intoxi-
cated and under license suspension, such 
operation could be justified because he be-
lieved it to be necessary to avoid imminent 
physical harm to himself or another. 
Judgment vacated, and case remanded 
for proceedings consistent with opinion. 
1. Criminal Law <3=>772(6) 
A defendant is entitled to a jury in-
struction on a particular defense when he 
can point to the existence of evidence suffi-
cient to make the existence of all the facts 
constituting the defense a reasonable hy-
pothesis for the fact finder to entertain 
regardless of whether it is the prosecution 
or the defendant or both who produce the 
evidence. 17-A M.R.S.A. § 103, subd. 1. 
2. Criminal Law e=>43.5 
Inconsistent defenses may generally 
be interposed in a criminal case such as 
when a defendant pleads both not guilty 
and not guilty by reason of insanity to the 
same charge. 
3. Criminal Law <s=>56(ll) 
Reliance upon a particular defense by 
the defendant should not automatically re-
lieve the prosecution of its burden to prove 
all the elements of the crime charged be-
yond a reasonable doubt 
4. Criminal Law <fc*330 
The denial of the criminal act by the 
defendant should not relieve the prosecu-
tion of its burden to negate any defense 
generated by the evidence. 
5. Criminal Law <*=>43.5-
It was not inconsistent for the defend-
ant to deny that he had operated his van 
while intoxicated and under license suspen-
sion and at same time assert that his opera-
tion of the van could be justified under the 
doctrine of competing harms because he 
believed it to be necessary to avoid immi-
nent physical harm to himself or another. 
17-A M.R.S.A. § 103, subd. 1; 29 M.R.S.A. 
§§ 1312-B, 2298; Rules Crim.Proc., Rule 
11(a). 
6. Criminal Law e=*720(6) 
The prosecution is free to point out an 
inconsistency in the assertion of defenses 
by the defendant during the trial and at the 
time of argument. 
7. Criminal Law <s=>43.5 
A defendant should have the option of 
presenting inconsistent defenses to the fact 
finder as long as there is evidence, from 
whatever source, that could rationally sup-
port those defenses. 
8. Criminal Law <s=>772(6) 
Trial court improperly denied defend-
ant's request for an instruction on compet-
ing harms to effect that, though he was 
alleged to have operated his van while in-
toxicated and under license suspension, 
such operation could be justified because 
he believed it to be necessary to avoid 
imminent physical harm to himself or an-
other. 17-A M.R.S.A. § 103, subd. 1; 29 
M.R.S.A. §§ 1312-B, 2298; Rules Crim. 
Proc., Rule 11(a). 
John Alsop (orally), Asst Dist Atty., 
Skowhegan, for plaintiff. 
Vafiades, Brountas & Kominsky, Jeffrey 
L. Hjelm (orally), Bangor, for defendant 
Before McKUSICK, CJ., and NICHOLS, 
ROBERTS, VIOLETTE, GLASSMAN and 
SCOLNIK, JJ. 
VIOLETTE, Justice. 
After a jury trial in the Superior Court, 
Somerset County, the defendant was con-
victed of operating a motor vehicle after 
his right to operate had been revoked be-
cause he was a habitual offender, 29 M.R. 
STATE v. KNOWLES 
Cite *s 495 U d 335 (Me, 1985) 
Me. 337 
S.A. § 2298 (Supp.1984), and operating a 
motor vehicle while under the influence of 
intoxicating liquor, 29 M.R.S.A. § 1312-B 
(Supp.1984). The sole issue on appeal is 
whether the trial court erred when it re-
fused to instruct the jury on the competing 
harms defense, 17-A M.R.S.A. § 103 
(1983). We determine that the court im-
properly denied the defendant's request for 
such an instruction. We therefore sustain 
the appeal. 
On the afternoon of July 13, 1984, the 
defendant, Linwood Knowles, and several 
other people travelled to Skowhegan in a 
van owned by Knowles. They drove to the 
parking lot of the Midtown Hotel. Robert 
Harris operated the van on this trip to 
Skowhegan. Knowles's right to operate 
had been revoked because he was a habit-
ual offender, 29 M.R.S.A. § 2292 (Supp. 
1984). 
After the group arrived at the Midtown 
parking lot, Knowles went alone to the 
hotel bar. According to Knowles, he ex-
pected to meet a friend, Crystal, later at 
the bar. With permission from the owner 
of the Midtown, Knowles recorded some 
music from the bar's jukebox with a tape 
machine that he had brought with him. 
At some point, there was a confrontation 
between Knowles and another person at 
the bar, Walter Moody. Moody and several 
of his friends assaulted Knowles. Knowles 
left the hotel area and called the Skowhe-
gan Police Department to report the beat-
ing. The dispatcher, Antonio Lemieux, told 
Knowles not to return to the hotel, and 
that an officer might assist him if he came 
to the police station. Knowles told Lem-
ieux that he had to return to the Midtown 
bar to get his keys. According to Lemieux, 
Knowles sounded intoxicated. 
Knowles then returned to the Midtown 
bar. He was again assaulted by Moody 
and his friends. After this beating, 
Knowles walked to the Skowhegan Police 
Department to seek assistance. He spoke 
with Sergeant Asselin. Both Sergeant 
Asselin and Antonio Lemieux observed 
Knowles to be very intoxicated at this time. 
Sergeant Asselin warned Knowles not to 
start trouble at the Midtown and told him 
not to drive anywhere. The sergeant in-
formed Knowles that he would be on patrol 
near the hotel bar in case there was any 
problem. 
Knowles then went back to his van in the 
parking lot at the Midtown. There, he 
spoke with Dwayne and Dorothy Bennett, 
two people who had accompanied him on 
the trip to Skowhegan that afternoon, and 
who had returned to the van to wait for 
him. Knowles told them that he was going 
into the bar to find his friend Crystal and 
that they would then all leave the Midtown. 
Moody and his friends again assaulted 
Knowles and would not let him enter the 
bar. Dwayne Bennett went into the bar 
and retrieved Knowles's tape machine for 
him. At that point, Dwayne and Dorothy 
Bennett left the area on foot. 
Knowles testified that Crystal then ap-
peared in the parking lot near his van. At 
this point, Knowles stated, Moody and his 
friends were still assaulting him. Accord-
ing to Knowles, Crystal got inside the van. 
Knowles testified that he then got into the 
passenger seat of the van. Knowles stated 
that either Dwayne Bennett or Crystal had 
retrieved his keys from inside the bar. Ac-
cording to Knowles, he then told Crystal to 
drive to a nearby pay phone to call the 
State Police. Knowles testified that Crys-
tal drove the van over to the pay phone. 
Upon seeing Moody and his friends ap-
proaching them, Knowles stated, he began 
to look for his shotgun in his van to defend 
himself and Crystal, who was attempting 
to use the pay phone. Knowles testified 
that he was in the driver's seat of the van 
when he saw a police cruiser arrive at the 
scene. 
After Knowles had left the Skowhegan 
Police Station, Sergeant Asselin had driven 
to and parked at a point where he could 
observe the parking lot of the Midtown bar. 
The sergeant later observed Knowles's van 
proceeding through this parking lot Ser-
geant Asselin then followed the van and 
pulled up next to it at a point where it had 
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stopped. Sergeant Asselin testified that 
the driver was the only person he observed 
in the van when he was following it, and 
that Knowles was seated behind the steer-
ing wheel when he pulled up next to the 
van. The sergeant further stated that, 
when he arrived, there was no female in 
the area who could have been Crystal. Ac-
cording to Sergeant Asselin, Knowles, who 
was still intoxicated, stated that he drove 
the van to save someone's life. The ser-
geant then placed Knowles under arrest. 
Knowles maintained that he never oper-
ated the van. According to Knowles, Crys-
tal disappeared shortly after the police 
cruiser arrived. 
At the close of the evidence at trial, the 
defendant asked the presiding justice to 
instruct the jury on the defense of compet-
ing harms under 17-A M.R.S.A. § 103.1 
The justice determined, however, that, be-
cause the defendant testified that he did 
not operate the van, he was not entitled to 
an instruction that his operation of the van 
could be justified under the doctrine of 
competing harms. The defendant renewed 
his request before the jury retired to delib-
erate. The justice again refused to give 
the instruction. 
[1] A defendant is entitled to a jury 
instruction on a particular defense when he 
"can point to the existence of . . . evidence 
sufficient to make the existence of all the 
facts constituting the defense a reasonable 
hypothesis for the factfinder to entertain." 
State v. Glidden, 487 A.2d 642, 644 (Me. 
1985); see State v. Reed, 459 A.2d 178,181 
(Me.1983); State v. Bahre, 456 A.2d 860, 
866 (Me.1983); State v. Greenwald, 454 
A.2d 827, 830 (Me.1982). This is true 
whether it is the prosecution or the defend-
ant or both who produce the relevant evi-
dence. Glidden, 487 A.2d at 644; State v. 
Kee, 398 A.2d 384, 386 (Me.1979). 
1. Section 103(1), in pertinent part, provides: 
Conduct which the actor believes to be neces-
sary to avoid imminent physical harm to him-
self or another is justifiable if the desirability 
and urgency of avoiding such harm outweigh, 
according to ordinary standards of reason-
In the case at bar, the presiding justice 
did not even reach this question of whether 
the competing harms defense was generat-
ed by the evidence. Rather, the justice 
refused to give the instruction because he 
determined, as a matter of law, that a 
defendant who denies that he committed 
the crime cannot also assert the inconsist-
ent defense that he did commit the crime 
because he "believefd] it to be necessary to 
avoid imminent physical harm to himself or 
another," 17-A M.R.S.A. § 103(1). 
[2-4] "Generally, inconsistent defenses 
may be interposed in a criminal case." 
State v. Harris, 189 Conn. 268, 271, 455 
A.2d 342, 344 (1983); see United States v. 
King, 587 F.2d 956, 965 (9th Cir.1978); 
Johnson v. United States, 426 F.2d 651, 
656 (D.C.Cir.1970) (per curiam); cf. M.R. 
Crim.P. 11(a) ("A defendant may plead both 
not guilty and not guilty by reason of in-
sanity to the same charge."). 'The rule in 
favor of inconsistent defenses reflects the 
belief of modern criminal jurisprudence 
that a criminal defendant should be accord-
ed every reasonable protection in defending 
himself against governmental prosecu-
tion.'' United States v. Demma, 523 F.2d 
981, 985 (9th Cir.1975) (en banc). Reliance 
upon a particular defense by the defendant 
should not automatically relieve the prose-
cution of its burden to prove all the ele-
ments of the crime charged beyond a rea-
sonable doubt. See id. at 986; People v. 
Perez, 62 Cal.2d 769, 776, 44 Cal.Rptr. 326, 
329, 401 P.2d 934, 938 (1965); Harris, 189 
Conn, at 271-276, 455 A.2d at 344-45; 
State v. Branam, 161 N J.Super. 53, 59-62, 
390 A.2d 1186, 1190-91, affd 79 NJ. 301, 
399 A.2d 299 (1978). Similarly, the denial 
of the criminal act by the defendant should 
not relieve the prosecution of its burden to 
negate any defense generated by the evi-
dence.2 See King, 587 F.2d at 965 (defend-
ableness, the harm sought to be prevented by 
the statute defining the crime charged. 
2. The State must disprove beyond a reasonable 
doubt the existence of any defense generated by 
the evidence. 17-A M.R.SJV. § 101(1) (1983); 
see Glidden, 487 A.2d at 644. 
STATE v. FLICK 
Cite u 495/124 339 (Me. 1985) 
ant's denial of drug transfer could not re- defenses to 
lieve prosecution of burden of refuting evi-
dence that alleged transfer, if made by 
defendant, was in the course of his profes-
sional practice). 
The State, however, insists that "it is . . . 
against logic and common sense" to allow a 
defendant to assert the competing harms 
defense after he denies that he committed 
the crime. For authority, the State relies 
exclusively upon decisions concerning 
whether a defendant who denies the under-
lying criminal conduct may also invoke the 
defense of entrapment 
Me. 339 
the fact finder, however, as 
long as there is evidence, from whatever 
source, that could rationally support those 
defenses. 
[5] Although many courts have refused 
to permit a defendant who denies the un-
derlying criminal conduct to rely upon the 
entrapment defense as well, the decisions 
are "both literally and figuratively spread 
all over the map on this question." United 
States v. Valencia, 645 F.2d 1158, 1170 (2d 
Cir.l980).s We express no opinion our-
selves regarding whether a defendant in 
Maine may rely upon the entrapment de-
fense if he denies that he engaged in the 
criminal act. It is sufficient for us to say 
that there is nothing about the competing 
harms defense that would prompt us in this 
case to depart from the principle that a 
defendant may assert inconsistent defens-
es. 
[6,71 We note that the assertion of in-
consistent defenses may be an unwise4 and 
therefore unlikely tactical choice.5 See 
Demma, 523 F.2d at 985. The prosecution 
is free to point out such an inconsistency in 
the defendant's case during trial and in 
argument. State v. Hinds, 485 A.2d 231, 
238-39 (Me. 1984). The defendant should 
have the option of presenting inconsistent 
3. Federal and state cases, respectively, dealing 
with this topic are collected at Annot.. 54 A.L.R. 
Fed. 644 (1981). and Annot., 5 A.L.R.4th 1128 
(1981). 
4. In the context of the entrapment defense, one 
court has gone so far as to remark that "it is 
difficult to conceive of a competent attorney 
arguing to a court and jury that the defendant 
did not [commit the criminal act], but, if so, he 
was entrapped." United States v. Liparota, 735 
[8] W« conclude that the trial court 
erred by refusing to instruct the jury on 
the competing harms defense because of its 
determination, as a matter of law, that the 
defendant could not assert inconsistent de-
fenses. If the competing harms defense 
was generated by the evidence, from what-
ever source, the defendant was entitled to 
an-instruction on it, regardless of the fact 
that he denied committing the underlying 
criminal acts. 
The entry is: 
Judgment vacated. 
Remanded for proceedings consistent 
with the opinion herein. 
All concurring. 
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STATE of Maine 
v. 
Daniel FLICK. 
Supreme Judicial Court of Maine. 
Argued May 9, 1985. 
Decided July 12, 1985. 
Defendant invoked an exception to the 
final judgment rule in order to appeal from 
F.2d 1044, 1048 (7th Cir.1984) (quoting United 
States v. Kaiser, 138 F.2d 219, 220 (7th Cir. 
1943)), rev'd on other grounds, 471 VS. , 
105 S.Ct. 2084, 85 L.Ed.2d 434 (1985). 
5. Illustrative is State v. Boilard, where the de-
fendant made a "tactical decision not to argue 
. . . justification [under 17-A M.R.S.A. § 104 
(1983) ], for fear of weakening the primary de-
fense of denial of assaultive conduct." 488 A.2d 
1380, 1390-91 (Me.1985). 
STATE of Vermont 
v. 
Roger L DAPO. 
No. 82-201. 
Supreme Court of Vermont 
Dec. 2, 1983. 
Defendant was convicted in the Dis-
trict Court, Unit No. 2, Chittenden Circuit, 
Alden T. Bryan, J., of operating motor vehi-
cle while under influence of intoxicating 
liquor, and he appealed. The Supreme 
Court, Billings, CJ., held that: (1) delay of 
37 days between impaneling of jurors and 
trial was not prejudicial, and (2) trial court 
did not err in failing to charge defense of 
necessity. 
Affirmed. 
1. Criminal Law <$=» 854(2) 
In misdemeanor cases, discretion of tri-
al court controls issue of separation of jury, 
and burden of demonstrating abuse of this 
discretion is on party claiming the abuse, 
but all that is required is showing of exist-
ence of circumstances capable of prejudic-
ing deliberative function of jury and not 
that jury was prejudiced in fact. 
2. Criminal Law <*=>854(1) 
Each case involving separation of jury 
will be decided on its own facts. 
3. Criminal Law <*=» 1174(4) 
In prosecution for driving under the 
influence, delay of 37 days between jury 
impaneling and swearing-in did not require 
reversal where defendant's counsel was al-
lowed to conduct second voir dire at time of 
trial and, after conducting the voir dire, 
expressed his client's satisfaction with the 
jury, where defendant verbally and in writ-
ing agreed to proceed with the 11-member 
jury when two of the jurors were unavaila-
ble on day set for trial, and where there 
was no showing of any circumstance that 
might have occurred during separation that 
STATE v. DAPO Vt. 1173 
Cite as 470 AM 1173 (Vt 1983) 
was capable of tainting jury's deliberative 
duty. 23 V.S.A. 
ConstAmend. 6. 
§ 1201(aX2); U.S.C.A. 
4. Jury <*=»9 
Defendant's right to trial by properly 
constituted and impartial jury is constitu-
tionally guaranteed and must not be threat-
ened by mere administrative convenience in 
advance drawing of juries. 
5. Criminal Law <s=>38 
Elements of defense of necessity are: 
there must be situation of emergency aris-
ing without fault on part of actor con-
cerned, the emergency must be so imminent 
and compelling as to raise reasonable expec-
tation of harm to actor or upon those he 
was protecting, the emergency must 
present no reasonable opportunity to avoid 
injury without doing criminal act, and inju-
ry impending from emergency must be of 
sufficient seriousness to outmeasure crimi-
nal wrong. 
6. Criminal Law <s=>772(6) 
In prosecution for driving under the 
influence, trial court did not err in failing 
to charge defense of necessity where, even 
if defendant's missing child represented an 
emergency, defendant knew that emergen-
cy had terminated and his child was safe at 
home at time of his arrest. 
7. Criminal Law <s=> 1134(3) 
Claim of ineffective assistance of coun-
sel must be brought through collateral at-
tack under postconviction proceedings rath-
er than on direct appellate review. 
Dena Monahan, Chittenden County Depu-
ty State's Atty., Burlington, for plaintiff-
appellee. 
Saxer, Anderson & Wolinsky, Burlington, 
for defendant-appellant 
Before BILLINGS, CJ., and HILL, UN-
DERWOOD, PECK and GIBSON, JJ. 
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BILLINGS, Chief Justice. 
Defendant appeals from a conviction of 
operating a motor vehicle while under the 
influence of intoxicating liquor (DUI). 23 
V.S.A. § 1201(aX2). He asserts three 
claims of error: (1) that the delay of 37 
days between jury impaneling and swear-
ing-in was prejudicial as a matter of law; 
(2) that the trial court failed to charge the 
jury with the defense of necessity; and (3) 
that he was prejudiced by ineffective assist-
ance of counsel. 
Around 11:50 p.m. on November 20,1981, 
defendant was awakened by a telephone 
call from his ex-wife, informing him that 
one of their children had failed to return to 
her home from a daytime outing. Defend-
ant borrowed a car and proceeded to look 
far his son, eventually meeting up with him 
at the Burlington police station. Shortly 
after returning his son to his ex-wife's 
home, defendant was stopped by a Burling-
ton police officer, taken to the police station 
and processed for DUI. 
On February 22, 1982, a jury of thirteen 
was drawn, but not sworn, for defendant's 
March 31, 1982, trial. On the day set for 
trial, only eleven of the thirteen jurors were 
available. The trial judge and defendant's 
attorney questioned defendant both as to 
his understanding that he had a constitu-
tional right to a twelve member jury and 
that a mistrial would be declared if he did 
not then wish to go forward with the trial. 
After the defendant indicated his willing-
ness to go forward, the trial judge ques-
tioned him further to insure that the pros-
pect of increased litigation costs, if a mis-
trial were declared, was not compelling de-
fendant's decision to proceed with the elev-
en member jury. Although defendant ex-
pressed some concern over litigation costs, 
he again expressed his willingness to go 
forward and signed a statement acknowl-
edging his voluntary waiver of his right to 
a twelve member jury. The trial court then 
allowed defendant's counsel to voir dire the 
jury, after which defendant's counsel indi-
cated satisfaction with the jury as consti-
tuted. 
[1,2] In misdemeanor cases, the discre-
tion of the trial court controls the issue of 
separation of the jury. State v. White, 129 
Vt. 220,225-26, 274 A.2d 690, 693-94 (1971). 
"[I]t is for the trial court to weigh concern 
for the prompt, orderly administration of 
criminal law against the possibility of jury 
prejudice in a given case." State v. Bris-
son, 124 Vt. 211, 214, 201 A.2d 881, 883 
(1964). The burden of demonstrating an 
abuse of this discretion is on the party 
claiming the abuse, but all that is required 
is a showing of "the existence of circum-
stances capable of prejudicing the delibera-
tive function of the jury," and not that the 
jury was prejudiced in fact. Id. at 215, 201 
A.2d at 883. Each case involving the sepa-
ration of the jury will be decided on its own 
facts. Id. at 214, 201 A.2d at 883. 
In State v. White, supra, 129 Vt. at 226, 
274 A.2d at 694, this Court held that a 
separation of 62 days between impaneling 
and trial was prejudicial as a matter of law. 
The defendant in White had been charged 
with possession of a regulated drug, mari-
juana. 18 V.S.A. § 4224(a). The separa-
tion of the jury occurred during a time 
when marijuana, because of the perceived 
novelty of its use, was a very sensitive and 
much touted issue. Id. at 225, 274 A.2d at 
693. In State v. Brisson, supra, 124 Vt at 
214, 201 A.2d at 883, a jury separation of 
ten days, in a misdemeanor case, was found 
not to be prejudicial as a matter of law, nor 
on the facts of that particular case. Prior 
to the jury's separation, the court had cau-
tioned the jury members to avoid activities 
which might prejudice its deliberative func-
tion. Id. at 212,201 A.2d at 882. Addition-
ally, at trial, the defendant did not demon-
strate the occurrence of any event during 
separation that might have tainted the 
jury's impartiality. Id. at 214, 201 AJ2d at 
883. Similarly, in State v. Stevens, 137 Vt 
473, 408 A.2d 622 (1979), a sixteen day 
separation in a DUI case was held not to be 
prejudicial where the court conducted a 
second voir dire at the trial's commence-
ment and offered to treat defendant's mo-
tion to dismiss as a motion for mistrial if 
STATE v, 
Cite as 470 A ^ d l 
any improper influence affecting the jury 
could be demonstrated. Id. at 476, 408 A.2d 
at 624. 
[3] In the instant case, the record is 
silent as to whether the court admonished 
the jury, prior to separation, to avoid any 
activity that might affect its impartiality. 
However, the court did allow defendant's 
counsel to conduct a second voir dire at the 
time of trial. On the basis of this voir dire, 
counsel for defendant expressed his client's 
satisfaction with the jury as constituted. 
Defendant, verbally and in writing, agreed 
to proceed with the eleven member jury. 
Additionally, there was no showing of any 
circumstance that may have occurred dur-
ing separation that was capable of tainting 
the jury's deliberative duty. Finally, de-
fendant made no claim of error in this 
regard until after the verdict. Considering 
the totality of circumstances, we cannot say 
that the defendant has demonstrated the 
existence of prejudice in law or fact. The 
trial court was acting within its discretion 
when it proceeded with the trial. 
[4] We do, once again however, express 
strong concern and reservation as to the 
continued propriety of advance drawing of 
juries. We recognize the increasing bur-
dens on trial court calendars, but a defend-
ant's right to a trial by a properly constitut-
ed and impartial jury is constitutionally 
guaranteed and must not be threatened by 
mere administrative convenience. The 
shorter the period of separation, the less 
likely that prejudice and abuse of discretion 
will be found on appeal. 
[5] Defendant next claims that the trial 
court erred in failing to instruct on the 
defense of necessity. Defendant did not 
request the charge but properly claims that 
the trial court must fully and correctly 
charge upon each point indicated by the 
evidence that is material to a decision of the 
case. State v. Gokey, 136 Vt. 33, 36, 383 
A.2d 601, 602 (1978). The defense of neces-
sity, as recognized in Vermont, requires evi-
dence in the record that supports the ele-
ments of the defense. State v. Shotton, 142 
DAPO Vt. H 7 5 
173 (V t 1983) 
Vt. 558, 561, 458 A.2d 1105, 1106 (1983). 
These elements are: 
(1) there must be a situation of emergen-
cy arising without fault on the part of 
the actor concerned; 
(2) this emergency must be so imminent 
and compelling as to raise a reasonable 
expectation of harm, either directly to 
the actor or upon those he was protect-
ing; 
(3) this emergency must present no rea-
sonable opportunity to avoid the injury 
without doing the criminal act; and 
(4) the injury impending from the emer-
gency must be of sufficient seriousness to 
outmeasure the criminal wrong. 
Id. at 560-61, 458 A.2d at 1105 (quoting 
State v. Warshow, 138 Vt. 22, 24, 410 A.2d 
1000, 1001-02 (1980)). 
[6] The court did not err in failing to 
charge the defense of ne<£ssity. Certainly 
defendant's missing child was an occurrence 
that arose without fault attributable to 
him. And, a missing child could very well 
represent an emergency so imminent and 
compelling as to raise a reasonable expecta-
tion of harm either to the actor or to the 
child. However, under the facts of this 
case, at the time of defendant's criminal 
activity, the emergency had already termi-
nated and, as the defendant knew, his child 
was safe at home. 
[7] We do not reach defendant's third 
claim, that of ineffective assistance of coun-
sel. Such a claim must be brought through 
collateral attack under post-conviction pro-
ceedings, rather than on direct appellate 
review. State v. Loehmann, 143 Vt. 372,467 
A.2d 118 (1983); State v. Campanelli, 142 
Vt. 362, 366, 454 A.2d 1248, 1251 (1982). 
Affirmed. 
ADDENDUM E 
ROGER K. SCOWCROFT 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Association 
Attorney for Defendant 
424 East 500 South, #300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-5444 
IN THE JUSTICE COURT OF PRECINCT NO. TWO, 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 





REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY 
Case No. 2-1983-121B 
The defendant , GILBERTO GONZALES, by and through h i s / h e r 
a t t o r n e y of r e c o r d , ROGER K. SCOWCROFT, pursuant t o Utah Code Ann. 
Sec t i on 77-35-16 (1953 as amended) and the Due Process of Clauses of 
Const i tu t ions of Utah and the United S ta t e s , hereby requests the 
following mater ia ls be provided to him ten days prior to t r i a l now 
se t for September 27, 1988. 
1. Any evidence which tends to negate the gu i l t of the 
defendant, or mitigate the gu i l t of the defendant or mitigate the 
degree of the offense for reduced punishment that has been 
discovered by any member of the agencies involved in the 
inves t iga t ion or prosecution of the above-enti t led case. 
2. A l i s t of a l l the witnesses that the State /Ci ty 
intends to ca l l for t r i a l in the above-enti t led matter, thei r 
addresses , telephone numbers and criminal records. 
3 . Any recordings, r epo r t s , t r a n s c r i p t s or reports about 
s ta tements in possession of any member, o-r group involved in the 
prosecut ion of the inves t iga t ion of the above-ent i t led case taken 
from the witness l i s t e d in number 2. 
4 . Any photographs or physical evidence from the alleged 
crime scene or taken by any such law enforcement officer procured 
during the course of the inves t iga t ion of the above en t i t l ed case by 
such police department, County Attorney, i t s s t a f f or invest igat ive 
agencies* 
5 . Statements made by the defendant to any of the 
S t a t e ' s witnesses and the da tes , t imes, places and persons present 
when such statements were made. 
6. Any reports or r e s u l t s of s c i e n t i f i c t e s t s taken 
during the invest igat ion of t h i s case* 
7 . Any reports made by non-governmental agencies 
involved including reports made by any s t a te secur i ty personnel. 
8. Any police or inves t iga t ive r e p o r t s , excluding the 
Sa l t Lake County Attorney's or Sal t Lake City Prosecutor 's work 
product , made during the course of the inves t iga t ion or prosecution 
of t h i s case . 
9 . Reports or descr ip t ions or any weapon or other 
physical evidence seized from defendant 's person or his residence or 
vehicle tha t the Sta te /Ci ty intends to use a t t r i a l . 
10. Any offers of leniency or plea bargain agreements or 
any other form of remuneration provided to any of the witnesses 
l i s t e d in number 2 and 3 above. 
11 . A copy of the booking sheet . 
11 • A copy of the booking shee t . 
WHEREFORE, defendant moves that the Court issue an Order 
granting the r e l i e f sought. 
DATED t h i s ^ ^ d a y of August, 1988, 
ROGER KT^ COWCROFT 
Attorney for Defendan 
MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing Request for 
Discovery to the o f f i ce of the South Valley county Attorney's 
O f f i c e , 2001 South S t a t e , #S3700, Sa l t Lake City , Utah 841190-1200 
t h i s CXffay of August, 1988. 
ADDENDUM P 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
By: W.C. GWYNN 
Deputy County Attorney 
2001 South State, Room #S3700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-1200 
Telephone: (801) 468-3422 
IN THE JUSTICE COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SECOND PRECINCT 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 





) Case No: 2-1984 
) CAO NO. 88-3-03914 
) 
The undersigned, DEPUTY BAIRD - S.O., under oath states on 
information and belief that the defendant(s) committed the crimes of: 
COUNT I 
DRIVING OR BEING IN ACTUAL PHYSICAL CONTROL OF A MOTOR VEHICLE WHILE 
HAVING A BLOOD ALCOHOL CONTENT OF 0.08 PERCENT OR GREATER; OR WHILE 
UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL AND/OR DRUGS, a Class B Misdemeanor, 
in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or about August 4, 1988, in 
violation of Title 41, Chapter 6, Section 44, Utah Code Annotated, 
19 53, as amended, in that the defendant, GILBERTO A. GONZALES, a 
party to the offense, did appear or was in actual physical control 
of a motor vehicle within this state while having a blood or breath 
alcohol content of 0.08 percent or greater, by weight, as shown by a 
chemical test given within two hours after the alleged operation or 
physical control or while under the influence of alcohol or any drug 
or the combined influence of alcohol and any drug to a degree which 
rendered the defendant incapable of safely operating a vehicle. 
INFORMATION 
State vs. GILBERTO A. GONZALES 
C.A.O. Case No. 88-3-03914 
Page 2 
THIS INFORMATION IS BASED ON EVIDENCE OBTAINED FROM THE FOLLOWING 
WITNESSES: 
Deputy Fred Baird 673E S.O. 
Citation #D09076 
DEFENDANT'S ADDRESS: 4311 West 4985 South, Kearns, Utah 84118 
Affiant 
Subscribed and sworn to before me 
this day of August, 1988. 
JUDGE 
Authorized for presentment and filing: 
DAVID E. YOCOM, 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
/s/W.C. GWYNN 





DUI REPORT FORM 
CASE IDENTIFICATION^/ „ _ , 
D ^ ^ - ^ ^ f n a y 7 7 ; 6 ^ ^ A c r , i r i p n t /U> n a . Q # J 2 ^ 2 2 & T i m e Prepared__2Z?Vr 
Subject's Name fa Lfb>s£n> 'A &AJ-Z*ie*- Address ^ 3 / / /j/&rr~t/9J><r&u-&, ^faog. 
Place of Employment f-tit-fatJ /faifcC-i-JtC^ Address 
Home Telephone Number 967"3o "7/ Work Telephone Number tt*Ui*S /h-fe<——jk&*~ 
D.O.B. &-H~tWX- Driver License # /¥£??4>fV5 TimeptArrest QoVS}*^ " ^ ^ 
Place of Arrest 3goo Jocfi% q^t? ^ a ; 7 ChaJgp* Z 7 ^ ^ 
Arresting Officer HceD &4*kt> Assisting Officers K&J PAOZ& 
Arresting Agency SLG>t>° 
VEHICLE ^ , * i * . ^ 
Year jT?-S Color 6*"™ Make C **> tlC+C,
 M o d e i Oe^tCOT 
License #' and state ^ ^ ^ < ~ T 5 ^ C ^ ~ Disppsitinn Slfo7£r"tt-C—/? Ct£T 
Registersd Owner &1U>S&no A> G**j-*A'LgZ. Address V 3 / / CUezT VPfSTJausZ 
WITNESSES: (If passengers, indicate specifically) 






ACTUAL PHYSICAL CONTROL: 
The facts establish i ing the subject's actual physical control of a motor vehicle ara: OxJky dCCU/^^7 
f>4- C/e&.ttUe'- p&csoA/#tCy od<s*±n*) A/L>. adi,*s4 r/edfrit*- L/esr~ Zalvsi 
DRIVING PATTERN: . 
Subject's location when first observed 3 ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ BCrO ^ 7
 r__ 
The facts observed regarding driving pattern: OfoeXJjeb Suz/te&~~ 0&\','cUr dcm/.Z't 
JF c&7v4/'<vusf> IT /5CU,J Scjsfir.er oet/cter fZ*u~> 3on &C7~ 7c S-fofe-*¥. 
PRE-ARREST STATEMENTS OF SUBJECT:
 v , 
k/ 
*>Jtyjiff Aft fa<2~. T 
PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS, 
Odor of alcoholic beverage _ 5 E f ^ £ i . 
Speech SCVJLL'J? - t,**y c{'P£ffuC*- TT' u^acsT*** —JUvsJ-rf- <ytrs> 
Balance sTfr*w,/S£go F>2IJ,A.'C /s<*£/cl(rj? D?*4?Cu 6tf/*' sw»<4«vf 
Signs or complaints of injury or illness AAj.tJCz ^ , 
Other physical characteristics C^A/fV jlt.<J I'lGWtT SHU,* / blcjr Sfat, A / sLtX-
1 rt>kwcgV ^uC/^ ^ V " tfdJc?1 r y < S - b^4vt&> V-j-fK-fc * M * 9 ^ / A - A-lws/ 
' J ; ' Tnuckefo Bleats 
Were tests .demonstrated by officer? ^25 Subject's ability to follow instructions 
SEARCHES 
A. Vehicle: C /J o o> LJ£zz/~~ 
Was subject's vehicle searched? y£5 Where? 37<MJou44x J.^ <"&/ 
Whfln? OoZD,kwK Evidence / > W g * " 
Person who performed the search 
8. Subject: ^ / & *-~ i ~7 
Was subject's oerson searched? \j<?> Wh"ie? J4&0 Jdu-tf* z ^ M&' 
WhAn? / X ? V * /V>W- CwjHflncfl Fnunr e  CO i f r w . Evide e o d A/<frU& 
Person who performed the search 
CHEMICAL T E S T S L , . - , 
Mr. or Mrs. C A - b&Ctv fi-, Qr<nu2,ACG> £- ^0 y o u understand thai you are under arrest for 
driving under the influence of alcohol (drugs)? Response, (if any) 
I hereby request that you submit Jo a chem^ l test to determine the alcohol (drug) content of your blood. I 
request that you take a JL>tJ~faj-l i / £ # ^ ~ test. 
(blood-breath-urine) 
D The following admonition was given by me to the subject before the chemical test was adminis-
tered: 
Results Indicating .OR°/o or more by weight of alcohol in your blood shall, and the existence of a olood 
alcohol content cr presence of drugs sufficient to render you incapable of safely driving a vehie'e may, 
result in suspension or revocation of your license cr privilege to operate a motor vehicle. 
What is your respense to my request that you submit to a chemical test? Response: 0 kc\^s 
Did subject submit to a chemical test? ^ j ^ S Type of tosL 
Test Administered by
 s f)<£t> S>./fr/Cf> Where? yX+fpr, oJ-frrtZ' 
Time- Ol13T/ft»%^ Results * ^X> Was subject notified of results?_\^5 
Serial No. of test machine: Cfif^C0/& ( 
(if the subject refuses the test, read the following) 
• The following admonition was given by me to the subject: 
If you refuse the test, it will not be given, however I must warn you that if you refuse, your license or 
permit to drive a motor vehicle may be revoked for one year with no provisioj«ror a limited driver's license. 
After you have taken this test, you will be permitted to have a physician of your own choice administer 
a test at vour own exoense, in addition to the one I haw reauested vcu to submit to. so lona a* it dc^* 
(If the subject c iy i js the right to remain silent or the righ""":; counsel, read the following:) 
• The following admonition was given by me to the subject: 
Your right to remain silent and your right to counsel do not apply to the implied consent law which 
is civil in nature and.separate from the criminal charges. Your right to remain silent does not give you 
the right to refuse to take the test. You do not have the right to have counsel during the test procedure. 
Unless you submit to the test I am requesting, 1 will consider that you have refused to take the test. 
I warn you that if you refuse to take the test, your driver's license can be revoked for one year with 
no provision for a limited license. 
XI. CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS: ~ J -
Was subject advised of the following rights? y€b When 0) pV^~
 r~-
BvWhom? J=*jgQ fc^rs^fr Where? TXsH&C <?WrC&r 
Jy~ 1. You have the right to remain silent. 
y ^ - 2. Anything you say can and will be used against you in a court of law. 
You have the right to talk to a lawyer and have him present with you while you are oeing ques-
tioned. If you cannot afford to hire a lawyer, one will be appointed to represent you before 
any questioning, if you wish one. 
If you decide to answer questions now without having counsel present, you may stop answer-
ing questions at any time. Also, you may request counsel at any time during quest;oning. 
following waiver questions asked?. 
Do you understand each of these rights t have explained to you? 
Response \IP)$/L 
Having these richts In mindydo you wish to talk to us now? 
Response IT~ C (A^ 
? y ® ^ 
INTERVIEW: 
Were you operating a vehicle  _. 
Where were you going? frW ) ^ i ^ ^ y . . 
What street or highway were you on? ^?<7g So^^k - J * (hsJT ATf^^J 
Direction of travel? (o fc*Y Attn; sc , 
Where did you start from? 7 T (JM*L *£>-O K&$ *4/<~ fay ^ ^ 
When? 7 oKClocA^ What time is it now? ^ OK3 c cttctij 
What is today's date? /UL<1 U S~t 3> Day of week? -~JT'{e^/0f4^j 
(Actual time OI *°]Ar^ r Date f~- U—££__ Day J^^uus/j^y 
What city or county are you in now?
 n lT DO«JT /X(<y<^ Z_ 
What were you doing during the last three hours? _ ^ / ) 0 KI'+LL ^ L t^y S**?L 
Have you been drinking? yVMA-x . 
What? &eF*L^ ~ How much? 3 ~0<- ¥ K&I&5 
When did you have ycur first rJrir.k? /ff M W / 4 ^ 3 ^ _ _ Last drink? * 7 ~ / / 
Are you under the influence of an alcoholic beverage (drugs) now? 
Are you taking tranquilizers, pills,/medicines or drugs of any Ivind? &0 
(What kind? Get sample) VIA-
When did you have the last dose? ^Idr 
Are you ill? M° 
(If subject was in an accident, ask these questions:) jj/j 
Were you involved in an acciaert today? \Z1 .. 
XH. OTHER OCCURRENCES OR FACTS: , 
X1U. ATTACHED DOCUMENTS: 
I have attached the following documents to this report: 
1. ^?»Copy of citation/temporary license 
2. ^ Subject 's Utah driver's license or driver's permit 
3. • Traffic accident report 
<\ D Other documents (specify) 
i hereby certify that I am a sworn Utah Peace Officer and that the information contained above in this report form and attached 
documents is true and correct to rny knowledge and belief and that this report form was prepared in the regular course of my 
duties. It is my belief the subject was in violation of section 41-6-44 U.C.A. at the date, time, and place specified in this report. 
a<«. 673^ 
Signatuie of Peace Officer <~ / / " C 
Law Enforcement Agency: ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
Eats: ?-r-f?PpTto*. QZ^At^, 
The original of this form must be sent within five (5) days of the arrest of the subject to: 
Driver License Division 
4501 South 2700 West 
P.O. Box 30560 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84130-0560 
ADDENDUM G 
IN THE JUSTICE COURT IH AND FOR THE 2nd PRECDTCT 
COUWTT OF SALT IAKB STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE GF OTAH 
v
* ) CERTIFIED COPT OP DOCKET EtfIRT 
1 Gilberto Gonzales dob 6/4/42 
Defendant ) 
2-1984-98A 
August 17, 1988 Filed: Citation #D09076. Gilberto Gonzales charged 
with DUI on August 4, 1988 by Deputy Fred 
Baird. 
Ent'd Order:Defendant arraigned. Plead Not Guilty. 
Defendant assigned Legal Defender. Pre-Trial 
set September 27, 1988 03:15 PM. 
September 27, 1988 Entfd Order: Pre-trial held. County Attorney, Woody Guynn 
Legal Defender, Roger Scowcroft present. Unable to 
resolve. Motion Hearing set October 18, 1988 ^ :30 AM. 
Legal Defender assessment fee $50.00 to be pd 9/30/88. 
Sept ember 30, 1988 Paid: $50.00 Legal Defender fee on Receipt #544096. 
October 18, 1989 Ent'd Order: On joint motion of County Attorney & Legal 
Defender, Jury was not called. Hearing held on 
Motions. Both attorneys are to file motions with 
the court as soon as possible. 
Set Jury .Trial January 12, 1989 08:30 A.M. 
Filed: Motion & MerDrandum in Support of Defendants 
Motion to Instruct. 
January 12, 1989 Ent'd Order: Continue Jury Trial. County Attorney has 
not answered defendants Motions. 
Page 1 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ra« 
COUNTY OF SALT UKE ) 
I, Phyllis J, Scott
 f Justice of the Peace, In and for the 2 n d 
Precinct, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, do hereby certify that the 
above is a full and correct cop7 of the record of the above proceed* 
ings in the above case as it appears in the docket of ny Court. 
Dated May 8, 1989 
Justice of the Peace 
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March 2, 1989 Entfd Order: Jury w&s not called. Set for 
Change of Plea on April 25, 1989 <§8:30A.M. 
April 25, 1989 Entfd Order: Defendant appeared with counsel, Roger 
Scowcroft and County Attorney, Vfoody Gwynn present. 
Entered into a "No Contest" plea in order to appeal 
within 30 days. 
Sentencing as follows: DUI- $480.00 + $120 Surcharge 
+ $100 VR + $50 AR fee + 60 days in jail/57 days susp-
ended on 1. Payment of fines & fees-to be determined . 
after stay date. 2. DUI series to be determined after 
stay date. 3. Probation to court 6 months- other 3 
days are suspended on 24 hours comnunity service. 
April 28, 1989 Filed: Notice of Appeal,Certificate of Probable Cause 
and Order to Stay Execution. 
May 8, 1989 Mailed: Certified Copy of the TDocket and file to 
Judge Floyd Gowans, Presiding Judge, Third Circuit 
Court, Salt Lake City, Utah 
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41-6-43.10 MOTOR VEHICLES 
(2) An ordinance adopted by a local authority that governs reckless driving, 
or operating a vehicle in willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons 
or property shall be consistent with the provisions of this code which govern 
those matters. 
History* C. 1953, 41-6-43, enacted by L. 
1983, ch. 99, § 11; 1987, ch. 138, § 36. 
Repeals and Enactments. — Laws 1978, 
ch. 33, § 54 repealed old § 41-6-43 (L. 1941, ch. 
52, § 33; C. 1943, 57-7-110; L. 1957, ch. 75, 
§ 1; 1967, ch. 88, § 1; 1969, ch. 107, § 1), relat-
ing to powers of local authorities as to driving 
while intoxicated and reckless driving, and a 
new § 41-6-43 was enacted by Laws 1979, ch. 
242, § 12. 
Laws 1983, ch. 99, § 11 repealed former 
§ 41-6-43 (L. 1979, ch. 242, § 12), relating to 
powers of local authorities, and enacted 
present § 41-6-43. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend-
ment substituted "operating" for "driving" 
both places it appears in this section and made 
minor changes in punctuation. 
Cross-References. — Traffic regulations, 
powers and duties of cities as to, § 10-8-30. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Effect of interim repeal. 
Powers of cities. 
Effect of interim repeal. 
The interim repeal of this section did not 
render municipalities without authority to 
enact ordinances prohibiting driving under the 
influence of alcohol as municipalities had au-
thority under their general police powers to 
enact such ordinances in the absence of a spe-
cific legislative grant of authority. Layton City 
v. Glines, 616 P.2d 588 (Utah 1980). 
Powers of cities. 
City held to have power to pass ordinance 
prohibiting driving while intoxicated, notwith-
standing statute on the subject. Salt Lake City 
v. Kusse, 97 Utah 113, 93 P.2d 671 (1938). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 7A Am. Jur. 2d Automo-
biles and Highway Traffic § 296 et seq. 
C.J.S. — 61A C.J.S. Motor Vehicles §§ 625 
to 637. 
Key Numbers. — Automobiles <= 332. 
41-6-43.10. Repealed. 
Repeals. — Section 41-6-43.10 (L. 1955, ch. relating to negligent homicide, was repealed 
71, § 1; 1957, ch. 78, § 2; 1983, ch. 99, § 12), by Laws 1985 (1st S.S.), ch. 1, § 2. 
41-6-44. Driving under the influence of alcohol or drug or 
with specified or unsafe blood alcohol concentra-
tion — Measurement of blood or breath alcohol 
— Criminal punishment — Arrest without war-
rant — Penalties — Suspension or revocation of 
license. 
(1) (a) It is unlawful and punishable as provided in this section for any 
person to operate or be in actual physical control of a vehicle within this 
state if the person has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 
grams or greater as shown by a chemical test given within two hours 
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after the alleged operation or physical control, or if the person is under 
the influence of alcohol or any drug or the combined influence of alcohol 
and any drug to a degree which renders the person incapable of safely 
operating a vehicle. 
(b) The fact that a person charged with violating this section is or has 
been legally entitled to use alcohol or a drug is not a defense against any 
charge of violating this section. 
(2) Alcohol concentration in the blood shall be based upon grams of alcohol 
per 100 milliliters of blood, and alcohol concentration in the breath shall be 
based upon grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath. 
(3) (a) Every person who is convicted the first time of a violation of Subsec-
tion (1) is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. But if the person has inflicted a 
bodily injury upon another as a proximate result of having operated the 
vehicle in a negligent manner, he is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
(b) In this section, the standard of negligence is that of simple negli-
gence, the failure to exercise that degree of care which an ordinarily 
reasonable and prudent person exercises under like or similar circum-
stances. 
(4) In addition to any penalties imposed under Subsection (3), the court 
shall, upon a first conviction, impose a mandatory jail sentence of not less 
than 48 consecutive hours nor more than 240 hours, with emphasis on serving 
in the drunk tank of the jail, or require the person to work in a community-
service work program for not less than 24 hours nor more than 50 hours and, 
in addition to the jail sentence or the work in the community-service work 
program, order the person to participate in an assessment and educational 
series at a licensed alcohol rehabilitation facility. 
(5) (a) Upon a second conviction within five years after a first conviction 
under this section or under a local ordinance similar to this section 
adopted in compliance with Subsection 41-6-43(1), the court shall, in addi-
tion to any penalties imposed under Subsection (3), impose a mandatory 
jail sentence of not less than 240 consecutive hours nor more than 720 
hours, with emphasis on serving in the drunk tank of the jail, or require 
the person to work in a community-service work program for not less than 
80 hours nor more than 240 hours and, in addition to the jail sentence or 
the work in the community-service work program, order the person to 
participate in an assessment and educational series at a licensed alcohol 
rehabilitation facility. The court may, in its discretion, order the person 
to obtain treatment at an alcohol rehabilitation facility. 
(b) Upon a subsequent conviction within five years after a second con-
viction under this section or under a local ordinance similar to this sec-
tion adopted in compliance with Subsection 41-6-43(1), the court shall, in 
addition to any penalties imposed under Subsection (3), impose a manda-
tory jail sentence of not less than 720 nor more than 2,160 hours with 
emphasis on serving in the drunk tank of the jail, or require the person to 
work in a community-service work program for not less than 240 nor 
more than 720 hours and, in addition to the jail sentence or work in the 
community-service work program, order the person to obtain treatment 
at an alcohol rehabilitation facility. 
(c) No portion of any sentence imposed under Subsection (3) may be 
suspended and the convicted person is not eligible for parole or probation 
until any sentence imposed under this section has been served. Probation 
417 
41-6-44 MOTOR VEHICLES 
or parole resulting from a conviction for a violation of this section or a 
local ordinance similar to this section adopted in compliance with Subsec-
tion 41-6-43(1) may not be terminated and the department may not rein-
state any license suspended or revoked as a result of the conviction, if it is 
a second or subsequent conviction within five years, until the convicted 
person has furnished evidence satisfactory to the department that all 
fines and fees, including fees for restitution and rehabilitation costs, as-
sessed against the person, have been paid. 
(6) (a) The provisions in Subsections (4) and (5) that require a sentencing 
court to order a convicted person to: participate in an assessment and 
educational series at a licensed alcohol rehabilitation facility; obtain, in 
the discretion of the court, treatment at an alcohol rehabilitation facility; 
or obtain, mandatorily, treatment at an alcohol rehabilitation facility; or 
do any combination of those things, apply to a conviction for a violation of 
Section 41-6-45 that qualifies as a prior offense under Subsection (7). The 
court is required to render the same order regarding education or treat-
ment at an alcohol rehabilitation facility, or both, in connection with a 
first, second, or subsequent conviction under Section 41-6-45 that quali-
fies as a prior offense under Subsection (7), as the court would render in 
connection with applying respectively, the first, second, or subsequent 
conviction requirements of Subsections 41-6-44(4) and (5). 
(b) For purposes of determining whether a conviction under Section 
41-6-45 which qualified as a prior conviction under Subsection (7), is a 
first, second, or subsequent conviction under this subsection, a previous 
conviction under either this section or Section 41-6-45 is considered a 
prior conviction. 
(c) Any alcohol rehabilitation program and any community-based or 
other education program provided for in this section shall be approved by 
the Department of Social Services. 
(7) (a) When the prosecution agrees to a plea of guilty or no contest to a 
charge of a violation of Section 41-6-45 or of an ordinance enacted under 
Subsection 41-6-43(1) in satisfaction of, or as a substitute for, an original 
charge of a violation of this section, the prosecution shall state for the 
record a factual basis for the plea, including whether or not there had 
been consumption of alcohol or drugs, or a combination of both, by the 
defendant in connection with the offense. The statement is an offer of 
proof of the facts which shows whether there was consumption of alcohol 
or drugs, or a combination of both, by the defendant, in connection with 
the offense. 
(b) The court shall advise the defendant before accepting the plea of-
fered under this subsection of the consequences of a violation of Section 
41-6-45 as follows. If the court accepts the defendant's plea of guilty or no 
contest to a charge of violating Section 41-6-45, and the prosecutor states 
for the record that there was consumption of alcohol or drugs, or a combi-
nation of both, by the defendant in connection with the offense, the result-
ing conviction is a prior offense for the purposes of Subsection (5). 
(c) The court shall notify the department of each conviction of Section 
41-6-45 which is a prior offense for the purposes of Subsection (5). 
(8) A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person for a violation of 
this section when the officer has probable cause to believe the violation has 
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occurred, although not in his presence, and if the officer has probable cause to 
believe that the violation was committed by the person. 
(9) The Department of Public Safety shall suspend for 90 days the opera-
tor's license of any person convicted for the first time under Subsection (1), 
and shall revoke for one year the license of any person convicted of any subse-
quent offense under Subsection (1) if the violation is committed within a 
period of five years from the date of the prior violation. The department shall 
subtract from any suspension or revocation period the number of days for 
which a license was previously suspended under Section 41-2-130, if the previ-
ous suspension was based on the same occurrence upon which the record of 
conviction is based. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 34; C. 1943, 
57-7-111; L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1; 1957, ch. 75, 
§ 1; 1967, ch. 88, § 2; 1969, ch. 107, § 2; 1977, 
ch. 268, § 3; 1979, ch. 243, § 1; 1981, ch. 63, 
§ 2; 1982, ch. 46, § 1; 1983, ch. 99, § 13; 1983, 
ch. 103, § 1; 1983, ch. 183, § 33; 1985, ch. 46, 
§ 1; 1986, ch. 122, § 1; 1986, ch. 178, § 29; 
1987, ch. 138, § 37; 1987 (1st S.S.), ch. 8, § 2; 
1988, ch. 17, § 1. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1985 amend-
ment divided Subsection (3) into Subsections 
(3)(a) and (3)(b); deleted "of this section" before 
"shall be punished" in the first sentence of 
Subsection (3)(a); divided the former first sen-
tence of Subsection (3)(a) into the first and sec-
ond sentences, substituting "But" for "except 
that" at the beginning of the second sentence of 
Subsection (3)(a); divided Subsection (5) into 
Subsections (5)(a) through (5)(c); divided the 
former first sentence of Subsection (5)(a) into 
the first and second sentences; substituted 
"may" for "shall" in three places in Subsection 
(5)(c); deleted "such time as" after "probation 
until" in the first sentence of Subsection (5)(c); 
deleted "and unless" before "the convicted per-
son" near the end of Subsection (5)(c); divided 
Subsection (6) into Subsections (6)(a) and 
(6)(b); deleted "of this section" at the end of 
Subsections (7)(b) and (7)(c); substituted "the 
officer has probable cause to believe the viola-
tion has occurred" for "the violation is coupled 
with an accident or collision in which the per-
son is involved and when the violation has, in 
fact, been committed" in Subsection (8); substi-
tuted "probable" for "reasonable" near the end 
of Subsection (8); deleted "a period of before 
"90 days" and "of this section" before "and 
shall revoke" in Subsection (9); and made 
minor changes in phraseology, punctuation, 
and style. 
The 1986 amendment by Laws 1986, ch. 122, 
in Subsection (4) deleted "for" following "pro-
vided" and substituted "240 hours" for "ten 
days", "24 hours" for "two" and "80 hours" for 
"ten days"; in Subsection (5)(a) substituted 
"240" for "48", "720 hours" for "ten days", "80 
hours" for "ten", and "240 hours" for "30 days"; 
and in Subsection (5)(b) substituted "720" for 
"30", "2,160 hours" for "90 days", "240" for 
"30", and "720 hours" for "90 days". 
The 1986 amendment by Laws 1986, ch. 178, 
in Subsection (3)(a), substituted the language 
beginning "is guilty of a class B misdemeanor" 
for "shall be punished by imprisonment for not 
less than 60 days nor more than six months, or 
by a fine of $299, or by both the fine and im-
prisonment" in the first sentence and the lan-
guage beginning "is guilty of a class A misde-
meanor" for "shall be punished by imprison-
ment in the county jail for not more than one 
year, and, in the discretion of the court, by a 
fine of not more than $1,000" in the second 
sentence. 
The 1987 amendment designated the previ-
ously undesignated provisions of Subsection (1) 
as last amended by Laws 1986, ch. 178, § 29 
and rewrote the provisions of Subsection (a) to 
the Extent that a detailed analysis is impracti-
cably; in Subsection (2) added the phrase fol-
lowing "centimeters of blood"; in Subsection 
(3)(a) deleted "imprisonment shall be for not 
fewer than 60 days" following "misdemeanor" 
in the first sentence and deleted "any impris-
onment in the county jail shall be for not more 
than one year" at the end of the second sen-
tence; in Subsection (6)(b) deleted "41-6-44 or"; 
in Subsection (7)(a) substituted "41-6-43(1)" for 
"41-6-43(b)"; in Subsection (9) substituted 
"41-2-130" for "41-2-19.6"; and made minor 
changes in phraseology and punctuation 
throughout the section. 
This section was set out in 1987 as reconciled 
by the Office of Legislative Research and Gen-
eral Counsel. 
The 1987 (1st S.S.) amendment, effective 
June 5, 1987, substituted "concentration of .08 
grams or greater as shown by a chemical test" 
for "content of .08% or greater by weight as 
shown by a chemical test" in Subsection (1) (a), 
substituted the provisions of Subsection (2) for 
the former provisions which read "Percent by 
weight of alcohol in the blood shall be based 
upon grams of alcohol per one hundred cubic 
centimeters of blood, and the percent by weight 
of alcohol in the breath shall be based upon 
grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath", and 
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76-2-302. Compulsion.—(1) A person is not guilty of an offense when 
he engaged in the proscribed conduct because he was coerced to do so by 
the use or threatened imminent use of unlawful physical force upon him 
or a third person, which force or threatened force a person of reasonable 
firmness in his situation would not have resisted. 
(2) The defense of compulsion provided by this section shall be un-
available to a person who intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly places 
himself in a situation in which it is probable that he will be subjected to 
duress. 
(3) A married woman is not entitled, by reason of the presence of her 
husband, to any presumption of compulsion or to any defense of compul-
sion except as in subsection (1) provided. 
History: C. 1953, 76-2-302, enacted by Collateral Eeferences. 
L. 1973, cb. 196, § 78-2-302. Criminal Law<§=>38. 
22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 44. 
21 Am. Jur. 2d 180, Criminal Law §§ 100, 
101. 
DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW 
Coercion. Where wife was asked by imprisoned 
Where defendant was charged with es- husband to break into jail and get the 
cape from state prison, trial court did not keys and unlock the doors, but instead 
err in refusing to submit to jury asserted gave him hacksaw blades, she was not 
defense of coercion where defendant ad- incapable of commission of crime because 
mitted his escape but claimed he did so she departed from his coercion and com-
because of trouble with the prison inmates mitted a crime of her own choosing, 
caused by his failure to pay for broken Farrell v. Turner, 25 U. (2d) 351, 482 P. 
radio. State v. Pearson, 15 U. (2d) 353, 2d 117. 
393 P. 2d 390. 
76-2-303. Entrapment.—(1) It is a defense that the actor was en-
trapped into committing the offense. Entrapment occurs when a law en-
forcement officer or a person directed by or acting in co-operation with the 
officer induces the commission of an offense in order to obtain evidence of 
the commission for prosecution by methods creating a substantial risk that 
the offense would be committed by one not otherwise ready to commit it. 
Conduct merely affording a person an opportunity to commit an offense 
does not constitute entrapment. 
(2) The defense of entrapment shall be unavailable when causing or 
threatening bodily injury is an element of the offense charged and the 
prosecution is based on conduct causing or threatening the injury to a 
person other than the person perpetrating the entrapment. 
(3) The defense provided by this section is available even though the 
actor denies commission of the conduct charged to constitute the offense. 
(4) Upon written motion of the defendant, the court shall hear evi-
dence on the issue and shall determine as a matter of fact and law whether 
the defendant was entrapped to commit the offense. Defendant's motion 
shall be made at least ten days before trial except the court for good cause 
shown may permit a, later filing. 
(5) Should the court determine that the defendant was entrapped, it 
shall dismiss the case with prejudice, but if the court determines the de-
36 
76-2-308 CRIMINAL CODE 
76-2-308. Affirmative defenses.—Defenses enumerated in this part con-
stitute affirmative defenses. 
History: 0. 1953, 76-2-308, enacted by CoUateral Eeferences. 
L. 1973, en. 196, § 76-2-308. Criminal Law<§=3330. 
22A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 573. 
21 Am. Jur. 2d 204, Criminal Law § 135. 
Part 4 
Justification Excluding Criminal Responsibility 
76-2-401. Justification as defense—When allowed.—Conduct which is 
justified is a defense to prosecution for any offense based on the conduct. 
The defense of justification may be claimed: 
(1) When the actor's conduct is in defense of persons or property 
under the circumstances described in sections 76-2-402 through 76-2-406 of 
this part; 
(2) When the actor's conduct is reasonable and in fulfillment of his 
duties as a governmental officer or employee; 
(3) When the actor's conduct is reasonable discipline of minors by 
parents, guardians, teachers, or other persons in loco parentis; 
(4) When the actor's conduct is reasonable discipline of persons in 
custody under the laws of the state; 
(5) When the actor's conduct is justified for any other reason under 
the laws of this state. 
History: C. 1953* 76-2-401, enacted by his office, or place of business or employ-
L. 1973, cn. 196, § 76-2-401. ment, 41 A. L. R. 3d 584. 
Homicide: duty to retreat where assail-
Cross-References. ant and assailed share the same living 
Burden of proving homicide justified, quarters, 26 A. L. R. 3d 1296. 
77-31-12. Homicide: modern status of rules as to 
burden and quantum of proof to show 
CoUateral References. self-defense, 43 A. L. R. 3d 221. 
Criminal Law<^38.
 f Homicide or assault in defense of habi-
22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 49. t a t i ° n or property, 34 A. L. R. 1488. 
40 Am. Jur. 2d 405, Homicide § 110. , ^ u ? t m t *£*? f 0 ^ ' * o m l c l d o a a a f* 
1 a
 f ected by, 25 A. L. R. 1007. 
". Relationship with assailant's wife as 
Admissibility on issue of self-defense provocation depriving defendant of right 
(or defense of another), on prosecution
 0f self-defense, 9 A. L. R. 3d 933. 
for homicide or assault, of evidence of Self-defense by one who has rightfully 
specific acts of violence by deceased, or entered on premises of his assailant, 53 
person assaulted, against others than de- A. L. R. 486. 
fendant, 121 A. L. R. 380. Self-defense, right of, as affected by 
Duty to retreat to wall as affected by defendant's violation of law only casually 
illegal character of premises on which related to the encounter, 10 A. L" R. 861. 
homicide occurs, 2 A. L. R. 518. Wife's confession of adultery as affect-
Homicide: duty to retreat as condition ing degree of homicide in killing her para-
of self-defense when one is attacked at mour, 10 A. L. R. 470. 
DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW 
Combat. attack on innocent victim. State v. John-
Combat, within meaning of former ex- son> 1 1 2 u - 130> 185 P. 2d 738. 
cusable homicide statute, required actual Guiding principle in determining whether 
participation by both deceased and de- homicide was committed by accident and 
fendant, and did not include one-sided misfortune in heat of passion and upon 
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History: C. 1953, 76-3-404, enacted by 24B C.J.S. Criminal Law §1983(2)b 
L. 1973, clL 196, § 76-3-404. (a). 
21 Am. Jur. 2d 547, Criminal Law § 584. 
Collateral References, 
Crixniaal L a w ^ l 2 0 8 ( 2 ) . J&^^lSHL.0' ** 
76-3-405. Limitation on sentence where conviction or prior sentence 
set aside.—Where a conviction or sentence has been set aside on direct 
review or on collateral attack, the court shall not impose a new sentence 
for the same offense or for a different offense based on the same conduct 
which is more severe than the prior sentence less the portion of the prior 
sentence previously satisfied. 
History: C. 1953, 76-3-405, enacted by 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law §403(9). 
Lc 1973, cb. 196, § 76-3-405. 
« « * i T> * Propriety of increased punishment on 
Collateral Eeferences.
 n e w t r i a l f o r B a m e o f f e n s e j 1 2 A . L. E. 3d 
Criminal Law<&»260(13). 978. 
CHAPTEB 4 
INCHOATE OFFENSES 
Part 1. Attempt 
Section 
76-4-101. Attempt—Elements of offense. 
76-4-102. Attempt—Classification of offenses. 
Part 2. Criminal Conspiracy 
76-4-201. Conspiracy—Elements of offense. 
76-4-202. Conspiracy—Classification of offenses. 
Part 3. Exemptions and Eestrictions 
76-4-301. Specific attempt or conspiracy offense prevails. 
76-4-302. Conviction of inchoate and principal offense or attempt and conspiracy to 
commit offense prohibited. 
Part 1 
Attempt 
76-4-101. Attempt—Elements of offense.—(1) For purposes of this 
part a person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if, acting with the 
kind of culpability otherwise required for the commission of the offense, 
he engages in conduct constituting a substantial step toward commission 
of the offense. 
(2) For purposes of this part, conduct does not constitute a substantial 
step unless it is strongly corroborative of the actor's intent to commit 
the offense. 
(3) No defense to the offense of attempt shall arise: 
(a) Because the offense attempted was actually committed; or 
(b) Due to factual or legal impossibility if the offense could have been 
committed had the attendant circumstances been as the actor believed them 
to be. 
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78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs 
and to issue all writs and process necessary: 
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or 
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative pro-
ceedings of state agencies or appeals from the district court review of 
informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the Public Ser-
vice Commission, State Tax Commission, Board of State Lands, Board of 
Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer; 
(b) appeals from the district court review of adjudicative proceedings of 
agencies of political subdivisions of the state or other local agencies; 
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts; 
(d) appeals from the circuit courts, except those from the small claims 
department of a circuit court; 
(e) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases, 
except those involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony; 
(f) appeals from district court in criminal cases, except those involving 
a conviction of a first degree or capital felony; 
(g) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs involving a 
criminal conviction, except those involving a first degree or capital felony; 
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, in-
cluding but not limited to divorce, annulment, property division, child 
custody, support, visitation, adoption, and paternity; 
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and 
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court. 
(3) The Court of Appeals, upon its own motion only and by the vote of four 
judges of the court, may certify to the Supreme Court for original appellate 
review and determination any matter over which the Court of Appeals has 
original appellate jurisdiction. 
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Chapter 
46b, Title 63, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings. 
History: C. 1953, 78-2a-3, enacted by L. 
1986, ch. 47, § 46; 1987, ch. 161, § 304; 1988, 
ch. 73, § 1; 1988, ch. 210, § 141; 1988, ch. 
248, § 8. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend-
ment by Laws 1988, Chapter 73, effective April 
25, 1988, inserted subsection designations (a) 
and (b) in Subsection (1); inserted "resulting 
from formal adjudicative proceedings" in Sub-
section (2)(a); substituted "state agencies" for 
"state and local agencies" in Subsection (2)(a); 
substituted "informal adjudicative proceedings 
of the agencies" for "them" in Subsection (2)(a); 
deleted "notwithstanding any other provision 
of law" at the end of Subsection (2)(a); inserted 
Subsection (b); redesignated former Subsec-
tions (2)(b) to (2)(h) as Subsections (2)(c) to 
(2)(i); added "except those from the small 
claims department of a circuit court" at the end 
of Subsection (2)(d); and made minor stylistic 
changes. 
The 1988 amendment by Laws 1988, Chap-
ter 210, effective April 25, 1988, added Subsec-
tion (2)(h) and redesignated former Subsection 
(2)(h) as Subsection (2)(i). 
The 1988 amendment by Laws 1988, Chap-
ter 248, effective April 25, 1988, in Subsection 
(2)(a), rewrote the phrase before "except" 
which had read "the final orders and decrees of 
state and local agencies or appeals from the 
district court review of them"; deleted "not-
withstanding any other provision of law" at the 
end of Subsection (2)(a); inserted present Sub-
section (2Kb); designated former Subsections 
(2Kb) to (2)(h) as Subsections (2)(c) to (2)(i); and 
substituted "first degree or capital felony" for 
"first or capital degree felony" in present Sub-
section (2)(0. 
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78-4-5 JUDICIAL CODE 
78-4-5. Jurisdiction — Exclusive and concurrent. 
(1) Circuit courts shall have jurisdiction over all classes of misdemeanors 
and infractions involving persons 18 years of age and older and shall have the 
power to impose the punishments prescribed for these offenses. The judge of 
the circuit court shall have and exercise the powers and jurisdiction of a 
magistrate, including proceedings for the preliminary examination to deter-
mine probable cause, commitment prior to trial, or the release on bail of 
persons charged with criminal offenses. Whenever a complaint may be com-
menced before a magistrate under § 77-57-2 or an arrested person is to be 
taken before a magistrate under § 77-13-17, the complaint may be com-
menced or the arrested person may be taken before any circuit court judge in 
the county or the justice of the peace in the county in whose precinct the 
offense occurred, unless both are unavailable, and then before any justice of 
the peace having jurisdiction. All complaints for offenses charged under Title 
41, except for offenses charged under Article 5 of Chapter 6 of Title 41, must 
be filed in the court of the municipal justice of the peace or the precinct of the 
county justice of the peace where the offense occurred where such justice 
courts exist and have jurisdiction of such offenses. 
(2) The circuit court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction of all cases 
arising under or by reason of the violation of any county ordinance involving 
persons 18 years of age or older, unless the office of precinct justice of the 
peace exists in the county, in which case jurisdiction shall be concurrent. 
(3) The circuit court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction of all cases 
arising under or by reason of the violation of any municipal ordinance involv-
ing persons 18 years of age and over in those municipalities in which a munic-
ipal department of the circuit court exists or has been created. 
(4) The circuit court shall have concurrent jurisdiction with the juvenile 
court over all traffic offenses committed by persons less than 18 years of age. 
History: C. 1953, 78-4-5, enacted by L. section (1), were repealed by Laws 1980, cb. 15, 
1977, chc 77, § 1. § 1. For present provisions, see §§ 77-25-1 et 
Repeals and Enactments. — Laws 1977, seq. and 77-7-1 et seq. 
ch. 77, § 1 repealed former § 78-4-5 (L. 1951, Cross-References. — Actions for violation 
ch. 26, § 2(2); C. 1943, Supp., 104-4-3.11), re- of ordinances, § 10-7-65 et seq. 
lating to prohibition of political activity, and Justices' courts, Chapter 5 of this title. 
enacted present § 78-4-5, effective July 1, Magistrates, § 77-7-18 et seq. 
1978. Power of cities to provide by ordinance for 
Compiler's Notes. — Sections 77-57-2 and treatment of alcoholics and narcotic or drug 
77-13-17, referred to the third sentence in Sub- addicts, § 10-8-47. 




—Signing and swearing. 
Juvenile traffic offenders. 
—Drunk driving. 






78-4-5 JUDICIAL CODE 
78-4-5. Jurisdiction — Exclusive and concurrent — Taking 
of juvenile licenses. 
(1) (a) Circuit courts have jurisdiction over all classes of misdemeanors and 
infractions involving persons 18 years of age and older and may impose the 
punishments prescribed for these offenses. The judge of the circuit court has 
the authority and jurisdiction of a magistrate including the conducting oi 
proceedings for the preliminary examination to determine probable cause, 
commitment prior to trial, or the release on bail of persons charged with 
criminal offenses. 
(b) When a complaint may be commenced before a magistrate under 
Section 77-3-1 or an arrested person is to be taken before a magistrate 
under Section 77-7-18, the complaint may be commenced or the arrested 
person may be taken before any circuit court judge in the county or the 
justice court judge in the county in whose precinct the offense occurred, 
unless both are unavailable; then before any justice court judge having 
jurisdiction. 
(c) All complaints for offenses charged under Title 41 except offenses 
charged under Article 5, Chapter 6, Title 41, shall be filed in the municipal 
justice court or the county justice court where the offense occurred if those 
justice courts exist and have jurisdiction of the offenses. 
(2) The circuit court has exclusive original jurisdiction of all cases arising 
under or by reason of the violation of any county ordinance involving persons 18 
years of age or older, but if a county justice court exists in the county, jurisdic-
tion is concurrent. 
(3) (a) The circuit court has exclusive original jurisdiction of all cases arising 
under or by reason of the violation of any municipal ordinance involving 
persons 18 years of age and older in those municipalities in which a muni-
cipal department of the circuit court exists or has been created. 
(b) The circuit court has concurrent jurisdiction with county justice 
courts over violations of municipal ordinances charging persons 18 years of 
age and older with driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs, driving 
with a blood alcohol content of .08% or higher, or reckless driving in 
municipalities within a county precinct in which a municipal justice court 
does not exist. 
(c) The circuit court has concurrent jurisdiction with municipal justice 
courts over violations of state statutes in municipalities where a municipal 
justice court exists. 
(4) The circuit court has jurisdiction over all traffic offenses committed by 
persons younger than 18 years of age, except those offenses exclusive to the 
juvenile court under Subsection 78-3a-16(l)(a). The circuit court shall notify the 
juvenile court of a conviction of any person younger than 18 years of age of an 
offense under Section 78-3a-39.5. 
(5) The circuit court has authority to take the juvenile's driver license and 
return it to the Driver License Division, Department of Public Safety, for 
suspension under Section 41-2-128. 
History: C. 1953, 78-4-5, enacted by L. Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend-
1977, ch. 77, § 1; 1988, ch. 248, § 29; 1989, ch. ment, effective April 25, 1988, divided Subsec-
150, § 5; 1989, ch. 157, § 9; 1989, ch. 188, § 8. tion (1) into subsections; substituted "Section 
77-3-1" and "Section 77-7-18" for "Section 
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(3) in actions under the Utah Uniform Probate Code; 
(4) in actions to review the decisions of any state administrative 
agency, board, council, commission, or hearing officer; 
(5) in actions seeking remedies in the form of extraordinary writs; and 
(6) in all other actions where, by statute, jurisdiction is exclusively 
vested in the district court or other trial or appellate court. 
History: C. 1953, 78-4-7, enacted by L. 
1977, ch. 77, § 1; 1983, ch. 76, § 1; 1986, ch. 
121, § 1; 1988, ch. 248, § 31. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend-
ment, effective April 25, 1988, deleted Subsec-
tion designation (1) at the beginning of the sec-
tion; substituted the subsection designations 
(1) to (6) for former subsection designations 
(l)(a) to (l)(f); deleted former Subsection (2) 
which read "The circuit court shall have con-
current jurisdiction with justices of the peace 
courts where the sum claimed is less than 
$750"; and made minor stylistic changes. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Title to real estate. 
An order of the circuit court purporting to 
adjudicate ownership rights to real property 
and the proceeds of its sale was null and void. 
A circuit court could not, through consent or 
waiver, expand its jurisdiction to adjudicate 
claims involving the title to real property. 
Thompson v. Jackson, 743 P.2d 1230 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1987). 
78-4-7.5. Trials de novo. 
The circuit court has appellate jurisdiction to hear trials de novo of the 
judgments of the justices' courts and trials de novo of the small claims depart-
ment of the circuit court. 
History: C. 1953, 78-4-7.5, enacted by L. 
1986, ch. 47, § 66; 1988, ch. 73, § 2; 1988, ch. 
248, § 32. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend-
ment by Laws 1988, Chapter 73, effective April 
25, 1988, rewrote the section which read "The 
circuit court has jurisdiction to hear trials de 
novo of the judgments of the justices' courts." 
The 1988 amendment by Laws 1988, Chap-
ter 248, effective April 25, 1988, inserted "ap-
pellate" before "jurisdiction." 
This section is set out as reconciled by the 
Office of Legislative Research and General 
Counsel. 
78-4-8. Venue and change of judge provisions — Excep-
tions. 
Provisions of law regarding venue and change of judge apply to the circuit 
courts the same as district courts, except cases arising under or by reason of 
the violation of municipal ordinances may, upon stipulation of the parties or 
upon order of the court for good cause shown, be tried and decided in a munici-
pality or county within the circuit other than the municipality or county in 
which the violation occurred. 
History: C. 1953, 78-4-8, enacted by L. 
1977, ch. 77, § 1; 1983, ch. 76, § 2; 1988, ch. 
248, § 33. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend-
ment, effective April 25, 1988, deleted the for-
mer first sentence which read "In criminal and 
civil cases the territorial jurisdiction of circuit 
courts shall be statewide" and made minor sty-
listic changes. 
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History: C. 1953, 78-4-10, enacted by L. ment increased the number of judges from 11 
1977, ch. 77, § 1; L. 1983, ch. 76, § 4; 1986, to 14 in the fifth circuit and from four to five in 
ch. 47, § 67. the eighth circuit; and added the last sentence. 
Repeals and Enactments. — Laws 1977, The 1986 amendment deleted the former last 
ch. 77, § 1 repealed former § 78-4-10 (L. 1951, sentence, which read: 'The governor shall ap-
ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943, Supp., 104-4-7), relating to point three judges for the fifth circuit and one 
residence of city court judges and place of hold- judge for the eighth circuit effective July 1, 
ing court, and enacted present § 78-4-10, effec- 1983, to hold office until their successors are 
tive July 1, 1978. duly elected and qualified at the general elec-
Amendment Notes. — The 1983 amend- tion in 1986," 
78-4-11. Appeal to Court of Appeals — County attorneys 
to represent state, city attorneys to represent mu-
nicipalities. 
Except as otherwise directed by § 78-2-2, appeals from final civil and crimi-
nal judgments of the circuit courts are to the Court of Appeals. The county 
attorney shall represent the interests of the state as public prosecutor in any 
criminal appeals from the circuit court. City attorneys shall represent the 
interests of municipalities in any appeals from circuit courts involving viola-
tions of municipal ordinances. 
History: C. 1953, 78-4-11, enacted by L. and enacted present § 78-4-11, effective July 1, 
1977, ch. 77, § 1; L. 1981, ch. 90, § 8; 1983, 1978. 
ch. 76, § 5; 1986, ch. 47, § 68. Amendment Notes. — The 1986 amend-
Repeals and Enactments. — Laws 1977, ment rewrote this section, 
ch. 77, § 1 repealed former § 78-4-11 (L. 1951, Cross-References. — Appellate jurisdic-
ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943, Supp., 104-4-8), relating to t i o n ' U t a h C o n s t - Art. V1H, Sec- ^ § 78"3-4-
absence of city court judge and filling vacancy, £ l t v attorney, § 10-3-928. 
J J
 County attorney, Chapter 18 of Title 17. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Criminal cases. 
—Finality of appellate judgment. 
—Right to appeal. 
Guilty plea. 
Effect of appeal. 
—Amendment of pleadings. 
Effect of satisfaction of judgment pending appeal. 
Jurisdiction of appellate court. 
—Amount in controversy. 
—Derivative nature. 




Rehearing by appellate court. 
—Time to take further appeal. 
Scope of review. 
—Supreme Court. 
Trial de novo. 
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 47 Am Jur 2d Justices of Key Numbers. — Justices of the Peace «=> 
the Peace § 58 79 
C.J.S. — 51 C J S Justices of the Peace 
§ 67. 
78-5-4. Concurrent criminal jurisdiction. 
Justices' courts have concurrent jurisdiction of the following public offenses 
committed within the respective counties in which such courts are estab-
lished: 
(1) all class B and class C misdemeanors punishable by a fine no 
greater than the maximum fine for a class B or C misdemeanor under 
§ 76-3-301, or by imprisonment m the county jail or municipal prison not 
exceeding six months, or by both the fine and imprisonment; and 
(2) all infractions and the punishments prescribed for them. 
History: C. 1953, 78-5-4, enacted by L. 
1979, ch. 127, § 5; 1986, ch. 178, § 65. 
Repeals and Enactments. — Laws 1979, 
ch 127, § 5 repealed former § 78-5-4 (L 1951, 
ch 58, § 1, C 1943, Supp, 104-5-4, L 1975 
(1st S S.), ch. 4, § 1, 1977, ch. 78, § 12), relat-
ing to criminal jurisdiction of justices' courts, 
and enacted present § 78-5-4 
Amendment Notes. — The 1986 amend-
ment, in Subsection (1), substituted "no 
ANALYSIS 
Constitutionality 
Failure to pay fine 
Nonindictable misdemeanor 
—Waiver of venue 
Preliminary hearing 
—Felony 
Representation of state 
Violation of game laws 
Violation of Sunday laws 
Constitutionality. 
Laws 1925, ch 62, amending former 
§ 20-5-4 (Code 1943) and limiting jurisdiction 
of justices' courts to offenses committed in their 
respective precincts, was not invalid because it 
might produce confusion and derangement in 
criminal practice and procedure in justices' 
courts and was inconsistent with other statu-
tory provisions Dillard v Distnct Court, 69 
Utah 10, 251 P 1070 (1926) 
Failure to pay fine. 
After justice of peace sentenced defendant to 
jail for petit larceny, and to pay fine, he was 
without authority to adjudge that defendant be 
greater than the maximum fine for a class B or 
C misdemeanor under § 76-3-301" for "less 
than $300" and "the" for "such" preceding "fine 
and imprisonment" 
Cross-References. — Abuse of process a 
misdemeanor, § 76-8-601 
Institutions of higher learning, violation of 
regulations, § 53-45-9 
Sentencing for misdemeanors, §§ 76-3-201, 
76-3-204, 76-3-301 
further imprisoned in default of payment of 
fine imposed In re Lewis, 10 Utah 47, 41 P 
1077 (1894) 
Nonindictable misdemeanor. 
—Waiver of venue. 
Although complaint charging the injuring of 
a cow by altering or defacing brand should 
have been filed in justices' court instead of in 
district court, since action was for 
nonindictable misdemeanor, question of venue 
was not raised by motion in arrest of judgment 
based on failure of jurisdiction, as district court 
had cognizance of subject of misdemeanors, 
and as question of venue was not raised, it was 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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78-5-13. Judgment not a lien unless so docketed. 
A judgment rendered in a justices' court creates no lien upon any lands of 
the judgment debtor, unless such an abstract is filed and docketed in the office 
of the clerk of the district court of the county in which the lands are situated; 
and when so filed and docketed such judgment is a lien upon the real property 
of the judgment debtor, not exempt from execution, situated in that county, 
for the period of eight years from the date the judgment was entered, unless 
the judgment is previously satisfied. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943, Limitation of action on judgment, 
Supp., 104-5-13. § 78-12-22 
Cross-References. — Lien of judgments of Satisfaction of judgments in district courts, 
distnct courts, § 78-22-1. Rule 58B, U R C P 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Priority of liens. such judgment was allowed to expire, and judg-
Where judgment rendered by justice of peace ment was then renewed, hen of first judgment 
became hen upon land by being duly docketed expired, mortgage hen attached as first hen, 
in district court, but before it was enforced by and sale on second judgment could not affect 
levy and sale, mortgage hen also accrued and such mortgage hen Smith v Schwartz, 21 
thereafter time limited by statute for hen of Utah 126, 60 P 305, 81 Am St R 670 (1899) 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 47 Am. Jur. 2d Justices of Key Numbers. — Justices of the Peace «=» 
the Peace § 93 131, 138(10) 
C.J.S. — 51 C J.S. Justices of the Peace 
§ 123(7) 
78-5-14. Trial de novo in circuit court. 
Any person dissatisfied with a judgment rendered in a justices' court, 
whether the same was rendered on default or after trial, is entitled to a trial 
de novo in the circuit court of the county as provided by law. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943, peal therefrom to the district court of the 
Supp., 104-5-14; 1986, ch. 47, § 74. county within the time and in the manner pro-
Amendment Notes. — The 1986 amend- vided by law" 
ment substituted "is entitled to a trial de novo Cross-References. — Fee of county clerk on 
with the circuit court of the county as provided appeal to district court, § 21-2-2 
by law" for "may apply for a new trial or ap- Jurisdiction of circuit court, § 78-4-7 5 




Jurisdiction of appellate court 
—Amount in controversy 
—Lack of jurisdiction of justices 
Effect 
—Waiver of objections 
Consenting that case be set for trial 
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78-31a-20. Scope of chapter. 
This chapter is not intended to provide a means of arbitration exclusive of 
those sanctioned under common law. 
History: C. 1953, 78-31a-20, enacted by L. 












Acts and omissions constituting 
contempt. 
Re-entry after eviction from real 
property. 
In immediate presence of court; 
summary action — Without im-
mediate presence; procedure. 
Warrant of attachment or commit-
ment order to show cause. 
Bail. 
Duty of sheriff. 













Damages to party aggrieved. 
Imprisonment to compel perfor-
mance. 
Procedure when party charged fails 
to appear. 
Excuse for nonappearance — Un-
necessary restraint forbidden. 
Contempt of process of nonjudicial 
officer. 
Procedure. 
78-32-1. Acts and omissions constituting contempt. 
The following acts or omissions in respect to a court or proceedings therein 
are contempts of the authority of the court: 
(1) Disorderly, contemptuous or insolent behavior toward the judge 
while holding the court, tending to interrupt the due course of a trial or 
other judicial proceeding. 
(2) Breach of the peace, boisterous conduct or violent disturbance, tend-
ing to interrupt the due course of a trial or other judicial proceeding. 
(3) Misbehavior in office, or other willful neglect or violation of duty by 
an attorney, counsel, clerk, sheriff, or other person appointed or elected to 
perform a judicial or ministerial service. 
(4) Deceit, or abuse of the process or proceedings of the court, by a 
party to an action or special proceeding. 
(5) Disobedience of any lawful judgment, order or process of the court. 
(6) Assuming to be an officer, attorney or counselor of a court, and 
acting as such without authority. 
(7) Rescuing any person or property in the custody of an officer by 
virtue of an order or process of such court. 
(8) Unlawfully detaining a witness or party to an action while going to, 
remaining at, or returning from, the court where the action is on the 
calendar for trial. 
(9) Any other unlawful interference with the process or proceedings of 
a court. 
(10) Disobedience of a subpoena duly served, or refusing to be sworn or 
to answer as a witness. 
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(11) When summoned as a juror in a court, neglecting to attend or 
serve as such, or improperly conversing with a party to an action to be 
tried at such court, or with any other person, concerning the merits of 
such action, or receiving a communication from a party or other person in 
respect to it, without immediately disclosing the same to the court. 
(12) Disobedience by an inferior tribunal, magistrate or officer of the 
lawful judgment, order or process of a superior court, or proceeding in an 
action or special proceeding contrary to law, after such action or special 
proceeding is removed from the jurisdiction of such inferior tribunal, 
magistrate or officer. Disobedience of the lawful orders or process of a 
judicial officer is also a contempt of the authority of such officer. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943, 
Supp., 104-32-1. 
Cross-References. — Abuse of office, 
§ 76-8-201 et seq 
Criminal Code not to affect contempt power, 
§§ 76-1-107, 76-3-201 
Defense costs in criminal actions, contempt 
based on failure of convicted defendant to pay, 
§§ 77-32a-7 to 77-32a-12 
Discovery, sanctions for noncompliance with 
order compelling discovery, Rule 37(b)(D), 
U.R.C P 
Execution sale bidder, refusal to pay sum 
bid, Rule 69(e)(4), U R.C P 
Judgment directing performance of specific 
act, Rule 70, U R C P 
Juvenile courts, §§ 78-3a-28, 78-3a-52 
Labor disputes, §§ 34-19-9, 34-19-10 
Masters, refusal of witness to appear or give 
evidence before, Rule 53(d)(2), U R C P 
Penalties for failure to appear or complete 
jury service, § 76-46-20 
Power of judicial officers to punish for con-
tempt, § 78-7-18 
Practice of law without a license, § 78-51-25 
Repeated application for orders as contempt, 
§ 78-7-20 
Subpoena, refusal to obey, Rule 45(f), 
U R C P 
Summary judgment affidavits made in bad 
faith, Rule 56(g), U R C P 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Ability to comply 
"Any other unlawful interference " 
Civil or criminal nature of proceedings. 
Criticism or comments 
Deceit or abuse of process 
Disobedience by inferior tribunal 
Disobedience of judgment, order or process 
Excuses or defenses 
Findings of fact required 
Independent proceeding 
Inherent power of courts 
Perjury 
Purpose of section 
Territorial courts 
Ability to comply. 
It is important that the ability of the party 
charged with contempt to perform receive con-
sideration before the court is justified in 
awarding damages Foreman v Foreman, 111 
Utah 72, 176 P2d 144 (1946) 
One who puts forth every reasonable effort to 
comply with court order, but is unable to do so, 
is not guilty of contempt on account of such 
failure Limb v Limb, 113 Utah 385, 195 P 2d 
263 (1948) 
Judgment finding defendant in contempt for 
failure to comply with divorce decree, requir-
ing payment of $75 per month for alimony and 
support of minor children, was upheld as sup-
ported by evidence that defendant was able to 
comply with that decree and that his failure to 
do so was willful, even though defendant testi-
fied that he had been sick and out of employ-
ment and that, since starting work again, he 
had paid divorced wife $50 a month out of 
monthly salary of $180, from which he also 
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Rule 4.3. Continuances — Civil. 
(a) Cases set for trial shall not be continued upon stipulation of counsel 
alone, but continuances may be allowed by order of the presiding judge or the 
judge to whom the case is assigned for trial. No continuances shall be allowed 
except for good cause shown. Said continuances may be granted upon motion 
of counsel made in open court or by written motion in which the grounds 
therefore are stated or by written stipulation of the parties and approval of 
the court. A notice of all written motions must be served upon counsel for the 
opposing side in the manner prescribed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
and these rules. In the event that counsel seeks to have the hearing of the 
same in less than five (5) days from the time of the service of the motion, an 
order permitting the same and directing that the notice be served, must be 
entered by the court and served upon counsel with the motion. 
(b) In law and motion matters, except orders to show cause and bench 
warrants, continuances may be had upon stipulation of the parties and notice 
to the law and motion clerks provided, however, that once a matter has been 
placed upon the typed law and motion calendar, a continuance may be had 
only upon approval by the court. 
Rule 4.4. Requests for instructions. 
(a) Requests for instruction shall be presented to the court at the com-
mencement of the trial, provided, that additional or further instructions may 
be presented no later than the close of evidence. At the time of presenting 
requests, a copy of the same shall be furnished to opposing counsel. 
(b) Requests for instructions to the jury must be in writing, stating in full 
the instruction requested. Requests referring only to numbers in JIFU will 
not be received. Each request shall be upon a separate sheet of paper, the 
original and copies of which shall be free from red lines and firm names, and 
shall be entitled: 
"Instruction No. " 
with the number of the request written thereon in lead pencil. 
(c) If citations are given in support of a requested instruction, at least one 
copy of the requested instruction furnished to the court shall be submitted 
without such citation being typed thereon. Citations may be set out upon 
separate sheets attached to the particular instruction to which the citation 
relates. 
Rule 4.5. Orders, judgments, and decrees. 
(a) Contents and service. Upon entry of judgment, notice of such entry of 
judgment shall be served upon the opposing party and proof of such service 
shall be filed with the court. All orders, judgments, and decrees shall be so 
drawn as to show that the same were made and entered upon the stipulation 
of counsel or the motion of an attorney of record in the cause or proceeding in 
which the same is made, and shall give the name of the attorney making such 
motion, or that the same was ordered by the court on its own initiative. 
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Child Sexual Abuse Child or Unwarranted Compromise of the De-
Cases, 1986 Utah L. Rev. 443. fendant's Constitutional Rights?, 1986 Utah L. 
Victims Have Rights Too, 1986 Utah L. Rev. Rev. 461. 
449- A.L.R. — Closed-circuit television witness 
Note, Videotaping the Testimony of an examination, 61 A.L.R.4th 1155. 
Abused Child: Necessary Protection for the 
Rule 16. Discovery. 
(a) Except as otherwise provided, the prosecutor shall disclose to the de-
fense upon request the following material or information of which he has 
knowledge: 
(1) relevant written or recorded statements of the defendant or codefen-
dants; 
(2) the criminal record of the defendant; 
(3) physical evidence seized from the defendant or codefendant; 
(4) evidence known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of 
the accused, mitigate the guilt of the defendant, or mitigate the degree of 
the offense for reduced punishment; and 
(5) any other item of evidence which the court determines on good 
cause shown should be made available to the defendant in order for the 
defendant to adequately prepare his defense. 
(b) The prosecutor shall make all disclosures as soon as practicable follow-
ing the filing of charges and before the defendant is required to plead. The 
prosecutor has a continuing duty to make disclosure. 
(c) Except as otherwise provided or as privileged, the defense shall disclose 
to the prosecutor such information as required by statute relating to alibi or 
insanity and any other item of evidence which the court determines on good 
cause shown should be made available to the prosecutor in order for the 
prosecutor to adequately prepare his case. 
(d) Unless otherwise provided, the defense attorney shall make all disclo-
sures at least ten days before trial or as soon as practicable. He has a continu-
ing duty to make disclosure. 
(e) When convenience reasonably requires, the prosecutor or defense may 
make disclosure by notifying the opposing party that material and informa-
tion may be inspected, tested or copied at specified reasonable times and 
places. 
(f) Upon a sufficient showing the court may at any time order that discov-
ery or inspection be denied, restricted, or deferred, or make such other order 
as is appropriate. Upon motion by a party, the court may permit the party to 
make such showing, in whole or in part, in the form of a written statement to 
be inspected by the judge alone. If the court enters an order granting relief 
following such an ex parte showing, the entire text of the party's statement 
shall be sealed and preserved in the records of the court to be made available 
to the appellate court in the event of an appeal. 
(g) If at any time during the course of the proceedings it is brought to the 
attention of the court that a party has failed to comply with this rule, the 
court may order such party to permit the discovery or inspection, grant a 
continuance, or prohibit the party from introducing evidence not disclosed, or 
it may enter such other order as it deems just under the circumstances. 
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(h) Subject to constitutional limitations, the accused may be required to: 
(1) appear in a lineup; 
(2) speak for identification; 
(3) submit to fingerprinting or the making of other bodily impressions; 
(4) pose for photographs not involving reenactment of the crime; 
(5) try on articles of clothing or other items of disguise; 
(6) permit the taking of samples of blood, hair, fingernail scrapings, 
and other bodily materials which can be obtained without unreasonable 
intrusion; 
(7) provide specimens of handwriting; 
(8) submit to reasonable physical or medical inspection of his body; and 
(9) cut hair or allow hair to grow to approximate appearance at the 
time of the alleged offense. 
Whenever the personal appearance of the accused is required for the forego-
ing purposes, reasonable notice of the time and place of such appearance shall 
be given to the accused and his counsel. Failure of the accused to appear or to 
comply with the requirements of this rule, unless relieved by order of the 
court, without reasonable excuse shall be grounds for revocation of pre-trial 
release, may be offered as evidence in the prosecutor's case in chief for consid-
eration along with other evidence concerning the guilt of the accused and 
shall be subject to such further sanctions as the court should deem appropri-
ate 
(77-35-16, enacted by L. 1980, ch. 14, § 1.) 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
In general. 
Continuing duty to disclose. 
Discretion of court. 
Failure to request discovery. 
Nondisclosure. 









Discovery powers are conferred upon both 
the circuit courts and the district courts State 
v Easthope, 668 P.2d 528 (Utah 1983). 
Continuing duty to disclose. 
Even if there is no court-ordered disclosure, 
a prosecutor's failure to disclose newly discov-
ered inculpatory information which falls 
within the ambit of Subdivision (a), after the 
prosecution has made a voluntary disclosure of 
evidence, might so mislead a defendant as to 
cause prejudicial error State v Carter, 707 
P2d 656 (Utah 1985); State v Knight, 734 
P 2d 913 (Utah 1987). 
Discretion of court 
A trial court is allowed broad discretion in 
granting or refusing discovery and inspection, 
and its determinations on this subject will not 
be overturned on appeal unless the court has 
abused its discretion State v Knill, 656 P 2d 
1026 (Utah 1982), State v Lairby, 699 P 2d 
1187 (Utah 1984) 
Failure to request discovery. 
The defendant's claim that the prosecutor's 
failure to provide him with a police report de-
scribing a witness' testimony prior to trial was 
not entertained, no request for discovery, writ-
ten or oral, being made at any time State v 
Booker, 709 P 2d 342 (Utah 1985) 
Nondisclosure. 
—No violation of rule. 
State's failure to disclose to defendant before 
trial certain jail records which corroborated de-
fendant's testimony that he requested medical 
treatment while in jail did not violate defen-
dant's discovery rights where there was no 
showing in record from which it could be fairly 
inferred that prosecution knew or should have 
known that defendant's request for medical 
treatment would ever be an issue or of any im-
portance at trial State v Fierst, 692 P 2d 751 
(Utah 1984) 
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tion in trial of criminal case (or related hear-
ing) as ground of disqualification in subse-
quent cnminal case involving same defendant, 
6 ALR3d 519 
Social or business relationship between pro-
posed juror and nonparty witness as affecting 
former's qualification as juror, 11 ALR3d 
859 
Number of peremptory challenges allowed in 
criminal case where there are two or more de-
fendants tried together, 21 A L R 3d 725 
Prior service on grand jury which considered 
indictment against accused as disqualification 
for service on petit jury, 24 A L R 3d 1236 
Comment note on beliefs regarding capital 
punishment as disqualifying juror in capital 
case — post-Witherspoon cases, 39 A L R 3d 
550 
Propriety, on voir dire in criminal case, of 
inquiries as to juror's possible prejudice if in-
formed of defendant's prior convictions, 43 
ALR3d 1081 
Membership in racially biased or prejudiced 
organization as proper subject of voir dire in-
quiry or ground for challenge, 63 A L R 3d 
1052 
Similarity of occupation between proposed 
juror and alleged victim of crime as affecting 
juror's competency, 71 ALR3d 974 
Law enforcement officers as qualified jurors 
in criminal cases, 72 A L R 3d 895 
Former law enforcement officers as qualified 
jurors in criminal cases, 72 A L R 3d 958 
Use of peremptory challenge to exclude from 
jury persons belonging to race or class, 79 
ALR3d 14 
Right of defense in criminal prosecution to 
disclosure of prosecution information regard-
ing prospective jurors, 86 A L R 3d 571 
Racial or ethnic prejudice of prospective ju-
rors as proper subject of inquiry or ground of 
challenge on voir dire in state criminal case, 94 
ALR3d 15 
Religious belief, affiliation, or prejudice of 
prospective juror as proper subject of inquiry or 
ground for challenge on voir dire, 95 A L R 3d 
172 
Excusing, on account of public, charitable, or 
educational employment, one qualified and not 
specifically exempted as juror in state criminal 
case as ground of complaint by accused, 99 
ALR3d 1261 
Additional peremptory challenges because of 
multiple criminal charges, 5 A L R 4th 533 
Validity and construction of statute or court 
rule prescribing number of peremptory chal-
lenges in criminal cases according to nature of 
offense or extent of punishment, 8 A L R 4th 
149 
Cure of prejudice resulting from statement 
by prospective juror during voir dire, in pres-
ence of other prospective jurors, as to defen-
dant's guilt, 50 A L R 4th 969 
Professional or business relations between 
proposed juror and attorney as ground for chal-
lenge for cause, 52 ALR4th 964 
Fact that juror in criminal case or juror's 
relative or friend, has previously been victim of 
cnminal incident as ground of disqualification, 
65 A L R 4th 743 
Examination and challenge of federal case 
jurors on basis of attitudes toward homosexual-
ity, 85 A L R Fed 864 
Key Numbers. — Jury «=» 57 et seq 
Rule 19. Instructions. 
(a) At the close of the evidence or at such earlier time as the court reason-
ably directs, any party may file written request that the court instruct the 
jury on the law as set forth in the request At the same time copies of such 
requests shall be furnished to the other parties The court shall inform counsel 
of its proposed action upon the request, and it shall furnish counsel with a 
copy of its proposed instructions, unless the parties stipulate that such in-
structions may be given orally, or otherwise waive this requirement 
(b) Upon each written request so presented and given, or refused, the court 
shall endorse its decision and shall initial or sign it If part be given and part 
refused, the court shall distinguish, showing by the endorsement what part of 
the charge was given and what part was refused 
(c) No party may assign as error any portion of the charge or omission 
therefrom unless he objects thereto before the jury is instructed, stating dis-
tinctly the matter to which he objects and the ground of his objection Not-
withstanding a party's failure to object, error may be assigned to instructions 
m order to avoid a manifest injustice. 
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(d) The court shall not comment on the evidence in the case, and if the court 
refers to any of the evidence, it shall instruct the jury that they are the 
exclusive judges of all questions of fact. 
(e) Arguments of the respective parties shall be made after the court has 
instructed the jury. Unless otherwise provided by law, any limitation upon 
time for argument shall be within the discretion of the court. 
(77-35-19, enacted by L. 1980, ch. 14, § 1.) 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Failure to request or object. 
—Review without objection. 
Objections. 




Requests by jury. 
Specific instructions. 
—Circumstantial evidence. 
—Elements of offense. 
—Lesser included offenses. 




Failure to request or object. 
Where a defendant does not request an in-
struction on a certain subject, he cannot later 
claim that the trial court's failure to instruct 
on that subject is error. State v. Cowan, 26 
Utah 2d 410, 490 P.2d 890 (1971). 
Except when necessary to avoid manifest in-
justice, this rule prohibits the assigning as 
error the trial court's failure to give a jury in-
struction where no objection is made before the 
jury is instructed. State v. Malmrose, 649 P.2d 
56 (Utah 1982). 
Where oral admissions of defendant in a 
criminal trial are introduced without an in-
struction that such evidence ought to be 
viewed with caution, there is no error as long 
as such an instruction has not been specifically 
requested, especially in a case where the sub-
ject matter is generally covered by the instruc-
tions that are given. State v. Shabata, 678 P.2d 
785 (Utah 1984). 
When faced with a claim that a particular 
assertion of instructional error not raised at 
trial should be considered on appeal because 
failure to do so would result in "manifest injus-
tice" under Subdivision (c), the Supreme Court 
will determine whether to review such a claim 
of error under the same standard used to deter-
mine the presence of "plain error" under Utah 
Rule of Evidence 103(d). State v. Verde, 101 
Utah Adv. Rep. 37 (1989). 
—Review without objection. 
Notwithstanding defendant's failure to ob-
ject to jury instruction on criminal trespass, 
Supreme Court reviewed the instruction to 
prevent manifest injustice where the instruc-
tion misstated the law of criminal trespass and 
was entirely inconsistent with the statutory 
definition of that offense. State v. Lesley, 672 
P.2d 79 (Utah 1983). 
The Supreme Court declined to review a 
modified "dynamite" or Allen charge under the 
manifest error exception to Subdivision (c), 
where defense counsel did not remain silent 
but actively represented to the court that she 
had read the instruction and had no objection 
to it. State v. Medina, 738 P.2d 1021 (Utah 
(1987). 
Where the defendant was not forewarned 
that the trial court was about to issue a ver-
dict-urging instruction and had no opportunity 
to know of or object to the allegedly harmful 
portion of the instruction until after it was 
given to the jury, his failure to object to it prior 
to its being given to the jury did not bar consid-
eration of the charge on appeal, under the 
manifest error exception in Subdivision (c). 
State v. Lactod, 761 P.2d 23 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988). 
Objections. 
—Failure to object. 
Defense counsel knew the contents of a pro-
posed instruction from in-chambers discussion, 
knew that the instruction would be given 
orally, and made no objection to either the con-
tents of the instruction or its oral presentation 
until after the verdict, but merely indicated 
that the instruction was not "appropriate." The 
defendant was, therefore, precluded from rais-
ing an objection on appeal. State v. Kotz, 758 
P.2d 463 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
—Specificity. 
A general statement to the effect that an in-
struction does not correctly state the law is not 
a sufficient objection to the instruction for pur-
poses of a later appeal. State v. Schoenfeld, 545 
P.2d 193 (Utah 1976). 
Subdivision (c) requires more than a general 
exception to the instructions. It requires that 
the matter excepted to and the ground therefor 
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where he was held sane on August 14, 1969 
and trial was initially set for January 7, 1970 
and commenced on April 8,1970, after disposi-
tion of defendant's motion to dismiss made on 
January 7. State v. Carlsen, 25 Utah 2d 136, 
478 P.2d 326 (1970). 
Magistrate's authority to dismiss. 
City court judge acting as a committing mag-
istrate upon a preliminary examination did not 
have authority to dismiss criminal proceed-
ings. Van Dam v. Morris, 571 P.2d 1325 (Utah 
1977). 
Offense improperly alleged. 
In prosecution for rape of female under 18 
years of age, where defendant was given pre-
liminary examination on complaint charging 
rape had been committed on April 1, and infor-
mation charged rape on that date, but proof 
showed that female was then over 18 years of 
age, and state promptly introduced evidence of 
prior acts of intercourse before female became 
18, conviction could not be upheld since defen-
dant was not given benefit of preliminary ex-
amination for offense for which he was con-
victed. State v. Hoben, 36 Utah 186, 102 P. 
1000 (1909). 
Reasonableness of delay. 
Fact that information was not filed within 30 
days after defendant's commitment, did not en-
title defendant to discharge, where good cause 
for delay was shown. State v. Reynolds, 24 
Utah 29, 66 P. 614 (1901). 
Statutes not in conflict. 
There was no conflict between statutes pro-
viding for dismissal of and bar to further prose-
cutions against a sole defendant for misde-
meanors only and other statutes providing for 
dismissal of and bar to further prosecutions, 
whether felony or misdemeanor, against one of 
several joint defendants for purpose of allowing 
dismissed to be witness for the state. In re 
Petty, 18 Utah 2d 320, 422 P.2d 659 (1967). 
Subsequent prosecution. 
Where district court erroneously dismissed 
ordinance violation prosecution on appeal from 
city court but before arraignment and trial de 
novo in district court and that order of dismis-
sal was later reversed by the Supreme Court, 
subsequent prosecution of defendant in district 
court for the ordinance violation was not "any 
other prosecution" within the bar of this sec-
tion, it was merely the same prosecution which 
had never been begun de novo in the district 
court and thus was not barred. Boyer v. Lar-
son, 20 Utah 2d 121, 433 P.2d 1015 (1967). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal 
Law §§ 512 to 519; 21A Am. Jur. 2d Criminal 
Law §§ 859 to 875. 
C.J.S. — 22A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 468. 
A.L.R. — Construction and effect of statute 
authorizing dismissal of criminal action upon 
settlement of civil liability growing out of act 
charged, 42 A.L.R.3d 315. 
Propriety of court's dismissing indictment or 
prosecution because of failure of jury to agree 
after successive trials, 4 A.L.R.4th 1274. 
What constitutes "manifest necessity" for 
state prosecutor's dismissal of action, allowing 
subsequent trial despite jeopardy's having at-
tached, 14 A.L.R.4th 1014. 
Key Numbers. — Criminal Law «=> 574, 
576. 
Rule 26. Appeals. 
(1) An appeal is taken by filing with the clerk of the court from which the 
appeal is taken a notice of appeal, stating the order or judgment appealed 
from, and by serving a copy of it on the adverse party or his attorney of record. 
Proof of service of the copy shall be filed with the court. 
(2) An appeal may be taken by the defendant from: 
(a) the final judgment of conviction, whether by verdict or plea; 
(b) an order made, after judgment, affecting the substantial rights of 
the defendant; 
(c) an interlocutory order when, upon petition for review, the appellate 
court decides that the appeal would be in the interest of justice; or 
(d) any order of the court judging the defendant by reason of a mental 
disease or defect incompetent to proceed further in a pending prosecution. 
(3) An appeal may be taken by the prosecution from: 
(a) a final judgment of dismissal; 
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(b) an order arresting judgment; 
(c) an order terminating the prosecution because of a finding of double 
jeopardy or denial of a speedy trial; 
(d) a judgment of the court holding a statute or any part of it invalid; 
(e) an order of the court granting a pretrial motion to suppress evi-
dence when, upon a petition for review, the appellate court decides that 
the appeal would be in the interest of justice; or 
(f) an order of the court granting a motion to withdraw a plea of guilty 
or no contest. 
(4) (a) All appeals in criminal cases shall be taken within 30 days after the 
entry of the judgment appealed from, or, if a motion for a new trial or 
arrest of judgment is made, within 30 days after notice of the denial of the 
motion is given to the defendant or his counsel. Proof of {jiving notice 
shall be filed with the court. 
(b) An appeal may not be dismissed except for a material defect in 
taking it, or for failure to perfect the appeal, or upon motion of the appel-
lant. The dismissal of the appeal affirms the judgment unless another 
appeal may be, and is, timely taken. 
(5) Cases appealed in which the defendant is unable to post bond shall be 
given a preferred and expeditious setting in the appellate court. 
(6) Appeals may be submitted on briefs. If an appellant's brief is filed, the 
appeal shall be decided even though a party, upon notice of the hearing, fails 
to appear for oral argument. 
(7) The rules of civil procedure relating to appeals govern criminal appeals 
to the appellate court, except as otherwise provided. 
(8) (a) In appeals to the Supreme Court of capital cases where the sentence 
of death has been imposed, appellant briefs shall be filed within 60 days 
of the filing of the record on appeal. Respondent briefs shall be filed 
within 60 days of receipt of the appellant brief. All issues to be raised on 
appeal shall be included by each party in its appellate brief. Appellant 
reply briefs shall be filed within 30 days of receipt of the respondent's 
brief. 
(b) One 30-day extension of the 60-day filing period may be granted to 
each party, but only upon application to the Supreme Court showing 
extraordinary circumstances warranting an extension. 
(c) The Supreme Court shall schedule the oral arguments of the case to 
be heard not more than ten days after the date of filing of the final brief. 
Following oral arguments, the case shall be placed first on the Supreme 
Court's calendar, for expeditious determination. 
(9) After an initial appeal has been resolved, a subsequent appeal of a 
capital case where the sentence of death has been imposed may not be enter-
tained by any court, nor may a stay of execution of the sentence be granted, 
when the appeal does not raise any new matter not previously resolved or 
when new matter could have been raised at the previous appeal. 
(10) In capital cases where the sentence of death has been imposed and the 
defendant has chosen not to pursue his appeal, the case shall be automatically 
reviewed by the Supreme Court within 60 days after certification by the 
sentencing court of the entire record, unless the time is extended by the 
Supreme Court for good cause. A case involving the sentence of death has 
priority over all other cases in setting for hearing and in disposition by the 
Supreme Court. 
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(11) The rules of practice for the Court of Appeals and circuit courts made 
by the Judicial Council and approved by the Supreme Court relating to ap-
peals from circuit courts govern criminal as well as civil appeals. 
(12) An appeal may be taken to the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals, 
as is appropriate, from all final orders and judgments rendered in a district 
court or juvenile court under this rule. 
(13) An appeal may be taken to the circuit court from a judgment rendered 
in the justice court under this rule, except: 
(a) the case shall be tried anew in the circuit court. The decision of the 
circuit court is final, except when the validity or constitutionality of a 
statute or ordinance is raised in the justice court; 
(b) within 20 days after receipt of the notice of appeal, the justice court 
shall transmit to the circuit court a certified copy of the docket, the origi-
nal pleadings, all notices, motions, and other papers filed in the case, and 
the notice and undertaking on appeal; 
(c) stay of execution and relief pending appeal are under Rule 27, Utah 
Rules of Court Procedure; or 
(d) all further proceedings are in the circuit court, including any pro-
cess required to enforce judgment. 
(77-35-26, enacted by L. 1980, ch. 14, § 1; L. 1983, ch. 51, § 1; 1987, ch. 237, 
§ 1; 1989, ch. 65, § 3.) 
Amendment Notes. — The 1983 amend-
ment substituted "Rule 27" for "Rule 30" in 
Subsection (k)(3). 
The 1987 amendment rewrote this section, 
which formerly read as amended by Laws 
1983, ch. 51, § 1. 
The 1989 amendment, effective April 24, 
1989, added "whether by verdict or plea" to the 
end of Subsection (2)(a); deleted "or" from the 
end of Subsection (3)(d), added "or" to the end 
of Subsection (3)(e), and added Subsection 
(3)(f); substituted "may" for "can" in the second 
sentence of Subsection (4Kb); divided Subsec-
tions (6) and (13)(a) into two sentences by de-
leting "and"; divided Subsection (8) into Sub-
sections (8)(a) through (8)(c); substituted 
"made" for "promulgated" in Subsection (11); 
added "Utah Rules of Court Procedure; or" to 
the end of Subsection (13)(c); and made minor 
stylistic changes throughout the rule. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule governs ap-
peals from district, circuit, and juvenile courts. 
The practice and procedure for taking such ap-
peals, including the time in which the appeal is 
filed, is prescribed by the Rules of the Utah 
Supreme Court and the Rules of the Utah 
Court of Appeals. 
The reference in Subsection (13)(c) to the 
"Utah Rules of Court Procedure" is apparently 
intended as a reference to the Rules of Crimi-
nal Procedure. 
Cross-References. — Appeals from circuit 
court to district court, § 78-4-11. 
Appeals from justice's court to district court, 
§ 78-5-14. 
Appellate jurisdiction of district courts, Utah 
Const., Art. VHI, Sec. 5; § 78-3-4. 
Appellate jurisdiction of Supreme Court, 
Utah Const., Art. VIII, Sec. 3; § 78-2-2. 
Applicability of Rules of the Utah Supreme 
Court, Rule 1, R. Utah S. Ct. 
Dismissal if affidavit of impecuniosity is 
untrue, § 21-7-7. 
A Judicial Council, Utah Const., Art. VIII, 
Sec. 12. 
Right of defendant to appeal, Utah Const., 
Art. I, Sec. 12; § 77-1-6. 
Right of indigent accused to counsel on ap-
peal, § 77-32-1 et seq. 
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cretion in refusing to allow a change of venue 
State v Smith, 11 Utah 2d 287, 358 P 2d 342 
(1961) 
A bare allegation of prejudice in the county 
is patently inadequate to justify a change of 
venue. State v Wood, 648 P 2d 71 (2d case) 
(Utah), cert denied, 459 U S 988, 103 S Ct 
341, 74 L Ed 2d 383 (1982) 
Defendant failed in his burden of proving 
that a fair and impartial trial could not be had 
in the county where the action was tried, and 
was therefore not entitled to a change of venue, 
where his motion for a change of venue was 
supported only by his counsel's affidavit to 
which was attached a single newspaper article 
reporting the victim's father's gratitude for the 
manner in which victim's family had been 
taken care of by local authorities, and which 
reported a short and accurate account of a few 
of the basic facts of crime, including the names 
of the two persons who had been charged, such 
supporting evidence was a mere allegation of 
prejudice in the county and was not adequate 
to justify a change of venue State v Wood, 648 
P2d 71 (2d case), cert denied, 459 U S 988, 
103 S Ct 341, 74 L Ed 2d 383 (1982) 
Motion for a change of venue and the docu-
ments supporting the motion failed to show 
that the community atmosphere was suffi-
ciently inflammatory that the jurors' assur-
ances of impartiality should have been disre-
garded, even though some of the jurors had ex-
pressed an opinion that defendant was guilty 
State v Lafferty, 749 P 2d 1239 (Utah 1988) 
Defendant was not entitled to a change of 
venue where pretrial publicity and community 
sentiment was not so prejudicial as to lead in-
evitably to an unfair trial, to prevail on appeal, 
defendant must demonstrate that the trial was 
not fundamentally fair State v Bishop, 753 
P 2d 439 (Utah 1988) 
Factors to be considered in determining the 
potential for prejudice from pretrial publicity 
include (1) the standing of the victim and the 
accused in the community, (2) the size of the 
community, (3) the nature and gravity of the 
offense, and (4) the nature and extent of public-
ity State v James, 99 Utah Adv Rep 14 
(1989) 
Disqualification of judge. 
A judge should recuse himself where there is 
a colorable claim of bias or prejudice, even un-
der such circumstances, however, absent a 
showing of actual bias or an abuse of discre-
tion, failure to recuse does not constitute re-
versible error as long as the requirements of 
this rule are met State v Neeley, 748 P 2d 
1091 (Utah 1988) 
A judge who has had previous contact with a 
defendant on a totally unrelated matter is not 
per se disqualified State v Neeley, 748 P 2d 
1091 (Utah 1988) 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 21 Am Jur 2d Criminal 
Law § 372 et seq 
C.J.S. — 22 C J S Criminal Law §§ 186 to 
222. 
A.L.R. — Pretrial publicity in criminal case 
as ground for change of venue, 33 A L R 3d 17 
Change of venue by state in criminal case, 
46 A L R 3d 295 
Adequacy of defense counsel's representation 
of criminal client regarding venue and recusa-
tion matters, 7 A L R 4th 942 
Disqualification of judge because of political 
association or relation to attorney in case, 65 
A L R 4th 73 
Key Numbers. — Criminal Law <s» 115 to 
145 
Rule 30. Errors and defects, 
(a) Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect the 
substantial rights of a party shall be disregarded 
(b) Clerical mistakes m judgments, orders or other parts of the record and 
errors in the record arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by 
the court at any time and after such notice, if any, as the court may order. 
(77-35-30, enacted by L. 1980, ch. 14, § 1) 
Cross-References. — Arraignment, neces-
sity of objection to preserve error, § 77-35-10 
Indictments and informations, harmless 
errors, § 77-35-4 
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Gun control laws, validity and construc-
tion of, 28 A. L. R. 3d 845. 
Law Reviews. 
The Constitutional Right to Keep and 
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of 
process of law. 
Comparable Provision. 
Montana Const., Art. I l l , § 27. 
Cross-Reference. 
Eminent domain generally, 78-34-1 et 
seq. 
In general. 
"Due process of law" comes to us from 
the Great Charter and is synonymous with 
"law of the land." It means that a party 
shall have his day in court—trial. Jensen 
v. Union Pac. Ry. Co., 6 U. 253, 21 P. 994, 
4 L. R. A. 724. 
Due process of law is not necessarily 
judicial process. People v. Hasbrouck, 11 
U. 291, 39 P. 918. 
Judgment against defendant, not served 
with process and not appearing either in 
person or by attorney, would not be due 
process of law. Blyth & Fargo Co. v. 
Swenson, 15 U. 345, 49 P. 1027. 
It is elementary that there can be no 
judicial action affecting vested rights that 
is not based upon some process or notice 
whereby the interested parties are brought 
within the jurisdiction of the judicial 
tribunal about to render judgment. Parry 
v. Bonneville Irr. Dist., 71 U. 202, 263 P. 
751. 
"Due process of law" requires that, be-
fore one can be bound by a judgment 
affecting his property rights, some process 
must be served upon him which in some 
degree at least is calculated to give him 
notice. Naisbitt v. Herrick, 76 U. 575, 
290 P. 950. 
Due process of law requires that notice 
be given to the persons whose rights are 
to be affected. It hears before it con-
demns, proceeds upon inquiry, and renders 
judgment only after trial. Biggins v. Dis-
trict Court of Salt Lake County, 89 U. 
183, 51 P. 2d 645. 
The phrase "due process of law" appar-
ently originated with Lord Coke, who de-
nned the terms. Many attempts have been 
made to further define due process of law, 
but all of them resolve into the thought 
that a party shall have his day in court. 
Christiansen v. Harris, 109 U. 1, 163 P. 
2d 314. 
In depriving a person of life or lib-
erty, the essentials of due process are: 
(a) the existence of a competent person, 
Bear Arms, Lucilius A. Emery, 28 Harv. 
L. Rev. 473. 
Restrictions on the Right To Bear Arms 
—State and Federal Firearms Legislation, 
98 U. Pa. L. Rev. 905. 
life, liberty or property, without due 
body, or agency authorized by law to de-
termine the questions; (b) an inquiry 
into the merits of the question by such 
person, body or agency; (c) notice to the 
person of the inauguration and purpose 
of the inquiry and the time at which 
such person should appear if he wishes 
to be heard; (d) right to appear in per-
son or by counsel; (e) fair opportunity 
to submit evidence, examine and cross-
examine witnesses; (f) judgment to be 
rendered upon the record thus made. In 
the absence of statute laying down other 
or more specific requirements, the above 
conditions meet the demands of due 
process. In the absence of specific pro-
visions to the contrary, due process does 
not require that any or all of these 
requirements must be in writing or in 
any particular form. In the interests of 
orderly procedure and certainty as to its 
proceedings and action taken, any legally 
constituted body or agency should as far 
as practical have written records of all 
proceedings before it, except where other-
wise provided by law. Christiansen v. 
Harris, 109 U. 1, 163 P. 2d 314. 
In the trial of criminal cases the stat-
utes prescribe certain rules of procedure, 
which must be substantially complied with 
to keep the proceedings within the due 
processes of the law. A somewhat dif-
ferent set of rules is prescribed in civil 
cases and in special proceedings. Some 
rules, affecting all types, are not found in 
the statutes, but in that great basic body 
of the law commonly known as the deci-
sions or rules of the courts. But all these 
methods and means provided for the pro-
tection and enforcement of human rights 
have the same basic requirements—that 
no party can be affected by such action, 
until his legal rights have been the sub-
ject of an inquiry by a person or body 
authorized by law to determine such 
rights, of which inquiry the party has due 
notice, and at which he had an opportu-
nity to be heard and to give evidence as 
to his rights or defenses. Christiansen v. 
Harris, 109 U. 1, 163 P. 2d 314. 
While normally we think of "due proc-
ess of law" as requiring judicial action, 
yet "due process" is not necessarily judi-
cial action. Christiansen v. Harris, 109 
U. 1, 163 P. 2d 314. 
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Land Registration Act. 
The Torrens Act was not unconstitu-
tional as conferring judicial powers on 
registrar of titles. Ashton-Jenkins Co. v. 
Bramel, 56 U. 587, 192 P. 375, 11 A. L. E. 
752. 
Limitation of actions. 
This section does not preclude the legis-
lature from prescribing a statute of limi-
tations for time within which to assail 
the regularity or organization of an irri-
gation district. Horn v. Shaffer, 47 U. 55, 
151 P. 555. 
Occupational disease law. 
Occupational Disease Disability Law, in 
excluding compensation for partial disa-
bility from silicosis, and in rendering 
remedy under that act exclusive so as to 
abrogate common-law right of action 
therefor, is not unconstitutional as depriv-
ing such employee of his remedy by due 
course of law for injury done to his per-
son. Masich v. United States Smelting, 
Ret & Min. Co., 113 U. 101, 191 P. 2d 612. 
Waiver of rights. 
Right to apply to courts for redress of 
wrong is substantial right, and will not 
be waived by contract except through 
unequivocal language. Bracken v. Dahle, 
68 U. 486, 251 P. 16. 
Workmen's compensation law. 
Employers are entitled to have recourse 
to courts under Workmen's Compensation 
Act concerning question of their ultimate 
liability. Industrial Comm. v. Evans, 52 
U. 394, 174 P. 825. 
Workmen's Compensation Act is not in-
valid because it delegates to industrial 
commission the power to hear, consider 
and determine controversies between liti-
gants as to ultimate liability, or their 
property rights. Utah Fuel Coe v. Indus-
trial Comm., 57 U. 246, 194 P. 122. 
Dependents of employee killed by acts 
of third party, a stranger to employment, 
are not limited to recovery under Work-
men's Compensation Act exclusively, un-
less they have assigned their rights to 
insurance carrier. Robinson v. Union Pac. 
R. Co., 70 U. 441, 261 P. 9. 
Collateral References. 
Constitutional Law<§=>322, 324, 327, 328. 
16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law §§ 709, 711, 
714, 719. 
16 Am. Jur. 2d 718-721, Constitutional 
Law §§ 382-385. 
Law Reviews. 
The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens, 
Edward L. Barrett, Jr., 35 Calif. L. Rev. 
380. 
The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens 
in Anglo-American Law, Paxton Blair, 29 
Colum. L. Rev. 1. 
No-Fault Automobile Insurance in Utah 
—State Constitutional Issues, 1970 Utah 
L. Rev. 248. 
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear 
and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of 
the accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own 
behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compul-
sory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, 
to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or dis-
trict in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, and the 
right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any accused person, 
before final judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to secure 
the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to 
give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify 
against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any person 
be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
Comparable Provision. —acquittal notwithstanding defect in in-
Montana Const., Art. I l l , § 16. formation or indictment, 77-24-12. 
—acquittal or dismissal without judg-
Cross-References. ment, 77-24-11. 
Defendant as witness, 77-44-5. —acts punishable in different ways, 
Double jeopardy, statutory provision, punishment limited to one, 76-1-23. 
77-1-10. 
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Sec. 23. [Irrevocable franchises forbidden.] 
No law shall be passed granting 
or immunity. 
Comparable Provision, 
Montana Const., Art. I l l , § 11. 
Alcoholic beverages. 
Former Liquor Control Act held not un-
constitutional as violative of this section. 
Utah Manufacturers' Assn. v. Stewart, 
82 U. 198, 23 P. 2d 229. 
State legislature was acting within its 
power in enacting Liquor Control Act, 
which in effect revoked previously granted 
license authorizing the sale of light beer. 
Eiggins v. District Court of Salt Lake 
County, 89 U. 183, 51 P. 2d 645. 
Pioneer Memorial Building. 
Act pertaining to leasing of portion of 
state capitol grounds to Daughters of 
Utah Pioneers for erection and mainte-
nance of Pioneer Memorial Building, and 
amendments thereto making appropria-
tions therefor, as well as appropriation of 
irrevocably any franchise, privilege 
$150,000 for that building, were not vio-
lative of this section. Thomas v. Daugh-
ters of Utah Pioneers, 114 U. 108, 197 
P. 2d 477, appeal dismissed for want of a 
properly presented substantial federal 
question, 336 U. S. 930, 93 L. Ed. 1090, 
69 S. Ct. 739. 
Collateral References. 
Franchises<§=>ll. 
37 C.J.S. Franchises § 26. 
36 Am. Jur. 2d 733-745, Franchises 
§§9-23. 
Competition by grantor of nonexclusive 
franchise, or provision therefor, as viola-
tion of constitutional rights of franchise 
holder, 114 A. L. R. 192. 
Inclusion of different franchise rights 
or purposes in same ordinance, 127 A. L. 
R. 1049. 
Sec. 24. [Uniform operation of laws.] 
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation. 
Cross-Reference. 
Prohibition on private or special laws, 
Const., Art. VI, §26. 
In general. 
All laws shall operate uniformly wher-
ever uniform laws can be enacted. State 
v. Holtgreve, 58 U. 563, 200 P. 894, 26 
A. L. R. 696. 
Objects and purposes of law present 
touchstone for determining proper and 
improper classifications. State v. Mason, 
94 U. 501, 78 P. 2d 920, 117 A. L. R. 330; 
State v. J. B. & R. E. Walker, Inc., 100 
U. 523, 116 P. 2d 766. 
One who assails legislative classifica-
tion as arbitrary has burden of proving 
it to be such. State v. J. B. & R. E. Walk-
er, Inc., 100 U. 523, 116 P. 2d 766. 
Classification is never unreasonable or 
arbitrary in its inclusion or exclusion 
features so long as there is some basis for 
differentiation between classes or subject 
matters included, as compared to those 
excluded, provided differentiation bears 
reasonable relation to purposes of act. 
State v. J. B. & R. E. Walker, Inc., 100 
U. 523, 116 P. 2d 766. 
Before legislative enactment can be in-
terfered with, court must be able to say 
that there is no fair reason for the law 
that would not require equally its exten-
sion to those which it leaves untouched. 
State v. J. B. & R. E. Walker, Inc., 100 
U. 523, 116 P. 2d 766. 
Only where some persons or transac-
tions excluded from operation of law are, 
as to the subject matter of the law, in 
no differentiable class from those in-
cluded in its operation, is the law 
discriminatory in the sense of being arbi-
trary and unconstitutional, and if reason-
able basis to differentiate can be found, 
law must be held constitutional. State v. 
J. B. & R. E. Walker, Inc., 100 U. 523, 116 
P. 2d 766. 
Inability of legislature to make perfect 
classification does not render statute un-
constitutional. State v. J. B. & R. E. 
Walker, Inc., 100 U. 523, 116 P. 2d 766. 
In determining whether classification 
made by legislature is unconstitutional, 
discrimination is very essence of classi-
fication and is not objectionable unless 
founded upon unreasonable distinctions. 
Gronlund v. Salt Lake City, 113 U. 284, 
194 P. 2d 464. 
An act is never unconstitutional be-
cause of discrimination as long as there is 
some reasonable basis for differentiation 
between classes which is related to the 
purposes to be accomplished by the act, 
and it applies uniformly to all persons 
within the class. Hansen v. Public Em-
ployees' Retirement System Board of Ad-
ministration, 122 U. 44, 246 P. 2d 591. 
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practice law and the conduct and discipline of persons admitted to practice 
law. 
Repeals and Reenactments. — See the 
Compiler's Note following the analysis at the 
beginning of this article Former Article VIE 
contains no comparable provisions. 
Cross-References. — Supreme Court rule-
making process, Rule 11-101, Code of Judicial 
Administration. 
Cited in Stewart v Coffman, 748 P.2d 579 
(Utah Ct. App 1988). 
DECISIONS UNDER FORMER PROVISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Judge pro tempore 
Regulation of practice of law. 
Judge pro tempore. 
Appointment of a judge pro tempore to hear 
and decide a divorce action does not violate the 
provisions of § 30-3-4, since a properly ap-
pointed pro tempore judge becomes the equal 
in every respect to the regular judge Harward 
v Harward, 526 P2d 1183 (Utah 1974). 
Circuit judge appointed by state court ad-
ministrator to serve temporarily as a district 
judge pursuant to § 78-3-24 and former 
§ 78-4-15 was not a judge pro tempore and was 
not subject to the legal restrictions pertaining 
to that status. Cahoon v Cahoon, 641 P 2d 140 
(Utah 1982) 
Regulation of practice of law. 
Inherent in the judicial power conferred on 
the Supreme Court by former Article VIII, sec 
1, of the Utah Constitution is the power to reg-
ulate the practice of law In re Utah State Bar 
Petition, 647 P 2d 991 (Utah 1982). 
Sec. 5. [Jurisdiction of district court and other courts — 
Right of appeal.] 
The district court shall have original jurisdiction in all matters except as 
limited by this constitution or by statute, and power to issue all extraordinary 
writs. The district court shall have appellate jurisdiction as provided by stat-
ute. The jurisdiction of all other courts, both original and appellate, shall be 
provided by statute. Except for matters filed originally with the supreme 
court, there shall be in all cases an appeal of right from the court of original 
jurisdiction to a court with appellate jurisdiction over the cause. 
Repeals and Reenactments. — See the 
Compiler's Note following the analysis at the 
beginning of this article See former Art VIII, 
Secb 7, 8 and 9 in the bound volume for the 
former provisions comparable to this section 
ANALYSIS 
Summary appellate disposition. 
Cited 
Summary appellate disposition. 
Summary affirmance under Rule 10, Ct. 
App. R., is a determination of the appeal on its 
merits, after a full and adequate opportunity 
has been afforded all parties to present their 
arguments, and does not deny an appellant his 
right of appeal Hernandez v Hayward, 764 
P2d 993 (Utah Ct App 1988) 
Cited in Heninger v Ninth Circuit Court, 
739 P2d 1108 (Utah (1987), DeBry v Salt 
Lake County Bd of Appeals, 764 P 2d 627 
(Utah Ct App 1988) 
A.L.R. — Place where claim or cause of ac-
tion "arose" under state venue statute, 53 
A.LR.4th 1104 
DECISIONS UNDER FORMER PROVISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Appeal to Supreme Court by the state in crimi-
nal cases. 
Appeal to Supreme Court where case origi-
nated in circuit court. 
Appeal to Supreme Court where case origi-
nated in justice or city court. 





CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
AMENDMENT I 
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, 
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of 
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, 
and to petition the government for a redress of grievances. 
AMENDMENT II 
A well-regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free 
State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed. 
AMENDMENT i n 
No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without 
the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be 
prescribed by law. 
AMENDMENT IV 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to 
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
AMENDMENT V 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous 
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except 
in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in 
actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person 
be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; 
nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process 
of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation. 
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AMENDMENT XIV 
Section 1. 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State 
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which 
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; 
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws. 
Section 2. 
Bepresentatives shall be apportioned among the several States accord-
ing to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons 
in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote 
at any election for the choice of electors for President and Vice-President 
of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and 
Judicial OflScers of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is 
denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years 
of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except 
for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation 
therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male 
citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years 
of age in such State. 
Section 3. 
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector 
of President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under 
the United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken 
an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, 
or as a member of any State legislature or as an executive or judicial 
officer of any State, to support the Constitution of the United States, 
shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given 
aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-
thirds of each House, remove such disability. 
Section 4. 
The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by 
law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for 
services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. 
But neither the United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt 
or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the 
United States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; 
but all such debts, obligations, and claims shall be held illegal and void. 
Section 5. 
The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, 
the provisions of this article. 
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